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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I examine the diffusion process for a complex medical technology, the 
PET scanner, in two different health care systems, one of which is more market-
oriented (Switzerland) and the other more centrally managed by a public agency 
(Quebec). The research draws on institutional and socio-political theories of the 
diffusion of innovations to examine how institutional contexts affect processes of 
diffusion. I find that diffusion proceeds more rapidly in Switzerland than in Quebec, 
but that processes in both jurisdictions are characterized by intense struggles among 
providers and between providers and public agencies. I show that the institutional 
environment influences these processes by determining the patterns of material 
resources and authority available to actors in their struggles to strategically control the 
technology, and by constituting the discursive resources or institutional logics on 
which actors may legitimately draw in their struggles to give meaning to the 
technology in line with their interests and values. This thesis illustrates how 
institutional structures and meanings manifest themselves in the context of specific 
decisions within an organizational field, and reveals the ways in which governance 
structures may be contested and realigned when they conflict with interests that are 
legitimized by dominant institutional logics. It is argued that this form of contestation 
and readjustment at the margins constitutes one mechanism by which institutional 
frameworks are tested, stretched and reproduced or redefined. 
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1 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although there is a vast literature on the subject of the diffusion of innovation 
(Rogers 2003; Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005; Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005) and 
although institutional theory has frequently been mobilized to explain the diffusion of 
managerial innovations and ideas (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Abrahamson 1991), there is surprisingly little work on 
the specific role that institutionalized structures and meaning systems may play in the 
process of diffusion of technological artifacts. 
In this thesis, I address this issue by examining the diffusion process for a complex 
medical technology – positron emission tomography, or the PET scanner – in two 
institutional contexts, one of which is more market-oriented (Switzerland) and the 
other more centrally managed by a public agency (Quebec). Due to their structural 
similarities and differences, this comparison allows the role of the institutional 
environment in the diffusion process to be examined by maintaining the object of 
diffusion constant. The PET scanner is a particularly interesting technology for this 
study because it is complex, extremely expensive and was, initially at least, quite 
controversial, creating excitement in the medical community while engaging health 
care regulators in efforts to control its diffusion. Indeed, the PET scanner has all the 
characteristics of what I have called a bandwagon technology where the pressure to adopt 
would be intense. It is thus likely to engage multiple actors within the organizational 
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field, providing an ideal case to address my key research question: How does the 
nature of the institutional environment influence the process of adoption of advanced 
technology within an institutional field? 
Because they have multiple ramifications at economic, clinical, organizational and 
institutional levels (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994; Gelijns, Brown et al. 2005), many 
health-care innovations are complex. This particularity may render innovation hard to 
diffuse (Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002; Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005). Indeed, the 
adoption of complex technology in health care is rarely an individual choice, but 
involves an array of stakeholders with different values, interests and interpretative 
schemes whose motives, roles and scope for action with regard to any particular 
innovation are structured at least in part by the institutional environment in which 
they evolve.  
While there has been concern that some health care innovations have been adopted 
too slowly (Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002; Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005), there is 
evidence that others have over-diffused, resulting in excessive health care costs (Foote 
1992). This phenomenon tends to occur for capital-intensive technologies (e.g., CT 
scans, magnetic resonance imaging, PET scanner) which are attractive to health care 
providers because of their prestige and potential economic and/or clinical benefits. 
The resulting quality competition, so-called medical arms race, is fuelled by a perception 
that early acquisition will provide competitive advantage by enhancing the reputation 
of the provider, as well as by capturing scarce resources such as patients, specialized 
doctors, and budgets to operate the technology. Moreover, to recoup the acquisition 
cost of capital-intensive technologies, supplier-induced demand may further enhance 
the overuse of the technology (James, Perry et al. 1991; Foote 1992).  
Nonetheless, health care systems are highly regulated and institutionalized. Regulatory 
agencies, insurers and professions can intervene in an attempt to influence, control or 
manage the diffusion of costly innovations (Foote 1992). More generally, the 
particular institutional arrangements surrounding the health care systems of different 
countries or jurisdictions may structure adoption decisions in different ways through 
their influence on rules, on incentives and on local values and norms (Scott, Ruef et al. 
2000; Alexander and D'Aunno 2003). While previous economic studies have 
suggested that more competitive environments tend to speed up diffusion (Rapoport 
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1978; Vogt, Bhattacharya et al. 1995)1, there have been few comparative studies which 
have attempted to trace out in detail the processes of diffusion in different 
jurisdictions in order to examine how different contexts influence understanding of 
the technology and the patterns of adoption and diffusion over time. 
This research mainly draws on the institutional and socio-political theories of the 
diffusion of innovations. While the former is relevant to my initial research question 
for its extensive treatment of institutional environments, the latter is particularly 
important for understanding the motivations for adoption within different 
institutional contexts. Combining these perspectives, institutional arrangements in 
each jurisdiction are viewed as structuring patterns of power, interests and values 
which will influence technology adoption in interaction with the characteristics of the 
technology itself (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002).  
Since my inquiry is context-sensitive and involves investigating processes evolving 
over time, a comparative longitudinal case study is indicated (Yin 2003). Data was 
collected through 88 semi-structured interviews and through the analysis of internal 
and public documents. Each individual adoption or attempt at adoption in both 
Quebec and Switzerland was documented and analyzed in terms of three categories: 
the rationales used by adopters, their actions and their results. Visual mapping 
strategies as well as matrix displays (Miles and Huberman 1994) were used to 
synthesize the data (Langley 1999) and to compare the evolution of the processes 
across the two jurisdictions.  
Findings. Based on the comparative longitudinal case study, I found that the processes 
of diffusion of the PET scanner in both Switzerland and Quebec were characterized 
by struggles between providers (horizontal struggles) and between providers and 
public authorities (vertical struggles) as providers pushed to acquire the technology 
faster than their rivals. These struggles manifested themselves in two distinct but 
interacting forms of action. First, they involved what I call struggles for control in which 
actors strategically mobilized power in the form of material resources and authority to 
orient adoption decisions according to their particular interests. At the same time, they 
also involved what I call struggles for meaning in which actors engaged in competing 
arguments or theorizations concerning what the technology is, how and why it should 
be used and who might legitimately acquire it. I show that the institutional 
environment influences these processes by determining the patterns of material 
                                                     
1 This is the same reference as: Vogt, W. B., Bhattacharya, J., Kupor, S., Yoshikama, A., & Nakahara, T. 1995. The role 
of diagnostic technology in competition among Japanese hospitals. International Journal of Technology Management 
(Special Issue 1): 93-105. 
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resources and authority available to actors in their struggles for control, and by 
constituting the discursive resources or institutional logics on which actors may 
legitimately draw in their struggles for meaning.  
My results also suggest that the fragmentation of the governance structure provides 
more opportunities for actors to influence decisions in ways that correspond to their 
interests than more coherent systems, at least in the short term. Fragmentation is 
defined as the lack of unity and coherence of the health care system, and is related in 
this thesis to the existence of public and private regimes and of two distinct 
governmental levels (federal and cantonal). It seems that while the number of PET 
scanners diffused is higher under the more fragmented governance structure, 
efficiency in the use of the technology is lower. Furthermore, the number of 
institutional actors also influences the intensity of struggles because each of these 
strives for the same set of limited resources.  
I further show how institutional governance structures may be contested and realigned 
when they conflict with interests that are legitimized by dominant institutional logics. I 
suggest that this form of contestation, that I call institution testing, and adjustment 
constitute one mechanism by which institutional frameworks are stretched and 
reproduced or redefined. Finally, this study suggests that in order for institution 
testing to be successful, the normative legitimacy of the technology must outweigh the 
normative legitimacy of the regulation that hinders its diffusion. 
Theoretical Contributions. These results make four contributions to the field of 
institutional theory and to knowledge about the diffusion of innovations. First, 
although scholars recognize the powerful effect of the institutional environment on 
the diffusion of innovations (Abrahamson 1991; Strang and Meyer 1993; Gelijns and 
Rosenberg 1994; Arndt 1995; Christensen, Bohmer et al. 2000; Rosenau 2000; 
Cetindamar 2001; Hutchison, Abelson et al. 2001; Gelijns, Brown et al. 2005) and 
despite a vast literature investigating the role of regulations and incentives on 
technological change (McClellan and Kessler 2002) or the outcome of diffusion 
(Rogers 2003; Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2004), to my knowledge there is little work 
that scrutinizes further the process of diffusion and its interaction with the 
institutional environment. By documenting the struggles for control and the struggles 
for meaning, this thesis makes a detailed comparative analysis of the diffusion process 
of technological innovations. Since few studies have attempted to document how 
different institutional environments affect meaning-creation of technology and the 
patterns of adoption and diffusion over time, this constitutes an important empirical 
contribution to the literature. 
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Second, by showing how institutional logics are mobilized in competing theorizations 
and how these logics may be differentially interpreted according to actors’ interests, 
this thesis shows that the iron cage which constrains an actor’s rhetorical repertoire is 
composed of a given limited set of elements i.e. institutional logics that actors can 
actually mobilize in their struggles for meaning. By instrumentally selecting 
institutional logics which best suit their interests and values, actors gain legitimacy for 
their claims and provide legitimacy to the artifact. This instrumentalization of 
institutional logics shows that actors are aware, knowledgeable and active agents who 
have a deep understanding of institutions and know how to manipulate them. While 
many studies in the tradition of institutional theory have exploited the constraining 
nature of institutions (see Scott 2008), I answer the call of scholars for more studies 
on how institutions can be enabling (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Furthermore, by 
focusing on the socio-political dimension of the diffusion of innovation, this study 
incorporates politics and interest into institutional dynamics as called for by DiMaggio 
(1988) and Oliver (1991). This thesis also shows that theorization can legitimize both 
would-be adopters and the technology by grounding them in institutional logics. This 
provides an explicit analysis of legitimation which are still considered to be scarce 
(Suchman 1995; Vaara, Tienari et al. 2006).  
Third, institutional maintenance is highly relevant for institutional theory and was 
neglected by scholars until recently (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Zilber 2008). My 
work suggests that institution testing, a form of contestation, with readjustment at the 
margins of governance structure constitutes one mechanism that maintains 
institutions. My results also show how institution testing might eventually challenge 
institutional frameworks and even disrupt them. At the same time, they illustrate the 
reciprocal role of institutionalized governance structures in constituting the political 
context within which meanings are mobilized (Scott 2008). I further show that 
institution testing is successful when the normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy 
of the position defended is grounded in dominant institutional logics and is higher 
than the legitimacy of a regulation.  
Fourth, while several authors have discussed the coexistence of multiple institutional 
logics (e.g., Friedland and Alford 1991; Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Zilber 2006), to 
my knowledge this study constitute the first to document their impact on the diffusion 
of a medical technology.  
Besides theoretical contributions, this thesis may have practical implications. 
Technological change is believed to account for more than 50% of increasing medical 
expenditures (Newhouse 1992), which makes it a major cost-driver in the health care 
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sector (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994; Fuchs 1996; McClellan and Kessler 2002; Cutler 
and Huckman 2003). Given that rising expenditures in health care is putting increasing 
financial pressure on governments, better policies need to be designed in order to 
make better use of resources and to allocate these equitably. For example, instead of 
using a top-down approach, government can call for proposals and evaluate which 
hospital should have the technology; extends regulations to both private and public 
sectors; decrease the fragmentation of the decision-making system; and apply 
sanctions. Clearly, understanding the diffusion process of innovations in health care is 
important for policy makers, governments, and all citizens.  
Structure of the Chapters. The organization of the chapters closely follows 
recommendations by Eisenhardt (1989) on the case study approach to research. After 
defining the questions, researchers must become acquainted with the relevant 
literature. Accordingly, chapter II presents four theoretical perspectives which provide 
an overview of knowledge about the diffusion of innovations. The economics, 
evidence-based medicine, institutional theory, relational-network and the socio-
political literatures are reviewed because they offer potential for unraveling 
fundamental concepts and associations between the institutional environment and the 
diffusion of innovations. Then, drawing more specifically on two selected bodies of 
literature, I present the conceptual model which I used as a guideline for collecting 
data.  
Chapter III provides an overview of the research contexts which are the health care 
systems of Quebec and Switzerland, and explains why such a comparison is relevant 
for my research questions. I then detail the comparative qualitative approach used to 
answer the initial research question which is: “How does the institutional environment 
affect the diffusion of innovations?” Data was organized using visual mapping 
(Langley 1999) and matrix displays in order to explore, analyze and display results 
(Miles and Huberman 1994).  
This is followed, in chapter IV, by a chronological presentation of the two cases, 
drawing particular attention to the struggles inherent in the diffusion process and to 
the institutional logics mobilized by actors as they interpret the role of the technology, 
as well as to how actors challenge existing institutions. To preserve the anonymity of 
participants and organizations involved in this research, all names of individuals and 
organizations were removed from the narratives as were the positions of interviewees. 
The presentation of each case study is followed by a synthetic within-case analysis. 
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In chapter V, a detailed comparative analysis of the two cases leads to a series of six 
propositions for further research. Finally, some discussions of the implications of this 
study for the understanding of institutions and the diffusion of innovations constitute 
the heart of chapter VI. Limitations, directions for future research and practical 
implications, as well as a general conclusion close this chapter. 
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2 CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The diffusion of innovations has been the object of many research traditions and 
there have many attempts to review and classify these literatures (Damanpour 1991; 
Wolfe 1994; Rogers 2003; Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005). In order to have a better 
understanding of how the institutional environment may influence the diffusion of 
innovations, I selected four traditions which appeared to offer the highest potential to 
explain and provide me with an overview of this phenomenon.  
Assuming the rationality of actors, the economic perspective is reviewed here because 
it is concerned with the role of incentives and regulations in the environment, and 
with the impact of competition on the diffusion processes. This approach is 
contrasted with the relational-network approach which argues that diffusion is 
ensured neither by rational information nor by benefits per se; but arises through the 
influence of interpersonal communication and the social network. In turn, this 
approach is criticized by the neo-institutional standpoint which suggests that there are 
forces in the environment that colour the content of interpersonal communications. 
Consequently, this perspective extends the conception of the institutional 
environment beyond regulations by considering how norms and cultural-cognitive 
elements affect the diffusion of innovations. The socio-political view focus more 
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specifically on the motivation to adopt an innovation to consider that adoption is a 
matter of congruence between, on the one hand, values, interests and power 
distribution of the adopting system, and on the other hand, the risks and benefits of 
an innovation in an environment composed of various adopters having different 
interests, values and power. 
Thus, the first part of this chapter provides an overview of these four complementary 
theoretical perspectives. Then, the four perspectives are mobilized to establish the 
conceptual framework which forms the backdrop of the analysis of the case studies 
and the guidelines for data collection.  
2.1 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1.1 THE RATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
The rational-economic perspective assumes that organizational actors will adopt 
innovations based on the best choice, under prevailing context, which help them 
achieve their objectives. As such, actors try to maximize their benefits and minimize 
their costs by comparing different course of action. For some proponents of this 
approach, competition is assumed to be a mechanism that would insure a rational 
diffusion of innovation i.e., innovations bringing clear benefits are going to be chosen 
by organizations. A contrasting view is taken by other economists who examine how 
to overcome market failure through the enforcement of regulations and the use of 
financial incentives to orient organizations according to policy objectives. The 
following section reviews the role of competition between health care providers in the 
diffusion of innovation and strives to shed light on the impact of regulatory 
mechanisms and financial incentives on the diffusion of innovations. Besides 
reviewing economic theories, this section briefly presents the evidence-based medicine 
movement, a rational perspective which assumes that availability of information and 
knowledge may change actor behaviours.  
2.1.1.1 The Economic View – A Logic of Incentives 
Competition is believed to be a powerful force moulding the diffusion of innovations 
(Schumpeter 1944; Nelson, Peck et al. 1967; Rapoport 1978; Christensen, Bohmer et 
al. 2000). Schumpeter (1944) was the first to propose that competition is the 
fundamental motor of innovation understood as invention, and that it increases with 
market concentration. This hypothesis has been under relentless scrutiny ever since, 
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but studies have shown inconclusive results (Cohen and Levin 1989). However, 
Schumpeter's idea that competition stimulates innovation has been taken up by 
scholars and applied to the health care industry in relation not to invention, but to the 
diffusion of existing innovations. In this respect, most of the studies in this sector 
support the hypothesis that a competitive environment increases the speed of 
diffusion of innovation.  
It must be noted that competition takes on a particular form in this sector; because of 
third-party payer mechanisms and universal coverage, hospitals do not always 
compete on price to attract patients but on quality and status which are measured by 
having highly specialized equipment and personnel, and by offering a wide range of 
services. Consequently, the better equipped a hospital is, the easier it is to attract and 
retain good quality physicians, and ultimately to admit more patients (Lee 1971). This 
non-price competitive mechanism, which tends to increase the diffusion of 
innovation, has been empirically corroborated by various studies for diagnostic 
devices (Rapoport 1978; Hillman, Neu et al. 1987; Vogt, Bhattacharya et al. 1995; 
Chou, Liu et al. 2004) and for services such as 24-hour emergency care and cardiac 
catheterization (Luft, Robinson et al. 1986). Also, the supply of specialized services 
has been found to be more intensive and duplicative in competitive settings in order 
to attract physicians and patients (Robinson, Garnick et al. 1987; Dranove, Shanley et 
al. 1992; Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000), a phenomenon known as the "medical 
arms race" (Foote 1992). In general, scholars agree that services increasing patient 
admissions are more likely to diffuse widely (Luft, Robinson et al. 1986).  
Intraspeciality rivalry as a special form of competition has also been viewed as 
increasing the speed of diffusion. For example, the rapid diffusion of laparascopic 
cholecystectomy has been attributed to competition among surgeons (Escarce, Bloom 
et al. 1995; Denis, Hébert et al. 2002). In this case, surgeons compete to stay in the 
cholecystectomy market. Interspeciality rivalry has also been identified as a force 
increasing the diffusion of innovations for the treatment of angina pectoris and 
gallstones to capture patients who would otherwise be treated by other specialists 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994).  
If competition is believed to be a powerful force increasing the rate of diffusion of 
innovation, economists assume that adoption behaviour can be oriented toward policy 
objectives if appropriate rules and financial incentives are provided. One heavily 
studied avenue in health economics is the relationship between hospital payment 
methods and the rate of diffusion. While retrospective payment stimulates adoption of 
innovation by reimbursing costs already incurred (Hillman and Schwartz 1985; 
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McClellan and Kessler 2002; Chou, Liu et al. 2004), DRG-based prospective payment2 
may decrease diffusion by shifting the financial risk from insurers to hospitals but 
further empirical results are still required (e.g. Hillman and Schwartz 1985). The yearly 
fixed global budget is believed to be the most stringent hospital payment method 
affecting the diffusion of technologies (McClellan and Kessler 2002), but again robust 
empirical results are needed.  
Doctors’ payments may also influence the diffusion of innovation. In their study, 
McClellan & Kessler (2002) found that the fee-for-service payment of doctors was 
associated with a higher rate of diffusion. Doctors paid on a salary basis were less 
likely to adopt new technologies. Both substantial out-of-pocket patient participation 
in health care costs and the presence of a unique health insurance with universal 
coverage are believed to limit the diffusion of innovation strongly (McClellan and 
Kessler 2002). In contrast, low or zero out-of-pocket payment and various possible 
choices of health insurance are correlated with a propensity for technological diffusion 
(McClellan and Kessler 2002).  
Whereas economic incentives may influence the use and diffusion of innovation, they 
can also have detrimental effects on patients. In a study on the penetration of 
laparoscopic cholecystectomy in Quebec (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002), strong financial 
incentives stimulated a too rapid and uncontrolled diffusion of this technique with 
unfortunate results for patients such as complications and avoidable premature deaths. 
In a different setting, to compensate revenue loss consequential to lower birth rate, 
some obstetricians preferred caesarean procedures over natural delivery, despite the 
former bearing higher risks than the latter (Gruber and Owings 1996; Gruber, Kim et 
al. 1999).  
Other studies indicated that the presence of strict regulations on major investments in 
technology strongly limited the diffusion of technology in the treatment of heart 
attack (McClellan and Kessler 2002). However, while regulation seems at best to have 
had the effect of postponing adoption (Schenzler 1998), it did not limit diffusion in 
the long run (Hillman and Schwartz 1985). Although the presence of regulations may 
affect diffusion, the lack of regulatory control in the US tends to produce 
indiscriminate adoption of innovations whose real benefits to patients are not clear 
(Rosenau 2000). Thus, according to Rosenau, considering market alone seems to give 
                                                     
2 DRG stands for Diagnosis-Related Group. It is a classification system categorizing patients into different groups of 
pathologies which are expected to use approximately the same resources. For each DRG there is a payment which is 
associated and which covers at least the average costs for treating a given pathology. 
 13
rise to anarchic diffusion and favours private benefits at the expense of public 
institutions (Rosenau 2000).  
These results suggest that regulations and financial incentives are critical in 
determining the route and pace of innovation and imply that innovations may diffuse 
differently accordingly to various regulatory and financial mechanisms in the 
institutional environment. Therefore, the rational-economic approach assumes that, 
with adequate incentives, actors will react rationally, adopting innovations that offer 
the highest return. Also, to capture scarce resources, competition may encourage 
earlier adoption to obtain a competitive advantage in terms of perceived quality.  
2.1.1.2 The Evidence-Based Medicine Movement – A Logic of 
Information 
Another rationally-based perspective deserves attention in the field of the diffusion of 
medical innovations. The evidence-based medicine movement is a relatively recent 
tradition which emerged in the seventies from a growing body of research that 
identified a large variation of medical practice for a given pathology (Eddy 2005). 
Evidence-based medicine conceives actors as rational and responsive to new 
information (Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005) and assumes that disseminating scientific 
information based on randomized controlled trials may change physicians’ behaviour. 
Thus, the purpose of evidence-based medicine is to “provide a stronger scientific 
foundation for clinical work, to achieve consistency, efficiency, effectiveness, quality, 
and safety in medical care” (Timmermans and Mauck 2005). By and large, there are 
two sources of evidence. On the one hand, evidence-based medicine encourages 
physicians to integrate best evidence in their practice, and on the other hand 
physicians are asked to follow interdisciplinary and consensually designed clinical 
guidelines (Eddy 2005).  
For proponents of evidence-based medicine, institutional environment can be 
composed of a set of normative guidelines, and adoption by physicians is based on the 
best evidence available, clinical judgement and patient values (Sackett, Richardson et 
al. 1997). Information overload, non-adherence and variation in practice are 
considered as variables impeding diffusion processes. Unfortunately, many studies 
show that the mere presence of information is not sufficient for physicians to change 
their behaviour (Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005).  
At the basic level, the rational-economic perspective assumes that a more centralized 
institutional environment dominated by the public sector, such as that of Quebec, will 
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not necessarily be conducive to innovation; while Switzerland would be the theatre of 
faster and wider diffusion. However, while competition increases the speed of 
diffusion, most studies have not traced the processes of diffusion in depth (Renshaw, 
Kimberly et al. 1990), apart from indicating that diffusion flows from higher status 
teaching hospitals to less prestigious ones (Lee 1971; Rapoport 1978; Vogt, 
Bhattacharya et al. 1995). By considering economic incentives or the availability of 
knowledge and information as the prime factor behind the diffusion of innovation, 
the rational perspective assumes that actors may make choice of adopting an 
innovation only through a cost-effectiveness analysis or through a detailed analysis of 
scientific evidence and neglects other important aspects of the diffusion of innovation 
such as the role played by interpersonal communication, the social network and norms 
shared by the community. The next approach addresses these deficiencies.  
2.1.2 THE RELATIONAL-NETWORK PERSPECTIVE – A LOGIC OF 
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 
The relational-network perspective assumes that it is the interpersonal communication 
within a social network that is the main determinant of the diffusion of innovations 
and that the experience of near-peers is central for modeling and imitation (Rogers 
2003). By studying the diffusion of hybrid corn amongst Iowa’s farmers, Ryan and 
Gross (1943) were the first to demonstrate that the diffusion of innovation is a social 
process rather than a rational and economic one. This was based on their astonishing 
observation that although hybrid corn seeds were genetically and economically 
superior, it still took 14 years for farmers to adopt this innovation (Valente and Rogers 
1995). This seminal paper constitutes the endowment of the relational-network 
paradigm by identifying that: 1) the adoption of innovation is a decision-making 
process composed of different stages such as awareness, trial and adoption; 2) the 
source of information about innovation influences adoption, with farmer neighbours 
being more influential than sales representatives; 3) the rate of the diffusion of 
innovation follows an “S” pattern suggesting an initial slow diffusion followed by an 
acceleration and a deceleration of the adopting rate; and 4) that some characteristics of 
the adopters, such as cosmopolitanism (i.e. the number of trips to Iowa’s largest city), 
made farmers more likely to adopt (Ryan and Gross 1943).  
Moreover, these authors elaborated the embryo of the famous typology popularized 
by Rogers (2003), characterizing adopters as innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority and laggards according to the timing at which they adopted an 
innovation. These parameters, established by Ryan & Gross (1943), have dominated 
the literature since 1943 (Valente and Rogers 1995) and certainly contributed to the 
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classical definition of diffusion as the “process in which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (Rogers 2003: 5). 
Using network analysis, Coleman et al. (1966) extended the work of Ryan and Gross 
(1943) by studying the diffusion of the antibiotic tetracycline among doctors in 
Illinois. This study suggested that the network of social relations affected the 
likelihood of adoption by constituting the channels through which communication 
takes place. Indeed, doctors who were more integrated into a social network were 
more likely to adopt earlier, and more isolated doctors tended to adopt at a later stage. 
Social networks are defined as “the pattern[s] of friendship, advice, communication or 
support which exist among members of a social system” (Valente 1996: 70). They are 
dichotomously characterized as homophilous or heterophilous networks. Homophily 
is believed to accelerate the diffusion of innovation (Rogers 2003: 306) because 
communication is more likely to be effective when people share values, norms, 
perceptions and experience, and because interpersonal influence is likely to be 
stronger. However, as Granovetter (1973) points out in his influential paper “The 
strength of weak ties”, a homophilous community must have a pinch of heterophily, 
which refers to the diversity of ties between people having different values and 
objectives, in order to welcome new ideas from another community.  
If awareness of a medical innovation is often triggered by pharmaceutical companies, 
the legitimacy and influence for adopting new technologies often comes from 
evaluative information gathered through discussions with colleagues (Coleman, Katz 
et al. 1966; Escarce 1996). This suggests that the position of doctors in the network 
determine their propensity to adopt innovation or to influence diffusion (Coleman, 
Katz et al. 1966). Since communities are rarely composed of homogenous individuals, 
opinion leaders may have more influence on the diffusion of innovations than other 
actors.  
Opinion leaders are “those perceived as having particular influence on the beliefs and 
actions of their colleagues in any direction, whether positive (in the eyes of those 
trying to achieve change) or negative” (Locock, Dopson et al. 2001: 746). They have 
greater interaction with their network, have a higher socio-economic status, have more 
relationships with the external world, are more exposed to mass media and are more 
innovative than their followers in a setting where innovation is regarded as valuable 
(Rogers 2003). Locock et al. (2001) distinguish expert opinion leaders from peer 
opinion leaders. The former are more heterophilous than their followers and, due to 
their position, they can reduce uncertainty about an innovation by confirming the 
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strength of its evidence. Typically, their influence is drawn from their knowledge and 
from the academic or consultant position they hold. Peer opinion leaders are 
homophilous and reduce uncertainty about implementation issues. Because they hold 
the same position as their colleagues, they exert their influence through informal 
authority. 
If opinion leaders provide legitimacy for innovation by lowering uncertainty related to 
evidence and implementation issues, champions advocating an innovation are essential 
to its adoption. As Greenhalgh et al. (2005: 126) remark: “the axiom that an 
innovation requires active and energetic efforts by particular individuals to ‘keep it 
alive’ and create a robust coalition for change is a recurring theme in the literature.” 
Thus champions can provide autonomy to innovators for generating original ideas or 
solutions (organizational maverick role), convince others to support the adoption of an 
innovation (transformational leader), loosely monitor the adoption process (organizational 
buffer role), and ensure the institutionalization of the innovation (network facilitator role) 
(Shane 1995).  
In contradiction to the assumption of evidence-based medicine (Sackett, Richardson 
et al. 1997), the availability of valid scientific evidence is apparently not a sufficient 
condition for the diffusion and the adoption of innovations (Greer 1988; Greer 1994; 
Dopson, FitzGerald et al. 2002; Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002; Rogers 2003; Ferlie, 
Fitzgerald et al. 2005). Because scientific evidence does not inform practitioners about 
how innovation should be incorporated into practice, professionals need to develop 
and capture a kind of knowledge that is practical and tacit, in contrast to the explicit 
and codified scientific knowledge present in scientific articles. This forces them to be 
active in searching for local information that shows an innovation to be effective 
(Greer 1988). Thus, the adoption process is facilitated if a consensus emerges within 
the community about the effectiveness of the innovation (Greer 1988).  
This local information on the effectiveness of innovations and technologies is 
obtained by referring to expert and peer opinion leaders. However, the safety, 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of medical innovations are not sufficient for 
adoption: other characteristics of the innovation (quantity of resources required to 
implement a change) and the provider (younger actors, specialists, urban settings, 
under competitive pressure) influence the diffusion of innovation (Fendrick and 
Schwartz 1994). From this perspective, the institutional environment is considered as 
a set of social networks where interpersonal communication is the main medium 
influencing the diffusion of innovations. Interestingly, the notion of risk in adopting 
an innovation was evacuated from this literature. Nowadays there are still remarkably 
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few studies in this tradition which actually consider risk as a significant factor affecting 
diffusion rate (Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005). Even more surprising is the fact that, 
although there are many publications in this literature, little is known about why people 
actually adopt innovation (Rogers 2003). The next approach provides an interesting 
answer to this question. 
2.1.3 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE – A LOGIC OF POWER, 
VALUES & INTERESTS 
The socio-political perspective conceptualizes the adoption and the diffusion of 
innovation as the product of the interaction between the values, interests and power 
dependencies of the adopting system and the distribution of benefits and risks 
embedded in an innovation (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002). Because institutional 
environments are heterogeneous, this approach assumes that innovation adoption is 
not purely an individual decision (as it is often assumed in the rational choice theory), 
but rather involves an array of actors having different motivation and agenda. 
Power is the domination of some over others and is embedded and distributed in 
organizational structures (Hardy and Clegg 1996). Because the formal structure may 
determine who participates in decision-making processes, it can also determine who 
can exercise power by at least being represented in this process. Given that the 
adoption of innovations can be seen as a decision-making process, power can 
significantly affect adoption. Indeed, when dominant actors support an innovation, 
the likelihood of adoption increases (Champagne, Denis et al. 1991) because means 
are likely to be available for adoption to proceed. For example, the government 
endorsement of a medical innovation can significantly increase its adoption rate 
(Dopson, FitzGerald et al. 2002). Thus, support from a powerful actor for an 
innovation may influence its diffusion. 
Although domination may be achieved through the formal hierarchical structure, 
controlling the access to environmental resources which are critical for the operation 
of the organization is a strong form of power (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 (1978)). 
Indeed, power belongs to those who control uncertainties which may directly affect 
the production processes or organizational goals (Hardy and Clegg 1996), and to those 
who control scarce resources such as expertise, information, credibility, prestige, 
money and sanctions (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 (1978)). 
A socio-political perspective would imply that dominant actors in an organization will 
tend to impose an organizational structure that better suits their interests. For 
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example, it has been shown that organizations having a CEO with a background in 
sales, marketing or finance had a greater probability of adopting the multidivisional 
form because this structure has advantages for these specialists (Fligstein 1985). This 
suggests that while power is a facilitating factor, interest in an innovation certainly 
encourages adoption. Interest is defined in this approach as the idiosyncratic 
advantages or profits one derives from something. 
One of the most significant illustrations of the role of interest in the adoption of 
innovation was developed by Fennel (1984), to explain some surprising results. He 
found that the presence of unions and medical departments in 173 firms were 
negatively correlated to the adoption of an in-house program for the treatment of 
alcoholism, which would normally be beneficial for the health of employees. His ad hoc 
explanation for these findings was that, because these programs might compete with 
or represent an unwanted responsibility for medical departments, resistance emerged. 
The unions would perceive the innovation as a way to increase management control 
over employees (Fennel 1984). Moreover, professionals may not be disposed to 
recognize the validity of the evidence supporting an innovation if it threatens their 
interests i.e. their organizational position and status (Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002). 
Thus, interest seems to be instrumental in adoption as well as rejection of innovation 
and can be defined as the idiosyncratic advantage actors may derive from something. 
Values are beliefs about what is right and wrong and what people consider important 
in life. Values complement interests as motivation for adopting. For example, social 
groups sharing the same values are more likely to interpret the meaning of the 
innovation in the same terms (Pinch and Bijker 1987). Klein and Sorra (1996) found 
that implementation is more likely to occur when values embedded in an innovation 
correspond to organizational values. Moreover, different types of potential adopters 
may value certain forms of evidence at the expense of others. For example, while 
teaching hospitals may consider randomized controlled trials as the gold standard for 
evidence, smaller hospitals may value the adoption by leading institutions as a requisite 
for implementing an innovation (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002).  
In the theory of organizations, the socio-political perspective considers that 
organizations are composed of units having divergent interests (Cyert and March 
1963) and different values (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Because the specialization of 
organizational structure favours the emergence of needs, interests and goals which are 
specific to each sub-unit, resource allocation and strategic decisions are bargained for 
and negotiated (Hickson, Butler et al. 1986). This logic also applies to the adoption of 
innovations. In their empirical work, Fitzgerald et al. (2002) note that the adoption of 
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an innovation is the fruit of a negotiation between stakeholders, and that the balance 
of power affects the likelihood of diffusion.  
To gain power, organizational units create coalitions in order to impose their local 
rationality on other units (Cyert and March 1963). A coalition created by powerful 
actors and an absence of opposition may prompt over-diffusion. Indeed, the more the 
number of powerful actors has convergent interests and values mapping on an 
innovation, the more likely resources are to be devoted adoption and the less likely 
opposition may hinder diffusion. For example, low molecular weight heparin diffused 
rapidly because both hospital managers and doctors had financial or clinical incentives 
and therefore interest to create a coalition to support the adoption of this technique 
(Denis, Hébert et al. 2002). 
In order to fit an innovation into a context, actors may re-invent it (Rogers 2003). 
Recently, scholars raised the issue of the transformation of innovation as it diffuses 
(Czarniawska and Joerges 1996; Westphal, Gulati et al. 1997; Lozeau, Langley et al. 
2002), instead of considering it as discrete like earlier authors (Tolbert and Zucker 
1983). For example, Westphal et al. (1997) observe that early adopters customize 
innovations – in this case Total Quality Management – in order to better suit their 
needs, and that later adopters adopt merely conform to the normative model 
prescribed by network ties. Hence, actors may customize innovations in order to fulfil 
their own agendas (Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002). In the same manner, innovations are 
likely to be corrupted in order to fit the current power distribution of the adopting 
system when there is a compatibility gap between the assumptions embedded in the 
managerial innovation and the organizational context (Lozeau, Langley et al. 2002).  
If interest, values and power distribution affect the diffusion and adoption of 
innovations, their use has considerable consequences at the social and political levels 
as well. As Lehoux and Blume (2000: 1091) argue: 
"Medical innovations, because of their values and through their social 
utilization, may reinforce hierarchical relations (i.e., computerized information 
systems), contribute to the exclusion of certain groups (i.e., designated services 
and programs for AIDS patients), impede the social development of individuals 
(i.e., genetic screening for 'noninsurable' conditions), or extend questionable 
social practices (i.e., ultrasonography leading to selective abortion of female 
fetuses)."  
This suggests that socio-political issues are related to the adoption of innovation as 
well as to the consequences of its use by affecting power dependencies and the social 
position of some groups.  
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This conception of the diffusion process has some of the features identified by actor-
network theorists (e.g., Callon 1987; Latour 1989). In particular, the idea that objects 
may have different meanings for different actors and that this is key to understanding 
if and when adoption will occur is shared with this perspective. Conceptualizing 
innovations and networks as co-evolving over time is also common to both 
approaches. In one sense, the socio-political perspective described here takes the 
rational-economic perspective described earlier and breaks it down, bringing it inside 
the adopting system. Both rational-economic and socio-political perspectives tend to 
assume that self-interest largely governs organizational and individual behaviour with 
respect to innovation. 
2.1.4 THE NEO-INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE – A LOGIC OF 
LEGITIMACY 
From the point of view of institutional theory, within the same institutional 
environment, organizations are subjected to similar constraints which tend to 
homogenize them. Coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms constrain 
organizations to resemble other organizations “that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). These so-called 
isomorphic mechanisms homogenize organizations in a given population because 
compliance with them may bring about or maintain legitimacy; which is defined as a 
“generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). Hence, organizations may comply with 
isomorphic pressures by adopting compulsory or already widely diffused innovations 
in practice, structure or technology in order to gain or maintain legitimacy; even at the 
risk of being detrimental to organizational efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
Building on the isomorphic mechanisms documented by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
Scott (2001) identifies three institutional categories: the regulative, the normative and 
the cultural-cognitive pillars. The regulative element of institutions is composed of 
laws, rules, sanctions and incentives. Central to this pillar is the coercive mechanism 
which constrains behaviour by means of force, fear and authority. This mechanism is 
often associated with government agencies (Cetindamar 2001) acting as rule maker, 
referee and enforcer of the Law (Scott 2001), but it can also be incarnated by other 
institutional actors such as labour unions or professional bodies. Due to the legitimacy 
provided by the power of legal sanction (Scott 2001), coercive agents can legally 
impose the adoption of innovations. Abrahamson (1991: 607) termed this 
phenomenon the “forced-selection perspective,” as it enables one organization to 
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force another to adopt or reject an innovation. The ability to achieve forced adoption 
may be correlated with the degree to which an organization is dependent on the 
coercive organization for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 (1978)) or with the 
authority the latter derives from its legal status. For example, the civil service reform 
in the U.S. was adopted faster in states where it was mandated by the government 
(coercive pressure) and when it was directed by a single source (centralization) 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Hence, while control through the use of force and 
sanctions constitutes the basic principle behind the regulative pillar, these mechanisms 
may not be sufficient to bring about social order. Indeed, if the rules and the rulers 
have to be perceived as legitimate in order to secure compliance (Scott 2008), there 
are other sources of legitimacy that actors can rely on. 
The normative pillar is composed of values, which refer to what is preferred and 
desirable, and norms, which define legitimate means to achieve goals (Scott 2008). 
Norms and values provide a moral gauge with which to evaluate the legitimacy of 
entities and constrain actors’ behaviour by social obligation (Scott 2008). This may 
occur through professionalization, an important normative mechanism, defined as “the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods 
of their work, to control 'the production of producers' and to establish a cognitive 
base and legitimization for their occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 
152-153). Formal and in-service education provided to professionals contribute to the 
dissemination of professional norms. At the same time, professionals working in 
organizations are also members of professional networks with trans-organizational 
scope and which may act as carriers of values and norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Hence, formal education and professional networks are powerful isomorphic forces 
tending to professionalize organizations and thereby homogenizing and legitimating 
professional behaviour. In the health-care sector, the elaboration of clinical guidelines 
is a normative tool aimed at reducing the variation of medical practice (Shaneyfelt, 
Mayo-Smith et al. 1999). Also, Health Technology Assessment Agencies may promote 
the adoption of innovations and organizations may adopt innovations for which the 
benefits are unknown (Arndt 1995) in order to conform to generally accepted norms 
thereby contributing to the legitimation of some technologies at the expense of others. 
Finally, certification and accreditation can be provided to organizations meeting 
certain standards of quality or proving that specific procedures are followed (Scott 
2008). Institutional environment is conceived in this pillar as a set of forces promoting 
values and norms that influence other organizations. 
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The cultural-cognitive pillar assumes that actors’ cognitive processes are shaped by the 
cultural environment. Shared cultural beliefs and premises constrain actions and orient 
what is considered as meaningful, conceivable and natural (Scott 2008). For example, 
routines in organization can be taken for granted while other courses of action may be 
inconceivable. In the cultural-cognitive element, isomorphism operates through the 
imitation of other organizations due to uncertainty. Thus, organizations can engage in 
imitation to gain legitimacy when organizational technologies and goals are ambiguous 
or when stakeholders’ expectations are unclear (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For 
example, managers have a tendency to observe competitors and to adopt 
organizational forms that they perceive as successful (Fligstein 1985). Hence, besides 
being an isomorphic mechanism, mimetism contributes to the spread of innovations. 
Abrahamson (1991) coined the term “fads perspective” to qualify the imitation that 
results from a wide diffusion of an innovation which prompts organizations to adopt 
it in order to gain legitimacy or to preclude competitors from maintaining an 
advantage.  
According to the institutional theory-based literature on innovations, while early 
adoption is often associated with the will of organizations to improve their 
performance (Westphal, Gulati et al. 1997), late adoption is more often the result of 
institutional forces because, as innovations diffuse, they gain legitimacy and become 
institutional imperatives, even though they might not lead to better performance 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983). In the health care sector, Walston, Kimberly and Burns 
(2001) found the same pattern where early adopters of process re-engineering were 
driven by economic factors and tended to implement it more extensively in order to 
gain competitive advantage; while late adopters were more permeable to institutional 
pressures and tended to undertake lighter implementation.  
Although there have been some attempts to theorize the development of idiosyncratic 
solutions which may eventually be institutionalized (Tolbert and Zucker 1996), early 
neo-institutional theories assume that innovations often come from external pressure 
rather than from inside organizations. However, when organizations are simply going 
through the motions of ceremonial adoption to achieve legitimacy, their capacity and 
motivation to make the innovation work in technical terms may be lacking. As Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) indicate and as revealed in many studies of institutional processes 
in health care (Westphal, Gulati et al. 1997), importing innovation from outside 
sources bears the risk of achieving only partial implementation (Walston, Kimberly et 
al. 2001) or even of making an alteration to the innovation which may threaten its 
performance (Lozeau, Langley et al. 2002). Hence, in the neo-institutional perspective, 
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adoption and diffusion of social innovations stem from the need for legitimacy or to 
adapt to isomorphic pressures. To achieve such objectives, actors tend to imitate other 
similar organizations, to conform to emergent norms, or to comply with coercive 
pressures. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
From these four theoretical perspectives, I developed and present here a conceptual 
framework that forms the backdrop of my analysis and served as a guideline for data 
collection. It defines in broad terms the set of factors that need to be considered to 
understand the patterns of innovation diffusion in both jurisdictions. This conceptual 
framework is not deeply rooted in any theoretical perspective, but borrows from 
different traditions to provide an overview of the phenomenon under study.  
As the economic perspectives assume, the benefits an actor or an organization can 
derive from an innovation - be it financial, clinical or of any other nature - may 
positively influence adoption (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002) and thereby increase 
diffusion. Yet institutional environments are composed of various actors having 
divergent values, interests and power and the interpretation of innovation attributes 
may differ from one potential adopter to another (Downs and Mohr 1976; 
Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2005). In this context, the benefits and risks of innovation 
may mean different things to different people (Pinch and Bijker 1987) whether inside 
or outside organizations, and institutional reference points for different groups of 
stakeholders may be divergent, especially in the pluralistic context of the health sector 
(Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005; Kraatz and Block 2008). For example, while physicians 
may be highly responsive to professional norms which emphasize the quality of 
medical practice, government officials and administrators may be more sensitive to 
efficiency norms. In a pluralistic context, specific adoption decisions involving several 
stakeholders are likely to be the result of socio-political processes. To influence the 
decision-making process for adoption, actors with common goals may need to create a 
coalition (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002) thereby generating a negotiated outcome 
(Maguire 2002) in which the balance of power affects the likelihood of diffusion 
(Champagne, Denis et al. 1991; Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002) and where congruence 
between the perceived benefits and risks of an innovation and the interests and values 
of adopters is the motor of adoption.  
Thus, while recognizing that rationality influences adoption and diffusion, this 
conceptual framework mainly draws on the socio-political approach which assumes 
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that the decision to adopt an innovation involves a large array of actors having 
different power, interests and values. However, for diffusion and adoption to occur, 
power, interests and values might not be sufficient as communication has to be 
involved. In this respect, the relational-network view proposes that communication 
through near-peer experience or through different media (scientific journals, 
pharmaceutical salespersons, etc.) is central for diffusion to occur. While I concur 
with this argument, I argue that the criteria of what constitutes convincing evidence as 
to why an innovation is adopted are provided by the institutional environment 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Scott 2008). Hence, rationalities or positive near-peer 
experience cannot be separated from the wider institutional context. As Scott 
indicates: “Social action is always grounded in social contexts that specify valued ends 
and appropriate means; action acquires its very reasonableness from taking these 
social rules and guidelines for behaviour.” (Scott 2008: 69). In other words, what 
counts as rational or effective is itself partly defined and structured by the institutional 
environment (Friedland and Alford 1991). For example, the values and interests of 
physicians – and thus their motivations – derive partly from the institutional structures 
within which they work and partly from the cultural-cognitive assumptions that 
underlie these structures. In turn, the values and interests that physicians uphold have 
contributed over time to the very formation of these structures (Scott, Ruef et al. 
2000; Scott 2008). Thus, in this thesis, I view innovation adoption as a socio-political 
process embedded in and structured by its institutional context.  
This socio-political conception of diffusion of innovation embedded in an 
institutional environment is schematized in figure 2.1. This conceptual framework 
should not be seen as a set of tight formal relationships to be tested but rather as a 
starting point for analysis as suggested by Miles & Huberman (1994) in their treatise 
on qualitative data analysis.  
The process of diffusion of innovations is conceived in this study as an interaction 
between: (a) an innovation with its key attributes: associated benefits and risks, 
evidence of clinical- and cost-effectiveness and evolution of the technology (see 
Innovation Attributes box in figure 2.1); and (b) adopters and key institutional actors 
with a certain set of power dependencies, values and interests that may or may not be 
compatible, and who may pursue different discursive or behavioural strategies (see 
Adopters and key institutional actors box in figure 2.1). This basic model of the diffusion 
process is embedded in an institutional environment which may influence both the 
adopting system and the innovation itself. Drawing principally on Scott et al. (2000) 
and partially inspired by the economic literature, the institutional environment is 
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described here in terms of (c) governance structures (market versus state model, a set 
of regulations and normative mechanisms, different systems of incentives, 
private/public balance) and (d) institutional logics (see Institutional Environment box in 
figure 2.1). Over time, under the influence of the institutional environment, 
interactions between key institutional actors and adopters and an innovation lead to a 
distinct pattern of diffusion (see Diffusion box in figure 2.1).  
FIGURE 2.1: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE INNOVATION DIFFUSION PROCESS 
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In the next sections, I provide a detailed description of each box of the conceptual 
framework presented in figure 2.1. After presenting the elements of the innovation 
attributes and the characteristics of the adopters and key institutional actors, the key 
components of the institutional context (governance structure and institutional logics) 
are described and the notion of theorization which is associated with the concept of 
institutional logic is introduced. 
2.2.1 INNOVATION ATTRIBUTES 
In order to understand the adoption of innovation within this conceptual framework, 
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advantage of one innovation over others (Rogers 2003), this conceptual framework 
predominantly considers its concordance with interests and values of would-be 
adopters (Meyer and Goes 1988; Denis, Hébert et al. 2002). Accordingly, perceived 
benefits and risks of innovations by potential adopters in terms of clinical and 
economic advantage are understood here as central in the diffusion pattern of an 
innovation. 
Because the value and interpretation of evidence differs from one professional group 
to another (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002; Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 2002; Ferlie, Fitzgerald et 
al. 2005), the body of evidence selected by each actor to assess an innovation is part of 
the conceptual framework developed. Consequently, evidence aligned with actor 
interests is more likely to be mobilized by would-be adopters. On the contrary, 
stakeholders without interest in seeing an innovation being diffused may boycott it by 
negatively interpreting evidence or selecting unfavourable evidence. 
Finally, the evolution of the technology is also a factor that might influence the 
understanding and the diffusion of the technology (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Munir and 
Phillips 2005). Indeed, the complexity of use or function of a technology may impede 
its diffusion (Rogers 2003). With its development, technology may become easier to 
use and a wider supply of related products may increase the likelihood of diffusion. 
Typically, internet is a technology which evolved to become more user-friendly and 
the fact that it started being widely supplied in the nineties certainly facilitated its 
diffusion.  
Thus, the innovation attributes which I consider central in this conceptual model are: 
benefits and risks associated with the innovation, clinical and economic evidences and 
the evolution of the technology. However, as already stated it is not the benefits and 
risks per se that drive adoption, but their concordance with interests and values of 
would-be adopters.  
2.2.2 ADOPTERS AND KEY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
Apart from innovation attributes, this conceptual framework places power, interest 
and values of adopters and key institutional actors at the hub of the diffusion of 
innovations. This assumption is based on the socio-political perspective which states 
that innovations are more likely to be adopted if they are instrumental to the 
achievement of idiosyncratic or organizational goals (Champagne, Denis et al. 1991) 
or to be rejected if not aligned with the actors’ interests and values (Fennel 1984). In 
other words, when actors’ interest is compatible with the benefits an innovation 
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offers, the likelihood for adoption increases (Meyer and Goes 1988). In this 
perspective, interest is defined as the idiosyncratic advantage which potential adopters 
obtain from adopting an innovation, due to the perceived benefits and risks that are 
embedded in it; adopters’ values are beliefs about what is right or wrong 
(appropriateness) and what is considered important in life (priority). In the same 
manner as interest, congruence between values in adopters and key institutional actors 
and the social desirability of an innovation increases the likelihood of adoption and 
successful implementation of an innovation (Klein and Sorra 1996). When different 
groups share common values, the uptake of innovation may be faster then when there 
is a clash of values between would-be adopters (Ferlie, Fitzgerald et al. 2005). The 
model developed in this section suggests that actors’ values should be taken into 
consideration in order to understand the motivation behind adoption. 
If actors’ interests and values constitute fundamental criteria for innovation adoption 
and are thus part of this conceptual framework, power is crucial because it provides 
both the levers for action inside a structure and the possibility of imposing action 
upon others (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). The power perspective states that 
dominant actors tend to impose innovations that better suit their interests (Fligstein 
1985). In the conceptual framework presented in figure 2.1, power takes on three 
different forms: 1) expertise; 2) authority; 3) controlling resources. Expertise and 
organizational skills in mastering a technology were associated with an increase 
likelihood of adoption (Greer 1984). Opinion leaders having specific experience, and 
thus expertise with regard to an innovation, can also have a powerful influence on 
their peers (Coleman, Katz et al. 1966; Locock, Dopson et al. 2001) if their experience 
is positive. The other dimension of power in my model is authority, which can be 
defined as being legitimate in asking for obedience. Consequently, the support of an 
innovation by actors in a position of power increases the likelihood of adoption 
(Champagne, Denis et al. 1991; Klein and Sorra 1996; Dopson, FitzGerald et al. 
2002). Finally, controlling resources is also a form of power if organizations or 
individuals are dependent on these for the performance of their activities (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003 (1978)). In this conceptual framework, resources can take different 
forms such as human, financial or informational. 
Any person, group or organization affecting any part of the adoption decision-making 
process is considered as a key actor in the conceptual framework proposed here. 
Institutional actors are agents with different degrees of power to influence the 
diffusion and adoption of innovations according to their interests and values and their 
position in the institutional environment. In the health care sector, the institutional 
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actors most likely to influence the diffusion of medical innovation are: potential 
adopting hospitals and physicians; diverse government agencies concerned with the 
provision of health care including health technology assessment agencies; health 
insurance companies; professional associations; pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies.  
In this model, instead of examining the compatibility of interest and values of one 
actor with the benefits and risks embedded in an innovation (Meyer and Goes 1988; 
Denis, Hébert et al. 2002), those of an array of actors involved in the diffusion of a 
technology are taken into account. This conception implies that when the decision to 
adopt an innovation involves many stakeholders, adoption is likely to be a political 
resultant (Allison 1971) that is the fruit of negotiation among stakeholders, each having 
their own sources of influence to orient the decision favourably according to their 
viewpoint, and who may create coalitions to influence decision-making processes 
related to adoption (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002) or compete in order to adopt an 
innovation before another entity (Foote 1992; Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000). Thus, 
the adoption of innovation is considered as a negotiated outcome (Maguire 2002) 
where the balance of power affects the likelihood of diffusion (Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 
2002), and where the concordance between the perceived benefits and risks of an 
innovation and the interest and value of adopters is the motor of adoption. 
Thus, power, interest and values as well as coalition, negotiation and competition are 
central in the box adopters and key institutional actors. The last of these elements, 
theorization, is so strongly associated with institutional logic that I prefer to present 
both consecutively in the next section which describes the components (i.e, 
governance structure and institutional logics) of the box entitled institutional environment. 
2.2.3 COMPONENTS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
According to Scott (2008: 48), organizational environments are constituted by 
institutions which are “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life." While 
such elements constitute the backbone of institutions, their combination contributes 
to the three components of institutional environments defined by Scott governance 
structures, institutional logic and institutional actors (described in the previous 
section) who serve as carriers or agents. 
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2.2.3.1 Governance Structures 
Governance structures are comprised of regulative and normative elements. They are 
defined as the “arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised involving, 
variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, regulative and normative 
mechanisms” (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000: 173). While different typologies of governance 
structures are proposed (Williamson 1981; Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Lowndes and 
Skelcher 1998; Rodriguez, Langley et al. 2007), authors consider market and hierarchy 
as two fundamental archetypes. In the market mode of governance, competition is the 
main coordination mechanism. It is generally assumed that competition is the key 
mechanism by which innovations will diffuse and that profit maximization is the 
incentive for firms to adopt them. Firms are the key institutional actors which respond 
to economic incentives in order to maximize advantage through profit or material 
benefits, and the predominant legal foundation is the property right (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985). Regulations provide the market framework within which actors 
compete for scarce resources and governmental agencies are expected to correct 
market failure (Alexander and D'Aunno 2003) by adjusting rules of the game or 
providing appropriate financial incentives.  
Apart from payment mechanisms3 to correct market failure or orient technological 
change, other regulatory devices have sometimes been introduced into health care 
systems to control the diffusion of technology. Certificate-of-need4 is one of these 
mechanisms which were intended to limit the diffusion of expensive technologies. 
Empirical findings, however, suggest that this type of regulation was bypassed by 
hospitals and doctors who relied on different strategies (James, Perry et al. 1991). For 
example, to avoid going through a long process of authorization with the risk of 
refusal, public hospitals relied on private clinics to adopt MRI and signed contracts 
with them. This was possible since only public organizations were subjected to the 
certificate-of-need regulation.  
Conversely, in the hierarchic mode of governance, authority and coercion are the 
principle mechanisms of coordination. Bureaucratic agencies are the prevailing 
institutional actors who strive to minimize risks and maximize predictability. Fear of 
punishment is the main incentive for actors to comply with the authority and formal 
administrative procedures constitute the legal foundation of this mode (Streeck and 
                                                     
3 Although I take payment mechanisms into consideration in my analysis, this thesis does not focus exclusively on the 
impact of financial incentives on the diffusion of innovations. 
4 The certificate-of-need regulation forces hospitals, and only hospitals, to prove the epidemiological necessity for an 
additional adoption of a technology in a given area. 
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Schmitter 1985). Hence, if the administration of organizations in a field is centralized 
to the state, resources might be allocated according to some centrally determined 
criterion such as population needs (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) and regulatory 
mechanisms such as laws and rules will influence the degree to which coercive 
pressures may be used to force adoption of innovations (Tolbert and Zucker 1983; 
Abrahamson 1991) or, alternatively, to control or prevent them. Hence, the extent to 
which power is centralized to the state or decentralized in regional agencies affects the 
distribution of power and authority in an institutional field, and consequently may 
influence the diffusion of innovation. Because public and private non-profit 
organizations do not have the same financial incentives as commercial organizations, 
the assortment of the ownership and the legal status of adopters may also affect the 
diffusion of innovation (Scott 2008). In any particular case, governance structures are 
likely to involve a mixture of mechanisms supported by regulatory frameworks which 
establish rules and generate a variety of incentives for action. 
While regulations can be a powerful mechanism to promote or inhibit the diffusion of 
innovations, normative elements also influence diffusion by propagating ideas about 
what is morally acceptable and appropriate. For example, in many health care systems, 
technology assessment agencies produce studies to inform authorities and health care 
providers about the effectiveness and safety of medical interventions (Lehoux 2006). 
Professional associations may also promote or hinder the transformation of an 
institutionalized field (Greenwood, Suddaby et al. 2002) as well as the diffusion of 
innovation. 
2.2.3.2 Institutional Logics 
While regulations and normative elements are part of the governance structure, 
institutional logics shape organizational action (Friedland and Alford 1991) 
acknowledging key sources and meanings of power (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Thornton and Ocasio 1999) by providing interpretive schemes (Ranson, Hinings et al. 
1980; Barley 1986). Institutional logic is defined as “a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions – which constitute [a field’s] organizing principles and which are available to 
organizations and individuals to elaborate” (Friedland and Alford 1991: 248). Institutional 
logics were identified at different level of analysis, but most importantly at the societal 
and organizational field levels. At the societal level, Friedland and Alford theoretically 
identified five institutional spheres (capitalism, state, democracy, family, and religion) 
which may contradict each other, interact and bear the seed for institutional change. 
In the conventionalist school, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) identified six worlds, 
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inherently in contradiction (inspirational, domestic, opinion, civic, merchant, 
industrial), but which are locally integrated through negotiated conventions 
accommodating their differing interests and logics (Denis, Langley et al. 2007). Recent 
work on pluralism has also recognized that institutional environments are composed 
of multiple co-existing institutional logics along with several incompatible regulations 
and norms that organizations have to reconcile through their activities (Denis, Langley 
et al. 2007; Kraatz and Block 2008).  
At the organizational field level, Scott et al. (2000) identify three institutional logics 
that emerged sequentially during the transformation of health care in the San 
Francisco Bay Area. First, quality of care is a longstanding institutional logic that has 
been inherent to health care since its origins. This logic is displayed by physicians and 
professional associations who promote technological change in order to provide the 
best quality of services to patients. According to Scott et al. (2000), the Great Society 
movement following the Second World War brought in its wake a second institutional 
logic of equity of access to health care, whose emergence coincided with the 
development of universal coverage systems in most OECD countries (WHO 2000) 
and was sustained by governmental bureaucracies to ensure that everyone had access 
to care. However, universal coverage sparked increasing costs which stimulated 
pressure for enhanced control. Taking the private sector as an archetype of success, 
market mechanisms based on the managed care concept were introduced in the US, 
thereby creating a third institutional logic related to market-efficiency.  
Each of these three logics is presumed to be dominant for some period of time, 
thereby sculpting the dynamics of the organizational field for health care in the United 
States. This approach implicitly assumes that a dominant logic prevails and 
homogeneously affects organizational forms in a particular field (Glynn and 
Lounsbury 2005), while secondary logics have less important effects (Scott, Ruef et al. 
2000). Researchers have examined transitions from one logic to another by 
investigating how a dominant institutional logic tends to legitimize the adoption of 
certain organizational forms while delegitimizing others (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000; 
Thornton 2002) or by looking at how shifts in dominant institutional logics shape 
organizational action and decisions (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Scott, Ruef et al. 
2000; Lounsbury 2002; Thornton 2002; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Lounsbury 2007).  
While institutional theorists (e.g. Friedland and Alford 1991), conventionalists 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and recent traditions on pluralism (Denis, Langley et 
al. 2007; Kraatz and Block 2008) have raised the possibility of multiple logics, most 
empirical research has considered them sequentially (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; 
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Scott, Ruef et al. 2000) rather than simultaneously, with some exceptions (e.g., Zilber 
2006; Lounsbury 2007).  
Clearly, certain institutional logics may have greater cultural resonance at particular 
points in time and in particular geographic locations. However, because the health 
care sector is complex and inherently pluralistic (Denis, Lamothe et al. 2001; 
Glouberman and Mintzberg 2001; Kraatz and Block 2008), I expect multiple logics to 
coexist in these systems as Scott et al. (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000; Thornton 2002) have 
shown. Quality, equity of access and efficiency institutional logics which are inherent to 
OECD’s health care systems (Tuohy 1999) are much in evidence in the contexts 
studied both previously (Denis, Lamothe et al. 2003) and here as will be seen.  
Governance structure and institutional logics constitute the two main components of 
the institutional environment box in figure 2.1. However, theorization is also a potential 
contributor to the diffusion of innovations, as it is described in the next section. 
2.2.3.3 Theorization 
During the analysis of my data the concept of theorization appeared to be relevant to 
explain the discursive strategies used by actors to justify their need to adopt or to 
legitimate their institutional position. To gain legitimacy, organizations adopt different 
strategies ranging from actions such as complying to rules, norms and culturally 
shared beliefs, to the manipulation of their environment by means of discursive 
manoeuvres (Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995). By providing general abstract models and 
rationalized causality (Strang and Soule 1998), theorization is a discursive strategy which 
enhances legitimacy as it contributes to the propensity of an innovation to be taken 
for granted and to its objectification (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). While local 
theorization involves ad hoc peer-to-peer interactions to "make sense of the world" 
(Strang and Meyer 1993: 493), global theorization is believed to accelerate and widen 
the diffusion of innovation by abstractly homogenizing a potential population of 
adopters, by specifying the properties and outcomes of an innovation, and by 
identifying theorists behaving according to the theoretical model as channels of 
diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993). The more abstract the theorization, the greater its 
influence. Thus, theorization can be conceptualized as a discursive strategy providing 
rationales, meanings and interpretations which legitimate and make sense of adopting 
innovations. 
When applied to the diffusion of technology, theorization has been found to be 
involved in defining the position of new actors in the organizational field, as well as 
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creating new objects and new concepts (Munir and Phillips 2005). Yet, although 
theorization is associated with the legitimization of novelty, to be effective it must also 
be embedded in, or artfully connected to, shared cultural understandings (Strang and 
Soule 1998; Munir and Phillips 2005), prevailing discourses (Vaara, Tienari et al. 2006), 
or institutional logics (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000; Scott 2004). Hence actors tend to rely 
on institutional logics to build theorizations. Theorization is operationalized in this 
conceptual framework as what the purpose of the technology is, why the technology 
should be adopted, who should adopt it, and how it should be diffused. In this thesis, it 
is through the study of theorizations generated by organizational actors around the 
PET scanner technology that we attempt to understand how institutional contexts 
influence the meanings given to the technology and how these meanings are in turn 
mobilized within the process of diffusion. Theorization is part of the adopters and key 
institutional actors box in the figure 2.1 because it is part of the range of strategic 
behavior of would-be adopters.  
Overall, structural elements of the institutional framework (e.g. market vs. state 
models, regulation mechanisms, patterns of incentives, public/private balance, degree 
of decentralization) and cultural elements (i.e. institutional logics) are expected to 
influence the key actors involved in innovation decision making as well as their 
relative power. The pattern of incentives in place and the position of actors in the 
institutional environment combined with extant value systems may influence the 
interests and values of these actors and determine the identity of those who are 
allowed to compete and those who may collaborate. The distribution of benefits and 
risks perceived and interpreted as being embedded in the innovation may also impact 
the diffusion of innovation. Finally, regulatory mechanisms may influence the degree 
to which coercive pressures may be used to force innovations or alternatively the 
extent to which they may act as barriers to innovation. Taken together, innovation 
attributes, adopters and key institutional actors’ values, interests and power as well as 
governance structure and institutional logics are all expected to influence the diffusion 
and adoption of innovation through space and time (see the diffusion box in figure 2.1).  
This research aims to trace out in detail the mechanisms by which innovations diffuse 
and how the institutional environment intervenes in this process. I argue that, through 
in-depth exploration of complex inter-organizational processes over a fairly long time 
period, studying all cases of PET scanner adoption in both jurisdictions (Quebec and 
Switzerland) should raise many of the important factors that can explain how and why 
the diffusion of complex innovations may proceed differently in different contexts.  
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The analysis of my data gave rise to new concepts, some of which are briefly defined 
in this paragraph. The diffusion of innovation appeared in my data set to be 
characterized by struggles for control and struggles for meaning. Struggle for control concerns 
the competing effort deployed by actors to influence the course of the diffusion of the 
technology by mobilizing power in the form of material resources, formal authority or 
expertise. Struggle for meaning involves competing arguments or theorizations in 
order to influence the perceived purpose of the technology, how and why it should be 
diffused and who should legitimately acquire it. Both struggles represent competing 
attempts to orient adoption decisions according to one’s own interest. However, while 
actors involved in promoting or hindering the diffusion of innovations are engaged in 
a struggle to control the technology, they are not all struggling to provide meaning to 
the technology since some actors may adopt a technology regardless of its meaning. 
Therefore, struggle for meaning mediates struggle for control when actors estimate 
that the use of discourse can influence the diffusion of innovation in their favour. 
Struggle for meaning involves the interplay of theorization and counter-theorization 
based on dominant institutional logics.  
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3 CHAPTER III  
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY  
Investigating the impact of the institutional environment on the diffusion pattern of a 
complex innovation is the scope of this study. Considering the context-sensitive 
aspect of this research which also targets processes evolving over time, a comparative 
and retrospective case study design with embedded units of analysis5 is appropriate 
(Patton 2002; Yin 2003).  
In order to show how different institutional environments may variously impact 
patterns of diffusion of this technology, the study compares jurisdictions with 
contrasting modes of governance: the more centrally planned Quebec health care 
system and the more market-oriented Swiss health care system. These two 
jurisdictions constitute extreme cases in terms of governance structures while being 
sufficiently similar in terms of population size to allow useful comparisons 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Langley 1999). To understand the key features of the two 
institutional contexts, documentary data about each health care system was collected 
and reviewed.  
While the previous chapter detailed the conceptual framework of this analysis, the 
current chapter focuses more specifically on the presentation of the PET scanner 
                                                     
5 An embedded unit of analysis means that data is simultaneously analysed on multiple levels of analysis. 
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technology, the jurisdictions under scrutiny, as well as the research design, data 
collection methods, and data analysis strategies which were mobilized in this study. 
3.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The Positron Emission Tomography (PET scanner) is a complex and expensive 
diagnostic imaging technology that was initially rather controversial. The PET scanner 
has an initial history in neurology where it provided revolutionary imagery of brain 
functioning and in cardiology where it has been used to diagnose severe cardiac 
conditions. Nonetheless, it is the discovery of fluorodesoxyglucose (FDG), the most 
important radio-isotope (Rohren and Coleman 2004) enabling the diagnosis of cancer 
by means of the PET scanner, which remains its main clinical application. Compared 
with the Computed Tomography (CT-scanner), which provides structural anatomic 
clichés, the PET scanner produces functional images of the body, i.e. images showing 
activities of the body. Although clinical applications are now fairly universally 
accepted, the cost-effectiveness of this technology is still debated (Adams, Almazan et 
al. 2006). Indeed, the high acquisition cost (1.8 millions USD / machine) and running 
cost (1.3 million USD / year) are major counterweights to the benefits at least in some 
jurisdictions (Adams, Almazan et al. 2006). Assuming the PET scanner is useful, some 
experts suggest that one PET scanner for each million of population is sufficient for 
clinical and research purposes (Cleemput, Camberlin et al. 2008). 
This technology derives its complexity in large part from the necessity, at least in the 
early years of diffusion, of having a cyclotron nearby to produce the radio-isotope 
injected into the patient during the diagnostic procedure. This is due to the short half-
live of radio-isotopes. For example, the half-life of the FDG is 110 minutes and, in 
cardiology, the half-life of the radio-isotope oxygen-15 is only two minutes. The snag is 
that a cyclotron costs around $3.6 millions USD and requires highly qualified and 
scarce personnel (radio-pharmacists) as well as a major improvement to hospital 
infrastructure to comply with nuclear regulations. However, by the year 2003, private 
companies started producing and supplying FDG in both jurisdictions thereby 
facilitating the adoption of this technology by organizations not having a cyclotron 
nearby. Figure 3.1 shows a PET scanner (left) and a cyclotron (right). 
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FIGURE 3.1: 
A PET SCANNER AND A CYCLOTRON  
 
 
 
 
 
The adjunction of a CT scan to the PET scanner in 2001 and more extensively 
commercialized in 2003 was a breakthrough in the world of medical imaging. With 
this combination, the PET-CT scanner technology superimposes both structural and 
functional images of the body thereby increasing the precision of the diagnosis. In 
addition, the PET-CT scanner allows hospitals to perform 12 cases per day instead of 
8 with a stand-alone system, due to time6 reduction in acquiring the data. PET-CT is 
believed to add clinical value to stand-alone PET added-value for approximately 15% 
of cases, mainly in the otorhinolaryngology speciality, and costs around 3.7 millions 
USD.  
The diffusion of this technology was felt to be particularly interesting for this study in 
that it revealed how different jurisdictions dealt with bandwagon technology (i.e., a 
technology whose diffusion is hard to stop due to the powerful incentives associated 
with it; this concept is further developed at the beginning of chapter IV). Its 
applications for diagnosing cancer, cardiac and neurological diseases, as well as its high 
acquisition cost suggested analogies with other technologies such as Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) and CT scanning that were known to have been subject to 
bandwagon pressures. Moreover, since there are many applications in cardiology, 
neurology, and oncology, inter-speciality competition to acquire the technology can 
occur.  
3.1.1 TWO INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
The publicly funded Quebec health care system and the more market-oriented Swiss 
health care system are particularly suitable for this study in that both are sufficiently 
                                                     
6 Working alone, the PET scanner has to perform a correction in order to detect anatomical structures. This correction 
takes approximately 20-30 minutes. With the adjunction of a CT scanner, the production of anatomical images is quasi 
instantaneous. This speeds up the acquisition process of images. 
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small to enable an in-depth study including virtually all individual adoption decisions 
of the PET scanner beginning in 1985 and ending in 2006. 
Before mentioning the key differences between both health care systems, it is 
important to underline commonalities between both jurisdictions. First, both 
jurisdictions have a population of around 7.5 millions habitants. Life expectancy is 
also remarkably similar: overall, life expectancy at birth is 77.2 for men and 82.4 for 
women in Quebec, and 77.8 for men and 83.0 for women in Switzerland, suggesting 
that both health systems sustain the population with almost the same result. Table 3.1 
details the number of inhabitants in both jurisdictions and life expectancy for the year 
2003.  
The descriptions and statistics of the Quebec and Swiss health care systems reflect 
their state between 2001 and 2003. During this period, pressure for the diffusion of 
PET scanner increased importantly in both jurisdictions.  
TABLE 3.1: 
POPULATION, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH FOR MEN & WOMEN IN 2003 
Quebec Switzerland
Population 7,486,114 7,339,000
Life expectancy at birth for men 77.2 77.8
Life expectancy at birth for women 82.4 83.0
 
Sources: OECD Reviews of Health Systems – Switzerland (2006) & Eco-santé Quebec 
2007 (http://www.ecosante.fr/) 
3.1.1.1 The Quebec Health Care System 
3.1.1.1.1 Principles & Regulations 
The general principles which guided the evolution of the Quebec Health and Social 
Services Systems are universality, equity and public administration. The Hospital 
Insurance Plan of 1961 and the Health Insurance Plan of 1971 allow all citizens to 
have free-of-charge access to the same set of services independently of her/his 
revenue and without discrimination. The Quebec health care system is mainly a public 
planned economy administered by the central government for resource allocation, 
health provisions, and to insure all citizens. The Quebec health care system is 
organized in three levels, central, regional and local, each with its own sphere of 
responsibility.  
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3.1.1.1.2 Institutional Actors 
The Ministry of Health and Social Services is the central level and is accountable for 
funding and organizing most health care activities in the province. Thus, it is 
responsible for planning the provision of health care services, for funding and 
allocating financial resources and for supporting and evaluating activities taking place 
in the Quebec health care system (Gouvernement du Québec, 2008). To fulfill this 
mission, the central government has the responsibility for investment in infrastructure 
and for acquiring targeted expensive technology, as well as negotiating remuneration 
with professionals and global budgets with organizations to ensure that health care 
services will be delivered to the population.  
The central government relies on different organizations in order to obtain advice or 
to administer some facets of the Quebec health care system. Two of these 
organizations may play an important role in the adoption and the use of the PET 
scanner. The Health Technology Assessment Agency was created in 1988 with the 
mission to assess health services and technologies at the clinical and economic levels. 
These assessments are normally mandated by the central government to generate 
specific recommendations as to the use or adoption of a technology or a service.  
Earlier than the creation of the Health Technology Assessment Agency was the 
foundation in 1969 of the public health insurance agency called the RAMQ (Quebec 
Health Insurance Agency) which was a key element in the institutionalization of the 
universal health care system. This body does not have a power per se, but has an 
important administrative role as it reimburses doctors, hospitals and in some cases 
patients.  
At the regional level, each of the 18 territories of the province of Quebec has a Health 
Services Regional Agency which coordinates and controls activities between 
organizations and orchestrates the implementation of programs designed at the central 
level. The movement towards regionalization of the health care system started in 1990 
after the publication of the Rochon Report in 1988. One of the objectives behind this 
movement was to give more responsibility to these agencies but, according to 
Lemieux, Bergeron et al., (2003), attempts to decentralize the decision-making process 
entirely to the region were not fully successful (Lemieux, Bergeron et al. 2003) and the 
agencies are perceived more as relaying orders from the central government. 
Consequently, regionalization should not be equated to decentralization, especially as 
regards the adoption of expensive technology such as the PET scanner. Indeed, in this 
case, the regional agencies do not have any real power, and negotiations take place 
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between health care providers and the central government (i.e., the Ministry of Health) 
directly. 
At the local level, public health care organizations have to fulfill their mission. Around 
200 public organizations, 50 non-profit organizations, and 50 for-profit organizations 
offering long-term care compose the panorama of the Quebec health care system. 
These organizations were grouped by mission to fit into 5 categories. Hospital Centres 
(CHs) “ensure the provision of short-term primary, secondary and tertiary services in 
general or specialized health care and in psychiatric care”. The Local Centres for 
community services (CLSCs) are public clinics providing primary health care services 
including the prevention and promotion of health. Besides, there are private clinics 
that have similar missions to the CLSC with the exception that they can provide 
specialized services such as radiology, some of which can be reimbursed by public 
insurance. Three other missions complete this picture: residential long-term care 
centres (CHSLDs) are for people with decreasing autonomy; rehabilitation centres 
(CRs) specialize in helping people having physical impairment; child and youth 
protection centres (CPEJs) offer social services to young persons and their families. 
Moreover, around 3000 community organizations offer different services to the 
population such as preventing suicides or providing food for the homeless. Patient 
associations, with almost no power, may also be involved in defending patient 
interests.  
The design of the Quebec health care system changed significantly with the 2004 
reform which created Health and Social Service Centres (CSSS) that regrouped CHs, 
CLSCs and CHSLDs under one administrative board. This rearrangement did not 
change the distribution of organizations interested in obtaining the PET scanner 
technology. 
While the number of health care organizations was around one thousand by the end 
of the eighties, there were 482 organizations in the network in 2001. In this system, 
many organizations accumulate more than one mission. The Quebec health care 
system had 4 teaching hospitals (excluding hospitals affiliated to a university), 125 
general hospitals, 116 public clinics and around 2000 private clinics in 2001. The total 
number of doctors was 15,267 and the number of specialists was 7,717 among which 
555 were radiologists and 85 were nuclear doctors for the year 20067. 
                                                     
7 The year for hospitals and clinics and to doctors and specialists is not the same due to data availability. 
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Professionals are members of medical associations which represent their interests 
mainly to the government and negotiate budgets to be allocated. These budgets 
directly affect the revenue of the two main professional associations for doctors. 
While the FMOQ (The Quebec Federation of General Practitioners) represents the 
interest of general practitioners (GPs), the FMSQ (The Quebec Federation of 
Specialist Doctors) defends the position of specialists (Fournier 2001). Once a budget 
is allocated, each specialty within its Federation negotiates the amount it should 
receive. Typically, the Quebec Association of Nuclear Doctor and the Association of 
Radiologists are two different entities that are part of the FMSQ, and each one 
negotiates its own budget. Only nuclear doctors can operate PET scanners. 
3.1.1.1.3 Funding and Allocation of Resources 
In 2003, total expenditure in health care was around 18.6 billions USD, which 
represents about 10.4 percent of the GDP, and total expenditure per person was 2,487 
USD per year. With such a high ratio of health-care expenditure to its GDP, the 
province of Quebec would come fourth among the OECD countries, after USA 
(15.0%), Switzerland (11.5%) and Germany (11.1%) (OECD 2006). 
This system is in large part funded through taxation: 71.2% of the total health 
expenditure in 2000 was funded through taxation (Lemieux, Bergeron et al. 2003). 
Private expenditure on health accounts for 28.8% of the total expenditure. 
Pharmaceutical products and professionals other than doctors (e.g. dentists) are two 
major domains that are largely financed though private sources with 57.2% for the 
former, and around 88% for the latter (Lemieux, Bergeron et al. 2003). While public 
coverage pays for essential medical care, private insurance included as employee 
privilege can pay for supplementary services such as dentists, and for a PET scan 
before it was covered by the government of Quebec. However, only 2.0% of doctors’ 
remuneration is private (this is due to the public health insurance), and less than 10 % 
of hospital expenditure comes from private sources (Lemieux, Bergeron et al. 2003). 
This suggests that essential medical care is mainly financed through public funding. 
With the universal health insurance adopted in 1971, doctors began to be paid on a 
fee-for-service basis by a single health insurance agency (RAMQ) and lost their right 
to charge fees on a private basis to patients covered by this public health insurance 
(Lemieux, Bergeron et al. 2003). As a consequence of implementing universal 
coverage, health care costs and doctors’ revenues exploded, thereby forcing the 
government to introduce new methods to control remuneration. In 1976, the law of 
health insurance stipulated that doctors’ remuneration be the product of negotiation 
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between the government and two professional union associations regrouped under the 
banner of FMOQ and FMSQ (Fournier 2001). Both associations agree on a revenue-
target based on average revenue of GP and specialist doctors. If the negotiated 
average revenue is surpassed, the amount that has to be paid in excess is deducted 
from the next year’s increased rate of the budget. 
The individual revenue for GP is capped, i.e. once this revenue is reached doctors are 
paid at 25% of the normal rate; this revenue cap was set at about 33% higher than the 
average revenue. These caps are applied by sections of three months to make sure that 
doctors will still have incentives to work by the end of the year. In 1995, things slightly 
changed as an annual global budget was going to be negotiated with each association. 
From this moment, the system of capped individual revenue was also adopted by 
specialists (Fournier 2001) and the annual global budget had to be divided between 35 
specialties.  
Teaching and general hospitals were and are largely financed through public funds on 
a global budget, with the previous year being the criteria for allocation with 
adjustments for the costs of production factors and change in activities of the 
organization. Within the global budget and the limit of the law, managers are free to 
administer their organization as they wish. 
To counter deficits generated by hospitals, the Government adopted in 1996 a law 
forbidding hospitals to generate deficits at the risk of seeing authorities imposing a 
trusteeship or of changing the management team. To balance their budgets and 
comply with this regulation, the number of acute care beds is often reduced which 
entails an increase in the waiting list. 
3.1.1.1.4 Regulations Specific to Expensive Technologies and the PET 
Scanner 
Since expenditure on hospitals and doctor remuneration is directly paid by the 
government, the latter is more likely to be reluctant to invest or to allow 
reimbursement of costly procedures given its limited budget. This is exacerbated in 
Quebec since the provincial government is one of the most indebted in Canada and a 
large part of its budget (around 40%) is already dedicated to the health care system. 
Hence, to ensure that an innovation is worthy of being reimbursed and diffused, the 
government often relies on the recommendations of a Health Technology Assessment 
Agency. To control the diffusion of the PET scanner, the law specifies that under the 
public regime no organization can provide PET scanner procedures or acquire this 
technology without the authorization of the Ministry of Health. If this Ministry 
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refuses to support projects financially, some hospitals may rely on their private 
foundation for funding. However, even in this case, the acquisition of such 
technologies as the PET scanner, must be approved by the Ministry of Health. 
Interpretation of PET scans is reimbursed to doctor only if they perform this 
procedure in a public hospital. Nuclear doctors are paid on a fee-for-service basis for 
each of their interpretations of PET scans (up to the point where they have reached 
their revenue cap) and hospitals received an annual budget for the PET scanner which 
allows this technology to work properly. 
Overall, because the State administers the health care system and is the single 
authorized insurer for universal basic health care coverage for a wide range of medical 
services, the adoption of new technology is not accounted for as a source of profit by 
the regulator, but as a cost. Moreover, while the health care system is centrally 
managed and publicly funded, different forms of non-price-based competition are 
embedded within it. Most critically, physicians are generally paid on a fee-for-service 
basis and therefore may compete with each other in a market for patients. Moreover, a 
hospital's survival depends on attracting qualified medical specialists who thus have an 
important influence on organizational strategy. Competition for prestige, resources, 
and investment among institutions can therefore be intense. Since resources are largely 
controlled by government, this competition often plays itself out in the public sphere.  
3.1.1.2 The Swiss Health Care system 
3.1.1.2.1 The Federal Health Insurance Law 
Second only to the United States when it comes to Health Care expenditures as a 
share of GDP (OECD 2006), Switzerland has not only one of the most expensive 
health care system in the world, but also one of the more complex. Whereas the 
Quebec Health Care System is centralized and publicly funded, Switzerland’s health 
care system is highly decentralized (OECD 2006) and more market oriented. Indeed, 
because federalism is embedded in its political system and is at the hub of this health 
care system, it endows the 23 cantons with the responsibility of organizing the 
provision of health care in their territory and of financing major investment such as 
new expensive technologies. This highly decentralized political structure comes with a 
market for health care where competition takes place between health insurance 
companies as well as between health providers. 
The introduction of the Federal Law on Health Insurance (LAMal) in 1996 brought a 
significant change at least in the spirit of the preceding 1911 Federal Law on Health 
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Insurance by imposing compulsory universal coverage. Within this new law, 
reimbursable health services were to be exhaustively defined by the Federal Office for 
Social Insurance8 (OFAS), and each insurer would provide flat fee premiums to clients 
for compulsory health insurance without discrimination as regard to age, gender and 
medical profile. Compulsory health insurance confirms the same package of essential 
medical services for all, but does not provide free choice of physicians in hospital 
settings nor the possibility of enjoying extraordinary “hotel” services such as having a 
private room. For these privileges, supplementary health insurance must be bought. 
3.1.1.2.2 Institutional Actors 
Federal Level. Under the Federal Department of Internal Affairs, the highest instance of 
Switzerland as regard to health, social affairs, education and culture, the Federal Office 
for Social Insurance (OFAS) regulates and proposes reforms related to the Federal 
Law on health insurance (LAMal) and other social insurances, and decides what 
medicines and health technologies should be covered by compulsory health insurance 
as well as the price at which drugs should be sold (European Observatory, 2000). The 
Federal Department of Internal Affairs is also responsible for the protection, 
prevention and promotion of health, as well as for medical training and scientific 
research.  
The Federal Department of Internal Affairs has several advisory units and 
organizations to support its activities. For example, it relies for recommendations on 
the Federal Commission for Health Insurance when reimbursements of medical 
procedures are contested. To make sure that the PET scanner responds to nuclear 
norms, the Department of Radioprotection which is part of the Federal Office of 
Public Health (OFSP) is involved in measuring radiation and approving its use. To be 
commercialized, therapeutic products must be approved by Swissmedic, a federal 
organization which ensures the quality, safety and effectiveness of health related 
products. To produce and sell FDG, producers must have the authorization of 
Swissmedic.  
Despite the absence of a formal, legitimated and independent health technology 
assessment agency, the Federal Office for Social Insurance (OFAS) conducts its own 
cost-effectiveness analysis before granting reimbursement of health innovations. 
Unlike the health technology assessment agency in Quebec which publishes reports 
regularly, OFAS does not make its cost-effectiveness analyses available to the public. 
                                                     
8 The LAMal was under the responsibility of the Federal Office of Social Insurance (OFAS) up to 2003 when it passed 
to the Federal Office for Public Health (OFSP). 
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However, there is an independent organization called The Swiss Centre for 
Technology Assessment (TA-Swiss)9 which aims to assess health technology, although 
many interviewees agreed that this organization does not have significant political 
weight. 
Cantonal Level. Cantons have a high degree of independence in the organization and 
management of their health care system and as a consequence technology acquisition 
regulations change from canton to canton. The LAMal compels cantons to plan 
hospital provision, to limit the range of providers to be reimbursed and to finance 
health services partially (European Observatory, 2000). As such, cantons assure the 
provision of health care by owning some hospitals, by subsidizing a variety of health 
care institutions and by the planning and monitoring of health care activities. 
However, although cantons have a planning role in hospital setting, ambulatory 
activities are left to market forces. Cantonal tax revenue pays public and publicly 
subsidized hospitals for capital investment, education and research costs 
(European_Observatory 2000). Moreover, fee schedules negotiated between service 
providers and SantéSuisse (the cantonal association of health insurance companies) at 
the cantonal level have to be approved by the canton.  
Local Level. The local level is constituted by 2700 communes and by public and private 
organizations. While the former participate in the provision and subsidies of care for 
the elderly and for physically and mentally handicapped people 
(European_Observatory 2000), the latter provide primary, secondary and tertiary 
services whether from hospitals, specialized clinics or independent professionals. 
Hospitals can be public, publicly subsidized or private. While public hospitals are the 
property of cantons, associations of communes, independent communes or 
foundations (European_Observatory 2000), publicly subsidized hospitals are private 
but come under the control of the canton and have to account for their financial 
management. These two situations allow hospitals to receive cantonal subsidies and to 
be covered in case of deficit andreimbursed for services falling under compulsory 
health insurance (European_Observatory 2000). Entirely private hospitals do not 
receive financial subsidies from the canton and cannot be reimbursed under 
compulsory health insurance. They can only be financed by supplementary health 
insurance payments or by out-of-pocket payments. Between 1997 and 2002, 
Switzerland has seen the number of hospitals reduced from 406 to 365 in-patient 
hospitals (Office_fédérale_de_la_statistique 2004). From this number, 5 were public 
                                                     
9 Centre d’évaluation des choix technologiques. 
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teaching hospitals, 215 were public or publicly subsidized hospitals, while 134 were 
private (these data include specialized clinics in surgery, rehabilitation and in 
psychiatry). Public and private hospitals in Switzerland are represented by an 
association called H+ The Swiss Hospitals. Besides political lobbying, this association 
provides its members with training, management tools and hospital statistics and, at 
the cantonal level, H+ negotiates fee schedules with health insurance companies.  
Table 3.210 compares the number of hospitals in both jurisdictions and underlines 
their similarity in terms of the number of teaching hospitals, and their dissimilitude 
over the number of public and private hospitals (354 in Switzerland against 125 in 
Quebec). Unfortunately, there are still no statistics on the number of organizations or 
clinics which provide ambulatory services exclusively.  
TABLE 3.2: 
NUMBER OF HOSPITALS IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS 
Quebec Switzerland
Public teaching hospitals 4 5
Public hospital (including publicly 
subsidised and excluding teaching 
hospitals)
125 215
Private hospital 0 134
Public clinics 
   ambulatory only 
116 N.A.
Private clinics 
   ambulatory only
around 2000 N.A.
 
Sources: For Quebec, the data comes from Lemieux, V., P. Bergeron, et al. 2003. Le système de 
santé du Québec. Saint-Nicolas (Québec), Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal (p.104). Data 
in Quebec are for the year 2001. For Switzerland, data from the year 2003 comes from OECD 
Reviews of Health Systems – Switzerland (2006). N.A. means that these data are not available. 
In 2002 the density of physicians in Switzerland (3,6/1000 inhabitant) was one of the 
highest of all OECD countries (OECD 2006), partly because the organization of the 
ambulatory setting is mainly driven by market forces. To counter this phenomenon, 
some cantons have imposed a moratorium on licensing doctors in private practice, but 
allow doctors to work on public or publicly subsidized hospitals. Compared with 
Quebec, Switzerland had almost twice as many GPs (27,268 vs. 15,267) and specialists 
(17,995 vs. 7,717) in 2003. Table 3.3 compares the number of physicians and hospitals 
in both jurisdictions. Interestingly, while there are more GPs and specialists in 
Switzerland, there are, apparently, more radiologists (555 versus 348) and nuclear 
doctors (85 versus 45) in Quebec. Each cantonal medical association represents doctors to 
                                                     
10 In Quebec, for organizations cumulating several missions, only the mission of CH was computed in this table.  
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negotiate their fees with the respective cantonal association of health insurance 
companies.  
TABLE 3.3: 
NUMBER OF DOCTORS IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS 
Quebec Switzerland
Total number of doctors 15'267 27'268
Number of physician specialists 7'717 17'995
Number of radiologists 555 348
Number of nuclear doctors 85 45
 
Sources: The number of doctors and specialists in 2003 comes from OECD Source data 2006 – 
Statistics and Indicators for 30 countries & Eco-santé Quebec 2007: http://www.ecosante.fr/. 
The statistics of radiologists and nuclear doctors in Switzerland comes from the website of the 
FMH in 2007, and the same statistics for Quebec comes from Eco-santé Quebec 2007 for the 
year 2006. 
In contrast to the Quebec health care system where there is only one public health 
care insurance, Switzerland had 101 different insurance companies offering health 
plans in 2000. In 1997, 15 companies were covering 68,4% of the population for 
compulsory health insurance, while 71% of all other companies were covering less 
than 10,000 people (European_Observatory 2000). Not-for-profit health funds and 
for-profit health insurance companies can offer health insurance plans provided they 
register with the Federal Office of Social Insurance (OFAS). However, no profit can 
be made out of selling compulsory health insurance, only by selling supplementary 
health insurance. Insurers have to comply with different rules such as obligation to 
contract with service providers, obligation to cover people living in Switzerland, 
obligation to deliver services included on the Federal Office for Social Insurance 
health services list, to participate in a risk-compensation fund11 and to constitute 
reserves12 (OECD 2006). Health insurance companies are represented in every canton 
by an association called SantéSuisse. This association offers various services to its 
members such as making political representations to cantonal authorities, negotiating 
tariffs at national and cantonal level, and promoting the corporate image of its 
members.  
The Swiss Nuclear Medicine Association represents nuclear doctors in Switzerland at the 
political level, develops recommendations on the use of nuclear products in medicine, 
informs the public and promotes the training of nuclear doctors. In 1999, the Swiss 
                                                     
11 In Switzerland, all insurance companies must participate to a risk-compensation fund which is redistributed to 
companies having a pool of clients with age and gender structures which entail higher risk. 
12 A reserve is a compulsory amount of money that companies must keep in order to be able to pay debts engendered 
by their clients. By law, reserves must be constituted of at least 15% of premiums received if a company covers more 
than 250'000 people. 
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Nuclear Medicine Association was mandated by the federal government to find a new way 
to accredit PET scanner providers for reimbursement purposes. The case study of the 
diffusion of the PET scanner in Switzerland documents this mandate. This 
Association is also the required to keep statistics on the number of PET scanner 
procedures performed in each PET centre throughout Switzerland. 
3.1.1.2.3 Funding and Allocation of Resources 
Switzerland recorded a GDP percentage of 11, 5% and a per capita spending of 5,035 
USD for its Health Care system in 2003. As compared with Quebec, Switzerland 
spent about one percent more of its wealth in health care (expenditure as a share of 
GDP), but spent twice as much as Quebec in absolute terms. Table 3.4 compares 
health care expenditures in both jurisdictions.  
TABLE 3.4: 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH, PER PERSON, AND AS A SHARE OF GDP IN 2003 
Quebec Switzerland
Total expenditure on health at USD 
exchange rate ('000 000)
18'640 36'949
Total expenditure on health per 
person at USD exchange rate
2'487 5'035
Total expenditure on health as a 
share of GDP (%)
10.4 11.5
 
Sources: OECD Source data 2006 – Statistics and Indicators for 30 countries & Eco-santé 
Quebec 2007 http://www.ecosante.fr/. 
The Swiss health care system is financed through three main channels. In 2003, 1) 
23.9% of health care expenditures came directly from the government (Federal, 
Cantonal and Communal), 2) 10.5% through social insurances schemes (accident 
insurance, military insurance, and disability insurance) and other social protection, 3) 
65.7% from private households such as compulsory and supplementary13 health 
insurances, cost-sharing and out-of-pocket (OECD 2006). Thus, it can be argued that 
only 34.3% of the Swiss health care system is publicly funded through tax-collection 
and 65.7% is private.  
Representing 35.7% of the total expenditure in Switzerland, health insurance 
premiums for compulsory (26.8%) and supplementary (9.0%) health insurances is the 
largest part of private payment shared by households (e.g. visiting a private hospital is 
not covered by compulsory health insurance). Compulsory health insurance premiums 
                                                     
13 Supplementary health insurances are risk-related, which mean insurance companies can charge clients according to 
their personal medical history. 
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are fixed according to market conditions by estimating the total expenditure per 
canton in the year to come and dividing it by the number of clients expected to 
subscribe to a health insurance company. These premiums are systematically audited 
by the Federal Office of Social Insurance.  
Cost-sharing which mainly includes deductible (varying negatively with premium costs 
and ranging from 500 CHF to 2500 CHF in 2005) and co-insurance (10% beyond the 
value of the deductible up to an amount of 700 CHF / year) account for 5.3 % of 
total expenditure in health care, and 23.7% comes from out-of-pocket. For very low 
income households, the federal and cantonal governments offer programs of aid.  
Overall, the proportion of expenditure sustained by private households is higher in 
Switzerland (65.7%) than in Quebec (28.8%) in 2003. This suggests that health care 
expenditure in the Quebec health care system is more collectively shared. Table 3.5 
compares the percentage of public and private health expenditure in both 
jurisdictions. 
TABLE 3.5: 
PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH EXPENDITURE IN 2003 
 Quebec  Switzerland 
Public  71.2  34.3 
Private  28.8  65.7 
 
Sources: OECD Reviews of Health Systems – Switzerland (2006) & Eco-santé Quebec 2007: 
http://www.ecosante.fr/. 
Hospital Payment. While outpatient interventions are entirely covered by health care 
insurance, 50 % of costs incurred for public hospital in-patients are covered by health 
care insurance with the other 50% being financed from the global budget. In hospital 
settings, reimbursement for in-patient services under compulsory health insurance was 
performed using different payment methods such as per diem, APDRG, global budget 
and a combination of these which varies from canton to canton. Consequently, 
reimbursement is not based on a uniform tariff across cantons. However, these fees 
are negotiated between individual or groups of hospitals, the cantonal association of 
insurance companies and the cantonal authority. To alleviate the financial burden, 
most cantons impose a “fixed budget for the subsidies paid to public and publicly 
subsidized hospitals as well as nursing homes” (European_Observatory 2000: 68).  
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When services are provided under supplementary health insurance, negotiated rates 
are higher to cover the more costly “hotel” and medical services. Costs generated by 
out-patients and by in-patients staying less than one night in hospital are covered by 
insurers often by using APDRG14.  
Physician payment. Doctors are paid according to different regimes. In most hospital 
settings, doctors are salaried, but can make substantial bonuses through the 
redistribution of the profit generated by their Unit. “They also receive limited 
additional payments for services provided to people with supplementary health 
insurance” (European Observatory, 2000: 69). However, for ambulatory services and 
less-than-one-night hospital in-patients, fee-for-service reimbursed by health 
insurances is the dominant payment mechanism. Doctors in private practice are paid 
on a fee-for-service basis, and no limit is set on their revenue.  
Before 2004, there were no flat rates across cantons in ambulatory settings and tariffs 
were negotiated at the cantonal level. However, since January 2004, a nationally 
unified structure of ambulatory medical fees called TARMED has been adopted to 
standardize tariffs across cantons. In an ambulatory setting, there is no limit to a 
doctor’s revenue. Ambulatory health care is provided outside hospitals by general 
practitioners and specialists as well as by dentists, physiotherapists, psychotherapists, 
chiropractors, homoeopathic practitioners, acupuncturists, dieticians, chiropodists, 
analyses in pharmacological or medical laboratories, etc.  
3.1.1.2.4 Regulations Specific to Expensive Technologies 
From 2004 onwards, the reimbursement of the PET scanner procedures has been 
covered by TARMED, and the tariff negotiated nationally, instead of for each canton. 
As a result, it removed the barriers on private hospitals to buy expensive technologies 
because it guarantees the same tariff to everyone, private or public hospital, or doctors 
with an independent practice. However, even after the introduction of TARMED, if 
an organization is refused reimbursement by the federal government, it can still 
negotiate reimbursement with the Cantonal Association (SantéSuisse at the cantonal 
level) of Insurance.  
In most cantons, the acquisition of expensive technology by public and publicly 
subsidized hospitals requires the authorization of the cantonal government. 
Investments of over 500,000 CHF in some cantons and of over 1 million CHF (i.e. 
                                                     
14 APDRG: All Patient Diagnostic Related Group is a method of classifying patients in order to receive payment 
according to the patient’s group. 
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approximately one million USD) in others need the consent of cantonal authorities. 
However, most cantons do not require private organizations to obtain such 
authorization, only a few cantons having a certificate-of-need regulation which 
requires private organizations to obtain the consent of the cantonal government.  
Before 2001, PET providers had to be nominated by the Federal Office for Social 
Insurance (OFAS) for health insurance companies to reimburse PET scanner 
procedures. This health care system was flexible to the extent that if the federal 
government refused to nominate a PET provider for reimbursement, it was still 
possible to negotiate at the cantonal level with health insurers to be reimbursed for 
certain applications. Since 2001, the Swiss Medical Association accredits PET centres 
for reimbursement according to quality criteria. 
In this health care system, adopting new technologies can be considered as a source of 
profit for PET providers since it may contribute to attract patients and to increase the 
number of payments. In Quebec, new technologies can be perceived as a source of 
cost since the government is systematically paying for all health care services. 
Consequently, the institutional environment can alter the way a technology is 
perceived and may influence the rate of diffusion of expensive technologies. This, 
combined with open competition in Switzerland between insurers and between health 
care providers, probably serves to explain at least partially why this jurisdiction has 
one of the highest density of high-end technological equipment among OECD 
countries (OECD 2006), and why it has a higher number of MRIs (93 versus 19) and 
CT-scanners (127 versus 93) than in Quebec as shown in table 3.6. 
TABLE 3.6: 
NUMBER OF CT-SCANNERS AND MRI IN OPERATION IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS IN 2001 
Quebec Switzerland
Computed Tomography Scanners 
(CT-scanners)
81 127
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI)
19 93
 
OECD Source data 2006 – Statistics and Indicators for 30 countries & Eco-santé Quebec 2007 
http://www.ecosante.fr/. 
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TABLE 3.7: 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF THE QUEBEC AND SWISS HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 
Dimensions Québec Switzerland
Economy More centrally planned More market oriented
Centralization Centralized Decentralized
Funding sources One Many
For public hospitals, authorization 
to buy expensive technology or to 
obtain a budget to do so
From the central government From the cantonal governments
Financing the operation of 
expensive technologies
Operational budget from the central 
government
Authorization to reimburse from the 
federal government
Hospitals: salaried
Private: fee-for-service
Ambulatory Hospital Payment Global Budget Fee-for-service
Types of hospitals Public Public and private
Health insurance companies One, entirely public Many
Technology Assessment Agency One None
Physician payments Fee-for-service (capped)
 
 
Overall, using the criteria of Scott (2004) the governance structure of Quebec’s health 
care system appears to be more cohesive than the Swiss one. Indeed, 1) it is centrally 
administered and funded by the Ministry of Health which delegates operations to 
Regional Health Authorities and health care institutions. Because the governance 
structure is centrally administered, 2) unity of governance is fairly high. Moreover, 3) 
the principal mode of governance is mainly public (one mode of governance 
dominates), 4) there are a limited number of structural models for hospitals (structural 
isomorphism), and 5) formal organizational linkages are numerous. These five 
dimensions tend to produce a highly structured organizational field according to the 
dimensions proposed by Scott (2004) and a high degree of structural isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2004). This high degree of structural coherence 
would tend to give the State a tighter control on the distribution of funds in the health 
care system. This picture contrasts with the governance structure in Switzerland which 
has a more fragmented health care system as there is no unity of governance, a 
decentralized administration, a high level of involvement of private institutions, and 
where there are numerous structural models for hospitals and formal organizational 
linkages are not so intense as in Quebec. Table 3.7 summarizes the main differences 
between the governance structures of these two health care systems.  
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3.2 METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
Case study research methodology is particularly appropriate for the study of processes 
and for highly context-sensitive inquiry (Patton 2002; Yin 2003). As Eisenhardt (1989) 
and Yin (2003) suggest, case studies are particularly useful for answering “why” and 
“how” questions, examining emergent relationships (Eisenhardt 1989) and 
understanding how processes evolve over time (Langley 1999).  
Data on the adoption and diffusion processes for the PET scanner was collected 
through interviews and documentation. Overall, 88 semi-structured interviews (42 in 
Quebec and 46 in Switzerland) transcribed by a professional typist were carried out 
with key people involved in the diffusion or the adoption of the PET scanner at all 
levels of analysis: national (federal), regional (cantonal) and at each adoption site. 
More specifically, 33 interviews of 40 to 110 minutes and 9 interviews of 20 to 40 
minutes were conducted in Quebec and 36 interviews of 40 to 110 minutes and 10 
interviews of 20 to 40 minutes in Switzerland. Table 3.8 gives an overview of the total 
number of interviews per organization that was performed in each jurisdiction. 
To maximize the time devoted to the interview and to cover all relevant aspects, an 
interview guide was crafted according to the conceptual framework (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Patton 2002) synthesized in figure 2.1 (see section 2.2). The 
interview guide covered respondents' perceptions of the institutional environment, of 
the innovation itself, and of the role of different participants in adoption both within 
their own local context and more broadly. Interviews began by asking the interviewee 
to tell the story of the PET scanner in which she/he was involved. Respondents were 
then asked to explain what the technology meant to them, what were the arguments 
for and against the technology, what legitimization strategies were used, what was the 
impact of the adoption, and to describe the decision processes in which they 
participated as well as the role of all institutional actors involved. The interview guide 
was adapted according to the particularities of each jurisdiction (see Appendix A for 
the French version of the interview guide used in Switzerland). To participate in the 
research, informants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix B) stating their 
right to withdraw from the research and the purpose of the research. The consent 
form also guaranteed the confidentiality of the data. 
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TABLE 3.8: 
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS PER ORGANIZATION 
Level Organizations
Number of 
interviews
Organizations
Number of 
interviews
National
Ministry of Health & Ministry 
of Economy 5 Department of Health 5
Medical Associations 4 Medical Associations 1
Patient Association 1 Health Insurance Association 2
Manufacturers 2 Manufacturers 2
Health Technology Assessment 
Agency 3
Regional Regional Agencies of Health 3 Cantonal Department of Health 4
Local THA1 5 THD 6
THA2 4 THN 4
THA3 2 THS 4
THB 5 THU 3
THC 4 THV 4
GHC 2 CHG 1
PCA 1 CHR 2
PCC 1 CHT 1
PCQ 0 CHZ 3
PCXS 0
PCD 1
PCDV 1
PCV1 1
PCV2 1
Total 42 Total 46
SwitzerlandQuebec
 
Internal and external documents were also collected and analyzed to document 
processes, to examine written theorizations of the technology, to identify institutional 
logics inherent to each system and for triangulation purposes (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). Because triangulation involves the comparison of 
information collected in interviews with written documents, it provides higher validity 
to analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994). At the end of each interview, interviewees 
were asked to provide internal documents related to the diffusion or adoption of the 
PET scanner in their organizations. National and regional newspapers were also 
screened to collect public information related to the subject.  
3.2.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
To compare diffusion patterns, detailed case narratives were constructed for each 
region in each jurisdiction through iterations between data collection and data analysis 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994) and with the help of a visual mapping 
strategy (Langley 1999; see examples in sections 4.2 and 4.4). The narratives were 
useful in breaking down the complexity of the data into manageable chunks and 
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allowing meanings and specific mechanisms to emerge (Eisenhardt 1989; Langley 
1999). Each narrative was then revised by two interviewees of each jurisdiction to 
testify its validity and to suggest improvements. Each individual adoption or attempt 
at adoption in both Quebec and Switzerland was documented and analyzed in terms 
of the rationales used by adopters, their actions and their outcomes. The case studies 
thus cover three regions in Quebec and nine cantons in Switzerland and involve nine 
organizations in the former and fourteen in the latter.  
However, the use of narrative strategies has clear limitations in terms of generality and 
simplicity15 (Miles and Huberman 1994; Langley 1999). Thus, complementary 
analytical strategies were mobilized. The main idea is to combine different analysis 
techniques in order to avoid bias and to allow theoretical generalization (Yin 2003). As 
Eisenhardt (1989: 540) remarks: 
“…people are notoriously poor processors of information. They leap to 
conclusions based on limited data (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), they are overly 
influenced by the vividness (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) or by more elite respondents 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984), they ignore basic statistical properties (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973), or they sometimes inadvertently drop disconfirming evidence 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The danger is that investigators reach premature and 
even false conclusions as a result of these information-processing biases. Thus, 
the key to good cross-case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by 
looking at the data in many divergent ways.” 
To counter these biases and to explore similarities and discrepancies between cases, 
visual mapping strategies and matrix displays were used to synthesize the data (Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Langley 1999) and to compare the evolution of the processes 
across the two jurisdictions. By showing precedence, parallel processes, and passage of 
time (Langley 1999), visual mapping strategies enable the detection of key macro 
patterns. This strategy allows the simultaneous representations of many dimensions of 
phenomena thereby showing macro processes at work (Langley 1999). This technique 
was also used conjointly with narrative strategy to build case studies. Matrix displays 
are also helpful to explore, analyse and display results of within-case analysis and are 
remarkably useful for the synthesis of data for cross-case analysis (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Examples of how I grouped citations in order to create categories 
and analyse data are presented in Appendix C. 
Theory building strategies not only allow, but also encourage iterations between data 
collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994). This 
increases the probability for the researcher to discover new relationships and to 
                                                     
15 According to Langley (1999), generality refers to the range of circumstances in which the theory would be valid, and 
simplicity implies a high explanatory power with few elements and theoretical relationships.  
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exploit opportunities as they show up (Miles and Huberman 1994). Accordingly, my 
data collection was conducted iteratively with a wave of interviews being performed 
and then analysed in each jurisdiction: further interviews were conducted in order to 
address gaps in the data set. In the case of Quebec, 22 interviews were performed and 
analysed in the first wave. This was an opportunity to identify new concepts and new 
relationships and led to some modifications of the interview guide (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Miles and Huberman 1994). Then, 13 interviews were carried out in Switzerland to 
explore the compatibility of this jurisdiction with the research imperatives. While a 
second wave of 20 interviews was conducted in Quebec to saturate the data set, 
successive waves of 21 interviews and 12 interviews were carried out in Switzerland. 
Iterations between data collection and data analysis stopped when the marginal benefit 
of analysing and collecting further was negligible in providing additional information 
about the elements of the conceptual framework, the relationships between them and 
their deployment through time (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, interviews were performed 
and documents were collected up to the saturation16 of the data set (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). Where in some instances only one interview was performed, 
documentation was systematically collected to support actors’ arguments. In 
Switzerland, only one organization refused to participate in the study, but many 
documents were made available to compensate this gap. In Quebec, one organization 
was not included due to its very low potential for adding significant input to this 
research. 
Analysis of the data led us to identify the importance of struggles between actors in 
the organizational field along two axes, described as vertical and horizontal. On the 
one hand, vertical struggles refer to confrontations between the regulator (Ministry of 
Health in Quebec, various agencies in Switzerland) and other institutional actors. The 
term horizontal struggle was used to refer to the competition among institutional actors 
for scarce resources. As the case studies show, although Quebec’s health care system 
is not theoretically a competitive market, competition among health care providers 
nevertheless permeated the diffusion process. As mentioned at the end of the 
previous chapter, I also came to qualify these struggles in terms of two inter-related 
modes of action: struggles for meaning, in which participants drew explicitly on different 
theorizations to justify their positions and to translate the technology in terms that 
were favourable to them; and struggles for control in which organizational actors 
mobilized authority and material resources to achieve their goals. I adapted the notion 
                                                     
16 Saturation refers to the point where additional interviews or documentation does not provide new information. 
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of theorization (Strang and Meyer 1993; Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Strang and Soule 
1998) to include statements dealing with four questions: what was the purpose of the 
technology, why the technology should be adopted, who should adopt it, and how it 
should be diffused. Once theorizations were identified, public documents and reports 
were screened in order to identify institutional logics inherent in both health care 
systems. 
When data was close to saturation and analyses were almost complete, propositions 
were shaped. As compared to a hypothesis-testing approach, hypotheses emerged 
from the analysis instead of being set a priori (Eisenhardt 1989). To achieve this, 
process data, observed patterns across cases and conceptual constructs were 
compared to identify similarities and differences across case studies. In order to attain 
construct validity, data and observed patterns or theoretical constructs were constantly 
and iteratively compared (Eisenhardt 1989). Because the results of this study are 
replicated in the two jurisdictions, this research has stronger theoretical generalization 
(Yin 2003). Finally, to ensure internal validity and to generalize the study, results were 
connected to existing literature to find similarities and discrepancies (Eisenhardt 
1989). For this purpose, a broad range of literature was presented in the theoretical 
background section in the previous chapter. The following section presents the case 
narratives of the diffusion processes in Quebec and in Switzerland, emphasizing how 
struggles for meaning and struggles for control punctuated the processes and how the 
institutional environment modulated these struggles.  
 58
 59
 
4 CHAPTER IV 
 
CASE STUDIES & WITHIN CASES ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the narratives of the diffusion of the PET scanner in Quebec 
(more centralized) and in Switzerland (more market-oriented). These detailed case 
studies are punctuated by short analysis which synthesizes events of each subsection 
and are each followed by a larger within case analysis which theorizes the diffusion 
process in each jurisdiction. Before moving to the presentation of the narratives, the 
characteristics of the PET scanner as a bandwagon technology are exposed as these 
attributes influenced the diffusion of this innovation. 
4.1 THE PET SCANNER AS A BANDWAGON TECHNOLOGY 
Prior to detailing the key events in the two diffusion narratives, it is important to note 
certain commonalities that emerged from the analysis of these narratives. This initial 
analysis of the data provides the readers with the motivation behind adoption and the 
broad picture of the diffusion process, thereby easing the understanding and reading 
of these narratives. It is clear that in both jurisdictions the PET scanner took on the 
qualities of a bandwagon technology i.e., a technology that is hard to stop diffusing due to 
powerful convergent incentives. The governance structures in both institutional 
contexts afforded incentives for nuclear doctors and hospitals to adopt the technology 
as quickly as possible – and preferably in advance of rivals – in order to provide the 
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best care for patients, consolidate prestige, maintain their position with respect to 
other providers, attract patients and doctors, enhance revenues and remain viable sites 
for clinical research. For example, hospitals in Quebec were eager to receive a budget 
for PET scans due to the profit that could be generated. Specialist doctors also 
derived benefits from adopting this technology despite capped quarterly revenue. 
Once this limit is reached, the money earned is taxed at around 75% so there is a 
disincentive to do further work, but there is an important incentive to reach this limit 
as soon as possible in order to perform other activities inside or outside the hospital. 
In Switzerland, some hospitals made a substantial profit for each PET scan performed 
and profit redistribution also advantaged some doctors. 
If direct financial benefits are one important dimension of bandwagon technology as 
we shall see in the narratives, horizontal struggles impel would-be PET providers to 
adopt as quickly as possible in order to obtain a significant share of the benefits by 
attracting patients and increasing organizational prestige which can in turn attract 
good quality doctors and research funds. Moreover, providers in Switzerland were 
even more eager to adopt earlier because a critical mass of 4 to 5 patients per day has 
to be reached to be profitable. This clearly incites organizations to be the first movers 
not only in their canton, but throughout Switzerland. Hence, this urge to adopt lies at 
the root of the horizontal struggles and is illustrated in table 4.1 by excerpts from 
interviews in the two jurisdictions. As we will see, regulatory bodies in both 
institutional contexts attempted to control the diffusion of the technology (with 
greater or lesser success) because of concerns about effectiveness (quality), efficiency 
and economy. This gave rise to vertical struggles between would-be adopters and 
regulators. 
TABLE 4.1: 
THE PET SCANNER AS A BANDWAGON TECHNOLOGY 
 Quebec Switzerland 
Best care 
Beating the 
competition 
“If we want to give the best cancer care, we 
have to have this equipment. There’s 
competition between the general hospital and 
the teaching hospital to determine who will 
dominate cancer programs in the region.” 
“Losing this technology would mean weakening 
our cancer institute in relation to the competition 
and we can’t allow that if we want to remain 
leaders in this sector.” 
Benefits to 
doctors 
“We learn things and we have the impression 
that we are giving better services to clients. 
And its an activity that generally brings in 
revenues…” 
“This way, Nuclear Medicine doctors gained an 
additional 20,000 CHF a year per doctor.” 
Maintaining 
research 
viability 
“At X university, they are excluded from over 
30 multi-centre clinical protocols [for lack of a 
PET scanner]. They become regional, they 
can’t have an impact.”
“To position ourselves in research who don’t give 
pharmaceuticals projects if the institute does not 
have a PET scanner.”  
Prestige, 
attractiveness 
“Pride in having something that others don’t 
have. The pride or desire to be bigger… 
always bigger.”  
“The CEO of the teaching hospital needed a 
new boss for the nuclear medicine department, 
and he had to offer a PET scanner [to make the 
hospital attractive].” 
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This bandwagon effect which was influenced by horizontal and vertical struggles is an 
important motor for the diffusion of the PET scanner in both jurisdictions. The 
diffusion curves of the PET scanner in both health-care systems are drawn in figure 
4.1. They show that from 1986 till the end of 2006, Switzerland had adopted twice as 
many PET scanners as in Quebec (22 versus 11). Considering the initial date of 
adoption in each jurisdiction up to the end of 2006, the rate of adoption in 
Switzerland is 1.10 PET scanners per year on average (22 PET scanners / 20 years), 
while Quebec has an adoption rate of 0.34 PET scanners per year (11 PET scanners / 
32 years).  
FIGURE 4.1: 
DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC AND SWITZERLAND17  
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Comparing the number of the PET scanners adopted in both jurisdictions shows the 
diffusion to be much faster and wider in Switzerland than in Quebec. This is not 
surprising given that the set of governance mechanisms is clearly more market-driven 
in Switzerland and that the distribution of MRI and CT scanners in both jurisdictions 
(see table 3.6) clearly suggests a more extensive diffusion in Switzerland. The dates of 
adoption of PET and PET-CT scanner in Quebec and in Switzerland, from which the 
diffusion curves were built, are presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. 
                                                     
17 These curves begin at the moment each jurisdiction had a PET prototype sufficiently developed to produce reliable 
clinical data. Figure 4.1 includes all PET and PET-CT scanners acquired under both health care systems. 
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TABLE 4.2: 
ADOPTION DATES OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC 
Number of 
PET scanners
Adoption 
Dates
Organi-
zations
PET 
scanners
Regions
1 01.06.1975 UA2 PET A
2 01.01.1998 THB PET B
3 01.01.2001 THB PET B
4 01.01.2003 THA1 PET A
5 17.05.2004 THA2 PET-CT A
6 01.09.2004 PCA PET-CT A
7 01.10.2004 GHA PET-CT A
8 15.10.2004 PCQ PET-CT Q
9 01.11.2005 THA1 PET-CT A
10 01.05.2006 THC PET-CT C
11 01.10.2006 PCC PET-CT C  
 
 
TABLE 4.3: 
ADOPTION DATES OF THE PET SCANNER IN SWITZERLAND 
Number of 
PET scanners
Adoption 
Dates
Organi-
zations
PET 
scanners
Cantons
1 01.06.1986 IR PET R
2 01.06.1993 THV PET V
3 01.12.1993 THU PET U
4 01.10.1995 THV PET V
5 01.06.1998 PCXS PET S
6 01.09.1999 THU PET U
7 01.07.2000 SPHS PET S
8 01.03.2001 THU PET-CT U
9 01.05.2001 SPCHT PET T
10 02.08.2001 PET PCN PET N
11 01.11.2002 THD PET D
12 01.11.2003 CHR PET R
13 01.03.2004 PCV1 PET-CT V
14 01.04.2004 PCV2 PET-CT V
15 01.06.2004 CHG PET G
16 01.08.2004 THU PET-CT U
17 01.12.2004 PCDV PET-CT D
18 01.07.2005 PET PCN PET-CT N
19 01.08.2005 SPCHZ   PET-CT Z
20 01.09.2005 PCD2 PET-CT D
21 01.12.2005 THV PET-CT V
22 02.12.2005 THV PET-CT V  
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These dates and curves are revealing in themselves. However, they do not tell us 
anything about the actual processes through which diffusion took place, in particular 
how the tensions played themselves out. These processes are elaborated in detail in 
the current chapter with the successive presentation of the narratives of Quebec and 
Switzerland. 
4.2 THE DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC 
This case study describes in details the diffusion of the PET scanner in Quebec and is 
characterized by two periods which are separated by the publication of a health 
technology assessment report on the PET scanner. Before this publication, there was 
mounting pressure for diffusion which corresponds to the struggle of actors in 
defining the major applications of this technology i.e. whether in cardiology or in 
oncology18. The period following the publication of this report which provided 
legitimacy to the PET scanner is characterized by two interacting stories. One of these 
features the clash of incompatible and divergent theorizations based on institutional 
logics of quality and access where interest groups are disputing the way this 
technology should be implemented. While theorization is a discursive strategy 
providing rationales, meanings and interpretations which legitimate and make sense of 
adopting innovations, institutional logics are organizing principles which orient actor 
behaviour and cognitive schemes. In the second story, actors began adopting the 
technology without the consent of the authorities. This adoption which challenges the 
position of the government is a form of what I call institution testing, i.e. an action 
against regulatory constraints. To stop this deviant behaviour, a dissemination plan 
specifying which and when organizations can obtain the PET scanner was elaborated. 
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of the chronology of events (visual mapping) that 
marked the diffusion of this technology in Quebec’s organizational field.  
The study examines adoption in three natural geographic regions that are fairly 
physically remote from one another. These are designated by the letters A, B and C 
where A is the most populated region with around three millions people, C the second 
most demographically important with about half a million people, and B a relatively 
less populated area with a little more than a hundred thousand people that 
nevertheless includes a university with a faculty of medicine.  
                                                     
18 The PET scanner was and is also marginally used in neurology. Neurologists were not involved in defining the 
purpose of the PET scanner. 
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FIGURE 4.2: 
VISUAL MAPPING OF THE DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC 
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4.2.1 DEFINING THE PET SCANNER TECHNOLOGY 
4.2.1.1 Region A: Developing the Machine THA2 – 1975 
The first PET scanner in Quebec was acquired in 1974 in the region A by the 
Department of Neurology at the University UA2. This acquisition was entirely 
financed through research funds and produced the first brain image in 1975. In 1981, 
following the acquisition of a cyclotron by the research team in neurology, radio-
isotopes started being produced locally. Four years later, the Quebec Association of 
Nuclear Medicine which was and is still defending the interests of patients and of 
nuclear doctors asked the Quebec Health Insurance Agency to reimburse doctors at a 
rate of $250 CND/procedure for the PET scanner. This request was accepted. 
4.2.1.2 Region B: Adopting a PET Scanner for Clinical Applications - 
1998 
The adoption of the second PET scanner in Quebec at the teaching hospital THB 
resulted from the enterprise of a nuclear doctor who relentlessly fought to persuade 
the Quebec Ministry of Health to invest in the creation of a research center, which 
would include a PET scanner and a cyclotron for research applications in oncology. 
For twenty years, this entrepreneur built up organizational assets such as developing 
an internationally renowned group of researchers in radiation technology, offering a 
unique PhD in radiation in Canada, and patenting a PET scanner prototype, all of 
which contributed to consecrate THB as a major centre in nuclear medicine. These 
assets and the competence developed provided legitimacy to THB which persuaded 
first the Ministry of Industry of Canada as well as private donators to finance this 
project. It is only when half of the financial resources were gathered that the Quebec 
Ministry of Health did agree to participate financially in this project; although region B 
was clearly less populated than regions A and C. 
In 1995, the main purpose of the PET scanner was still to perform research. 
However, with the development of new indications in oncology and the 
underutilisation of the PET scanner in research, the newly appointed nuclear doctor 
who was completing his training in the USA, started organizing from abroad what was 
required to use the machine for clinical applications. To do so, he needed an operating 
budget. Because the Ministry of Health did not want to provide him with financial 
resources to run the PET scanner, he persuaded the hospital to provide him with a 
small budget.  
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In 1998, the first PET scanner procedures were financed through research funds and 
through a special budget supplied by the teaching hospital. However, this small budget 
was largely insufficient and teaching hospital THB was insistently asking the Ministry 
of Health for an operating budget19 to run this expensive technology. Clinical 
arguments as well as citing cost-benefit studies were developed to defend the case: 
“These arguments, coming from scientific publications, clearly proved that, for 
example, when planning a lung cancer therapy, an exam done prior to a 
chirurgical intervention would reveal numerous unsuspected ailments. A better 
evaluation of the physical condition eliminated useless operations. […] 
Moreover, a few American publications also demonstrated that a favourable 
cost-profit ratio could be produced with this exam, within an American 
situation.” 
While these arguments may have influenced the Ministry of Health to provide an 
operational budget to the teaching hospital THB, patients who began going to the 
USA to undergo a PET scan were more problematic. Indeed, the law states that once 
a procedure is recognized as being medically required, if the technology is not 
available in Quebec, doctors can send their patients to the USA. In this case, the 
Ministry of Health has to reimburse the procedures to the patient, and here USA PET 
scanner expenditures were important. Hence, funding the operations of one PET 
scanner centre avoided having to pay for expensive examinations outside Quebec: 
“Once the technology is approved in the United States, Quebec doctors will 
often send their patients over there to get the exam, saying that the procedure 
has been approved and that the exam is available. But this was accomplished at 
an enormous cost. First, US medical bills are much more expensive there than 
in Quebec. Second, many Quebecers do not speak English, and needed 
numerous translating services, which added to the bill. […] Theses facts led to 
the conclusion that, if the exam is requested from a medical standpoint, it must 
also be made available inside our own health care system.” 
The first use of the PET scanner in a clinical setting aroused consternation among 
nuclear doctors around the province, especially from those practising in major 
teaching hospitals in the regions A and C, and it prompted those hospitals to press for 
a PET scanner for themselves. No one actually understood why a PET scanner was 
installed in a relatively small and remote area. Irrationality and political games were 
invoked to explain this unexpected situation. 
                                                     
19 Obtaining an operational budget for the PET scanner was not the only challenge faced by teaching hospital THB. 
Indeed, before being used or commercialized, pharmaceutical substances have to be registered with Health Canada to 
prove its harmlessness. Since the FDG is a public molecule, no private company intended to pay $400'000 CND for 
the registration procedure, and no public hospital had the financial capacity to do so. Negotiations between teaching 
hospital THB and Health Canada led to an agreement which allowed the use of FDG under a clinical trial protocol. 
This agreement is still in force nowadays. 
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In addition to this, the decision of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to 
authorize the reimbursement of the PET scanner for lung cancer as well as the wide 
and fast diffusion of this technology in USA contributed to build up pressure on the 
Ministry of Health to diffuse this technology on a larger scale: 
“The FDA [Federal Drug Administration] had an impact on demand because, 
once the FDA had recognized the technology, and especially the Centres for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services… which is the payer, when they began to pay 
in the States, then of course there were huge pressures here because we always 
compare ourselves with the United States in a North-American environment.”  
In July 2001, THB surprisingly acquired a second PET scanner; officially for research 
purposes. This adoption was the consequence of a private-public partnership with the 
manufacturer W which became involved in order to develop a new PET scanner. In 
exchange, the manufacturer W would sell the PET scanner at a lower price. The 
choice to deal with THB was attributed to the highly positive reputation of this 
organization in this domain. This second adoption increased the general 
misunderstanding of region B having two PET scanners while major centres in the 
most populated area of Quebec had none. 
Meanwhile, though hospitals in the region A were astonished, most of them were 
caught in political tensions due to the merger of teaching hospitals. Hence, many cases 
were dropped temporarily in favour of other important issues related to these 
mergers.  
4.2.1.3 Region C: Competing in Vain to Obtain a PET Scanner – 1988-
2001 
While the acquisition of the PET scanner by the teaching hospital THB encountered 
no competition either locally or nationally, competition in region C between the 
hospital GHC, a specialized hospital in cardiology and in lung cancer, and THC, the 
most important teaching hospital in the area, seriously impeded any attempt at 
adoption. As early as 1988, both hospitals were already striving to persuade the 
Ministry of Health to acquire a PET scanner for clinical purposes as well as for 
research, but the technology was not sufficiently mature from a clinical point of view 
to convince the authority and for hospitals to continue struggling for this cause. In 
1995, cumulating evidence for lung cancer revived interests of both hospitals in 
obtaining this technology, and in 1997-1998 each hospital submitted a report to the 
Health Services Regional Agency. In 2001, both hospitals sent an up-dated version of 
these reports to the same agency: 
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“Medical literature reported awesome clinical results when using PET scans for, 
among others, lung cancer. This was the first kind of cancer where their efficacy 
was documented. (…) This produced a renewed interest for PET scans around 
1994-1995. It became known, in oncology circles, that using the procedure 
could yield significant information on lung cancer diagnosis. This led us to 
produce a brand new report on this topic in 1997.” 
TABLE 4.4: 
COMPETING QUALITY-BASED THEORIZATIONS IN REGION C 
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
Hospital THC: PET for oncology Hospital GHC: PET for cardiology 
What to adopt? Definition 
of the innovation 
 
Oncology vs. Cardiology 
 PET as a research tool 
 PET as a clinical tool for oncology 
 
Argument supported by one article containing 
a systematic review of evidence supporting 
PET for oncology. 
 
"Clinical indications for the PET technology are by 
order of importance, oncology (over 18 pathologies for 
which indications are recognized), neurology (2 
indications), and cardiology (1 indication)."  
 PET as a clinical tool for cardiology 
and pulmonary oncology 
 
Argument supported by reference to 51 
studies, 42 of which provide evidence for 
cardiac applications. 
 
"The two areas where clinical use and potential are 
best developed and recognized are precisely for heart 
disease and lung cancer." 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation founded 
on common quality-based 
logic but a different 
definition of the innovation 
 PET has several clinical advantages 
 
Early diagnosis of cancer 
Early evaluation of the effectiveness of anticancer 
therapeutic interventions 
etc. 
 PET scanner is effective 
 
"Several studies confirmed the high diagnostic 
performance of the PET scanner for the detection of 
heart disease." 
"The PET scanner has emerged as an important 
diagnostic tool in the treatment of lung cancer." 
Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Common quality-based 
arguments based on different 
definitions of the innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric quality-based 
arguments based on 
competence 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric efficiency-
based arguments 
 Those whose missions and activities 
are aligned with the technology 
 
Hospital Mission: Large volume of patients in 
oncology; particular research vocation. 
 
"The strong points of the hospital were that it was a 
large hospital treating more than half of the clinical 
activity in oncology in the region." 
"THC wanted the machine because they are a centre 
for excellence and technology evaluation. They wanted 
to do research with that." 
 
 
 Those with appropriate competence 
"At THC, there was already a physician team. We 
had hired two nuclear doctors who were trained or in 
training with fellowships of a least a year."  
"We already had a solid physician team to make the 
cyclotron work, and to take care of it." 
 
 Those whose missions and activities 
are aligned with the technology 
 
Hospital Mission: Large volume of patients in 
cardiology & lung cancer. 
 
"GHC is a designated university  
institute in cardiology and pneumology where the 
highest number of heart surgeries are undertaken each 
year. It is also the centre with the highest number of 
lung cancer surgeries" 
"We have the largest group of pneumology specialists in 
Canada." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Those who need the cyclotron close to 
their installation 
"Our argument at GHC was that we needed the 
cyclotron in cardiology given the short half-lives of 
radiopharmaceuticals in this speciality" 
"By having it on our site, it could still be used by 
Hospital THC who work more in oncology" 
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These reports draw on competing theorizations which are summarized in Table 4.420. 
In this case, both hospitals were in competition and each theorized in such a way that 
its own site would be perceived by the authorities to be most appropriate for a PET 
scanner: 
 “When teaching hospital THC realized that we handed in an application for a 
PET scanner, they quickly reacted by writing one in which they argued that it 
was their hospital that should have everything [a cyclotron and a PET scanner]. 
They were directly competing against us. There was a competition between us 
to convince the authorities.” 
Specifically, because of its dual mission in cardiology and in lung cancer, the hospital 
GHC declared itself to be the best centre to receive a PET scanner. It contended that 
its supra-regional mission combined with the fact that it performed the highest 
number of cardiac surgical operations justified obtaining a PET scanner. Since the 
evidence on the potential in the case of lung cancer was indisputable, the hospital 
GHC also emphasized the fact that they were performing the highest number of 
surgeries in pulmonary cancer. On the other hand, teaching hospital THC argued that 
oncology was the main application of PET scanner. Given that more than half of the 
clinical activities in oncology in the region C were performed at THC, it argued that it 
should be the first centre to adopt a PET scanner. Also, since the cyclotron was 
essential to the production of radiopharmaceuticals, its location also became an issue. 
Because the half-life of the radiopharmaceutical used in cardiology is approximately 2 
minutes, the hospital GHC argued that the cyclotron should be close to their building. 
Emphasizing its mission in research and in evaluating new technology, THC argued 
that the cyclotron should be in their organization. These self-interested arguments and 
destructive battles did not accelerate the diffusion of the technology given that the 
government was trapped, not knowing who should obtain the technology. Moreover, 
important financial constraints such as a high deficit did not allow the government to 
provide both hospitals with this technology:  
“Confronted with this tug-of-war, how did the Managers of the Health Services 
Regional Agency react? They took no decisions. They did nothing. They did not 
know what to do. And don’t forget that, for them, cost is the most important 
consideration. They did not mind investing nothing, especially in a context 
where hospitals are still in deficit.” 
                                                     
20 Excerpts are drawn from the 2001 reports. Arguments mobilized in this report mirror the ones of the previous 
1997-1998 reports. 
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Institutions were involved in several political style approaches, and sometimes 
getting quite close to interference. […] Some direct interventions were made 
towards members of the Regional Board Commission, trying to influence them, 
so they would vote in favour of a given option. […] People wrote extensive 
letters, presented their report, made numerous phone calls and other similar 
approaches. 
Hence, confronted with these struggles, the Ministry of Health had no choice but to 
avoid announcing an investment that might turn out to be in its disfavour: 
“Even in ‘C’ region, there were debates between THC and the GHC. They told 
us: ‘settle your own problems. The minister won’t get the news out, only to be 
fired upon by one of the two hospitals.’ ”  
Later on, the Committee of the Regional Health Services Agency of region C agreed 
that three machines were required in the area given that a third hospital in the region 
manifested its interest in obtaining a PET scanner. This recommendation to the 
Ministry of Health initially relieved THC and hospital GHC from their fierce 
competition, at least regarding this issue.  
4.2.2 ANALYSIS 
The strategy deployed by teaching hospital THB to find financial resources for a PET 
scanner through alternative channels (the Ministry of Industry and from private 
donators) reveals the entrepreneurship of this doctor who found alternative ways to 
finance the new machine. This was a convincing strategy to get the Ministry of Health 
involved in the project. While adopting the technology for research purposes was 
certainly an important issue, obtaining an operational budget from the government for 
clinical applications was another. This gave rise to a vertical struggle between THB 
and the Ministry of Health. While the former wanted a budget in order to use its 
machine more efficiently and to continue developing an expertise in the domain, the 
Ministry of Health was confronted with the continuous challenge of cost-
containment. The case illustrates that it is when the Ministry of Health understood 
that providing funds might limit expenses by preventing doctors from referring 
patients to the USA that a budget was granted to THB. 
While THB was in a situation of monopoly in its region, region C was the theatre of 
intense horizontal struggle which pushed the hospitals to develop different 
theorizations aimed at shaping the perception of authorities regarding what the 
purpose of the technology was, as well as why and how it should be diffused (see Table 
4.4). They mainly drew on clinical scientific evidence to support their arguments. 
Accordingly, each hospital deployed a quality-based theorization to convince the 
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authorities. Our analysis illuminates three dimensions of theorization: 1) the definition 
of the technology (what), 2) benefits of the technology (why), and 3) justifying a 
solution (who and how). First, given the uncertainty surrounding what the technology 
could actually achieve, both camps were using different scientific evidence to define 
the technology in a way that supported their positions. For example, THC argued that 
there were potentially many more applications in oncology using one paper 
developing a systematic literature review, whereas hospital GHC displayed a large 
array of studies in cardiology involving the PET scanner to prove its significance in 
this domain while also emphasizing its maturity for lung cancer applications. 
Considering why this technology should be diffused, both actors emphasized similar 
arguments but aligned them with different definitions of the technology. Again, as to 
how to diffuse or how to implement the technology locally, the actors proposed to 
align diffusion of the technology with their interpretation of the evidence and its 
correspondence (or fit) to the hospital's mission. Indeed, each hospital asserted that its 
specialty was precisely related to the state of the evidence in order to provide 
legitimacy to its institutional position in the field as being a potential receiver.  
In addition, THC used competence-based arguments to enhance its organizational 
legitimacy, while hospital GHC invoked pragmatic issues of efficiency related to the 
location of the cyclotron. Nevertheless as shown in table 4.4, the dominant 
institutional logic invoked in this debate was clearly based on quality of care (Scott, 
Ruef et al. 2000). The arguments about the evidence and the clear perception that the 
two hospitals saw evidence differently and were at the same time undermining the 
theoretical claims of their adversaries did not contribute to accelerating diffusion at 
this point. 
4.2.3 THE HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES: A CLASH BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS 
4.2.3.1 Legitimizing the PET Scanner through a Report – October 2001 
Altogether, quarrels in region C, the first clinical use of the technology in the province 
of Quebec, the authorization to reimburse the PET scanner procedure by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services in USA, and the emerging evidence in the 
scientific literature praising the clinical benefits of the PET scanner stimulated both 
the president of a Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine and a Patients’ 
Association for Cancer to ask the Ministry of Health to produce a report on the cost-
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effectiveness of this technology. This request was addressed to the Health Technology 
Assessment Agency in September 2000.  
While the legitimization of the PET scanner as a clinical tool in this organizational 
field was strongly enhanced with its first clinical use and with the authorization for 
reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the USA, the 
publication of the Health Technology Assessment Agency (HTAA) report in October 
2001 confirmed the evidence-based legitimacy of the PET scanner in this 
organizational field as an indispensable diagnostic tool for specific conditions. The 
clinical conclusions of this report were unequivocal and claimed that at least 15,000 
examinations were required annually. Although the report does not proclaim any 
dominant application (cardiology, oncology, neurology), it definitively supports its 
legitimacy. Indeed, from that moment, the legitimacy (derived from evidence) of this 
technology was associated with an intensification of hospitals asking to have a PET 
scanner, especially in the region A: 
“After the HTAA report, the first impact and the most visible one is that we 
received rapidly many applications from the organizations that were all referring 
to this report.” 
Besides legitimating the technology in this organizational field, the HTAA report 
suggested how the PET scanner should be disseminated in the province of Quebec. 
Table 4.5 provides the quality-based theorization in the report that legitimized the 
PET scanner.  
The following quotations from interviews support our contention that from then on 
the technology was perceived as legitimate from a clinical point of view. Indeed, all 
the citations point to an evidence-based legitimacy that would eventually lead to the 
technology being taken for granted as an essential medical tool based on a quality of 
care institutional logic: 
“It's like asking whether you need an operating room in a hospital. (…) It's an 
indispensable and necessary tool.” 
- Nuclear doctor 
“It's inevitable; it's a question of the quality of medicine. Some will even say that 
it is bad medical practice not to use it in diagnosis.” 
- President of a Medical Association 
“After the Health Technology Assessment Agency report, the first and most 
visible impact is that we rapidly received many requests from the hospitals that 
were all referring to this report.” 
- Biomedical engineer 
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TABLE 4.5: 
QUALITY-BASED THEORIZATIONS OF THE HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AGENCY REPORT 
PROVIDING LEGITIMACY TO THE PET SCANNER 
What to adopt?  
Definition of the 
innovation 
 The PET scanner as a clinical and a research tool. 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation 
essentially grounded in 
quality-based arguments 
 
 Population clinical needs  
“Clinical needs appear sufficient to justify an adequate deployment of PET 
technology.”  
 
 Clinical utility of the technology 
“The HTAA study confirms the clinical usefulness of PET in several 
oncological, neurological and cardiological applications.”  
How it should be 
deployed?  
 
Distribution based on 
equity (access-based logic), 
but with a major economic 
dissuasive argument 
 
 
Distribution based on 
competence (quality-based 
logic) 
 Progressively because of the high cost
“These estimated needs can only be satisfied progressively. In a normal 
operating mode, PET scans would require from ten to twelve cameras, 
powered by three or four cyclotrons (including those already available). 
According to accepted implementation schemes, the global cost of 
deploying additional PET resources could reach more than a hundred 
million dollars.”  
 
 Progressively because competence has to be developed 
“A progressive deployment is even more advisable considering that a PET 
center demands specialized material and human resources to function 
properly. At the present time, available human resources trained 
specifically for PET are insufficient in Quebec. They could not sustain this 
planned deployment. Training of specialized personnel should be a top 
priority.”  
 
Who should adopt?  
 
Distribution based on 
competence (quality-based 
logic) 
 
Distribution based on 
research activities (quality-
based logic) 
 
 Those whose mission is to evaluate the technology 
“Since this PET plan should include an element of efficiency evaluation in 
addition to its deployment for clinical purposes, its realization must be 
done in strict collaboration between University Hospital Centers and 
University Centers.”  
 
 Those who are performing research 
“This plan must take into account that PET deployment for clinical 
purposes can not be realized without planning research activities aimed at 
promising activities, recognized as potentially constructive for the 
moment, even if their efficiency and cost effectiveness are not yet 
demonstrated.” 
 
4.2.3.2 Reacting to the HTAA Report: Confronting two Institutional 
Logics 
Although the clinical conclusions of the Health Technology Assessment Agency 
report provided evidence-based legitimacy to the PET scanner based on the logic of 
quality of care, the recommendations suggesting that the PET scanner technology 
should be "progressively deployed in collaboration with teaching hospitals and 
university institutes" and "through research activities" raised several concerns among 
nuclear doctors. The recommendations were perceived by the Quebec Association of 
Nuclear Medicine as a signal that the PET scanner technology was going to be 
diffused to teaching hospitals only, given their mission in research, and that the report 
was suggesting that more cyclotrons (an expensive machine mainly used in research) 
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should be bought to produce FDG. This was perceived to be favouring research at 
the expense of clinical applications:  
“The Report’s first conclusions were appalling, because several actors in this 
report had private interests. […]. I said : “We’re trapped”, because these two 
centers wanted major investments to become great training, teaching and 
research centers. But all we wanted was to develop a clinical tool […] to detect 
sickness and take the best possible clinical decisions for a patient to avoid 
removing half his face if he had tongue cancer.” 
Reacting to this report, the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine created a special 
committee rallying nuclear doctors in remote hospitals in order to negotiate directly with 
the Government in power. By primarily defining the PET scanner as a clinical device 
and not a research tool, the aim of this special committee was to counteract the 
recommendations favouring teaching hospitals, and to democratize access to this 
high-end medical technology by proposing that 12 major centres in oncology should 
obtain a PET scanner, but at once and not progressively. This was technically possible 
since by the year 2002 the FDG was being supplied by American private companies 
so a nearby cyclotron was no longer necessary.  
By December 2002, after intense negotiations and after teaching hospital THA2 
announced its intention to buy a PET scanner with or without the consent of the 
government, the Ministry of Health agreed to invest $23 millions USD to buy 12 PET 
scanners and to diffuse them all over the province. This agreement brought a short 
period of truce up to the election of April 2003 which witnessed the change of the 
party in power and the nomination of a new director of hospitals at the Quebec 
Ministry of Health. This marked a radical shift in the informal agreement to diffuse 
the technology widely.  
Moreover, from the beginning of 2003, the debate over how the technology should be 
diffused took a new turn with the availability of the relatively new and more effective 
architecture21 (Henderson and Clark 1990) of the PET-CT scanner. Because the CT 
scanner provides quasi instantaneous anatomical images while the PET scanner 
provides unrivalled functional images, the combination of both increased the 
precision of the diagnosis. With the emergence of this alternative, two types of 
architecture were available on the market: PET-CT scanners and standalone PET scanners. 
Experts estimated that the clinical added-value of the PET-CT scanner over the 
standalone PET scanner was for approximately 15% of cases, mainly in the Oto-
                                                     
21 “The essence of an architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an existing system to link together existing 
components in a new way” (Henderson & Clark: 1990: 12). 
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Rhino-Laryngology speciality. In addition, the PET-CT scanner allowed a hospital to 
perform 12 cases per day instead of 8 with a standalone PET scanner. This was due to 
the fact that the addition of the CT scanner reduced the time22 required to scan a 
patient. Besides allowing more patients to be diagnosed per day per machine, 
acquiring a PET-CT scanner would allow teaching hospitals to participate in 
international research protocols. Indeed, the PET-CT scanner was becoming a 
standard in research for OECD countries: 
“Even at the University UB, they were excluded from over 30 multi-centers 
protocols. As a result, they are becoming regional, and can not longer have any 
impact in terms of research.” 
The parallel development of this new architecture with the publication of the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency report combined with the election of the new 
government turned the institutional dynamic into a confrontation between two clans: 
the Pro-stand-alone-PET clan which favoured the diffusion of 12 PET scanners against 
the Pro-PET-CT coalition which wanted the technology to diffuse progressively from 
teaching hospitals to other hospitals. Table 4.6 summarizes arguments mobilized by 
each clan in this struggle. Because the cost of a PET-CT scanner ($3.7 millions USD) 
was twice the price of standalone PET scanner, promoting the diffusion of the former 
was equivalent to encouraging narrower diffusion considering that only $23 millions 
USD were available and that financing the building of hospital infrastructure had to be 
taken into account. Hence, the advent of the PET-CT was not good news for those 
who wanted the PET scanner to be widely diffused. 
To make sure that the PET scanner would be widely available, the Quebec 
Association of Nuclear Medicine invested in different lobbying actions to persuade 
the government of the necessity of diffusing the PET scanner to as many places as 
possible for people to have access to this technology. As one interviewee reports: 
“We made our presentation by sending a letter. We try to contact people in the 
Ministry. We sent a letter signed by three department heads and the president of 
the medical council. We showed them the facts, we gave the arguments that I 
listed just now to sensitize people. The Association also sent a letter to say that 
we did not agree that it would only be in the teaching hospitals. As an 
association, we wanted a wider deployment of the PET scanner to 12 centres.” 
Disagreeing with the policy of the new government, these lobbying activities were 
even more acute with the information circulating at the annual meeting of the 
Radiological Society of North America that the newly elected government was 
                                                     
22 See footnote number 6 on page 37. 
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intending to go with the PET-CT scanner and to diffuse it to only few teaching 
hospitals.  
This information flowed from private manufacturers who had an incentive to 
influence the diffusion of the PET-CT scanner given that the profit margin on this 
technology was higher than for the standalone PET scanner. Of course, part of the 
margin came from the higher selling price, but also from the yearly recurring 
maintenance costs which correspond to 10% of the selling price - twice as high as for 
a standalone PET. This prompted private manufacturers to ally with teaching 
hospitals in using lobbying activities to promote the diffusion of the PET-CT scanner 
to a smaller number of sites: 
“And then came two troublemakers. Some companies, not all of them, but 
some of them, influential companies who sell equipment, and want to sell it at 
the highest possible price […] started to harass administrators and chief public 
servants. They wanted to meet them, to talk with them, to take them along on 
trips, and everything else.” 
Also, although officially neutral, some radiologists favoured the diffusion of the PET-
CT because at least part of the examinations would procure them an advantage as only 
radiologists can read CT scanners.  
At that time, this technology tended to be privileged by the government due to the 
international trend on the PET-CT over the standalone PET scanner, and because 
private companies were more inclined to develop the PET-CT scanner technology in 
the future: 
“Finally, we realized that an agreement had being reached. This technology was 
going to be the most popular and appropriate. […] There was a new French 
report, in 2002 I think, from the French Hospital Federation. They submitted a 
document on the PET-CT, and they seem to orient themselves towards the new 
developments of this technology. We realized that, in fact, everyone was going 
in that direction. The industry also made us see that it was abandoning 
standalone PET development to concentrate on PET-CT developments.” 
However, this tendency was not enough for the government to announce that a 
decision had been made. Indeed, the Ministry of Health needed to get the support of 
the Pro-stand-alone-PET coalition which was still promoting a wider diffusion.  
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TABLE 4.6: 
COMPETING THEORIZATIONS EMERGING AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE HTAA REPORT 
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
Stand-alone PET
Access-based logic 
PET-CT 
Quality-based logic 
What to adopt? Definition 
of the innovation 
 
 PET as a proven clinical tool needed 
by all regardless of location 
 PET-CT as a high-performing proven 
clinical and research tool 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation essentially 
grounded in equity of 
access-based arguments vs. 
quality-based arguments 
 
 
 
Competing interpretations of 
efficiency-based logic tied 
to access-based and quality-
based arguments respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric naturalization 
arguments 
 PET scan for all 
"Chemotherapy is hard as a treatment. That's why 
with the PET scanner, we can evaluate whether local 
radiotherapy or chemotherapy would be better and 
protect the child from suffering. [...] Just think if you 
have a 12 year-old child who needs radiotherapy and 
you have to send them to the big city. It's torture." 
 
 Low purchase costs and lower travel 
costs with greater equity and access 
"Oncology is permanent. You have your cancer, you 
come back, you are re-evaluated. There's a lot of 
travelling. So the PET will allow the regionalization 
of care, keeping resources, people, and avoiding 
excessive travel costs."  
"The Association favours the dedicated PET cameras 
that are twice as cheap [than PET-CT], but everyone 
would get one."  
"[With PET] we can save $15,000-$20,000 for 
people we operate on unnecessarily." 
 Better quality diagnoses 
"A PET scanner will locate the tumor… in the body but 
not in a specific way. It will say: it is there. But with the CT, 
we can take a tomographic image which will locate the tumor 
in the tissue so we can see exactly where it is." 
 
 
 
 Lower cost per examination with higher 
quality 
"So, typically, if you look today at a typical hospital they 
take may be 15-20 minutes to do the attenuation correction 
a piece [with a standalone PET scanner] versus 30 seconds 
[with a PET-CT]. […] [Moreover], The FDG cost per 
patient is significantly less."  
"An ordinary PET scanner can do about six or seven 
patients per day. With the PET-CT, we can go up to 12 so 
we can double the volume. " 
 
 
 
 Inevitability of PET-CT 
"[In the conference] basically nobody was speaking of 
standalone PET. Nobody. [...] I can’t think of a single 
institution that has actively gone to tender for standalone 
PET." 
Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Distribution based on equity 
(access-based logic) vs. 
competence (quality-based 
logic). 
 
 PET for all, coherence with prior 
distribution of oncology centres 
"Better give everyone a good Chrysler than giving a 
Ferrari to 3 or 4 people, that's what we wanted at the 
Association."  
"With the government, we proposed that the 15,000 
exams that were necessary per year in oncology, that 
the 12 first pieces of equipment be installed in the 
regional centres for oncology as the government had 
already done it." 
 Competence has to be developed first 
before allowing adoption 
« They’ll say, « I am a Cessna pilot, I can also pilot a 
747.” People will say that, but it makes no sense! (..) 
They’ll say: “It’s not complicated – I’ll put it on automatic 
pilot.” OK, but is that the function of a 747 pilot? So you’ll 
place your life in the hands of someone who doesn’t have the 
expertise necessary to make complex and major adjustments 
that a technology like that requires.” 
 
4.2.4 ANALYSIS 
The first clinical use and the reimbursement of the procedure by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services contributed, at least partially, to the legitimacy of the 
procedure in this organizational field. Indeed, while the former launched a signal that 
the technology was mature enough to be used in the clinical setting of Quebec, the 
latter demonstrated that the technique was recognized as effective in another 
organizational field. Maybe even more important is the conclusion of the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency report which recognized without any doubt the clinical 
usefulness of the procedure thereby legitimating this technology. This was 
accomplished through the use of a quality-based theorization (see table 4.5). This 
episode illustrates three dimensions: 1) the demand for and the usefulness of the 
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technology (why?), 2) the speed of diffusion (how?), and 3) organizations having 
capacity in evaluating technologies (who?). Clearly, this report legitimized the diffusion 
of the PET scanner in specifying not only its usefulness, but also how it should be 
diffused and who should adopt it.  
While the HTAA report legitimized the PET scanner as an essential medical tool in 
this organizational field, it sharpened the appetite of those who were endlessly waiting 
for a PET scanner, and encouraged the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine to 
promote the diffusion of this technology to a wider extent than was advocated in the 
report. This initiative prompted a horizontal struggle between the Quebec Association 
of Nuclear Medicine and the teaching hospitals. Transformed into a legitimization 
battlefield with two confronting factions, this organizational field witnessed several 
theorization strategies deployed by the two camps to justify what type of machine 
should be diffused (see Table 4.6). The Pro-stand-alone-PET coalition used an access-
based theorization strategy, composed of moral arguments, to deplore the insufficient 
number of PET scanners in the Quebec health care system (why adopting more machine; 
problem), and to justify a wider diffusion of the technology to the previously-designated 
regional centres in oncology (who and how to adopt; solution). The rationale was to give 
the population access to the technology independently of their location, a real 
challenge in a huge territory like the province of Quebec. To support this view, it was 
argued that it was unethical for children to go through useless chemotherapy as well as 
asking them to travel long distances to get a PET scan. Other arguments involved 
reference to the common good and solidarity given that adopting 12 machines would 
economize on useless surgical procedures, thereby allowing better resource allocation.  
In contrast, the Pro-PET-CT coalition invoked arguments related to the technical 
superiority of the PET-CT – a quality-based logic. Whereas the access-based 
theorization stressed the importance of widely diffusing the technology (quotation in 
table 4.6: “Better give everyone a good Chrysler than a Ferrari to 3 or 4 people”), the 
quality-based theorization defined efficiency in techno-economic terms related to a 
single machine and not to the impact of the diffusion of many machines across the 
organizational field. Arguments related to the inevitability of the PET-CT were also 
put forward. In consonance with its quality orientation, the Pro-PET-CT coalition 
proposed that the technology should be diffused along competence-lines (quotation in 
table 4.6: a Cessna pilot should not pilot a 747). This group argued that nuclear 
doctors must be well trained to perform good quality diagnoses, and that this 
technology had to be further developed, thereby deeming the PET scanner technology 
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to be a research as well as a clinical tool. Hence, this coalition defended the idea that 
the best technical machine had to be purchased to ensure quality.  
Overall, while the access-based perspective promoting a wide diffusion is at the heart 
of the legitimization strategy of the Pro-stand-alone-PET coalition, the Pro-PET-CT 
clan is clearly in favour of narrower diffusion of more highly-performing machines as 
shown in table 4.6. These two divergent legitimization strategies are the expression of 
a horizontal struggle between two factions having divergent interests in the diffusion 
of the PET scanner. For the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine, wider 
diffusion would satisfy more members and would reinforce the profession of nuclear 
doctors, while rendering the services accessible to a larger portion of the population. 
For doctors in teaching hospitals, adopting a PET-CT scanner would allow them to 
participate in international protocols as well as to have more effective and efficient 
machines, and in the end would increase their prestige through the acquisition of the 
latest technology. 
Because the two factions within the profession of nuclear doctors could not agree on 
which architecture of the innovation should be diffused and to what extent, the 
government decided to withhold any decision. Indeed, moving without the support of 
the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine would have been politically risky.  
This period shows how multiple institutional logics may be mobilized to elaborate 
competing theorizations in order to defend different modes of diffusion of a 
technology, even when its basic utility has been fully legitimized as it was in the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency report. Each theorization relies on different moral 
imperatives presenting plausible but incompatible arguments. While the access-based 
theorization strategy focuses on the idea that failing to diffuse the technology widely is 
unethical because suffering and useless operations could be avoided, the quality-based 
theorization underlines the superiority of the more recent technology, its technico-
economic advantages and the need for it to be calibrated and operated by highly 
skilled and competent professionals who master its complexities. Efficiency-based 
arguments are also mobilized by both camps, but they tend to be subordinated to the 
dominant access- and quality-based logics. 
The acceptance of one or other theorization could have a huge impact. As compared 
with the access-based theorization which contended that this technology should be 
available in 12 centres in oncology all over the province, the quality-based theorization 
was more oriented towards the performance of the machine itself. As a consequence, 
while the Pro-stand-alone-PET clan was arguing that with 12 machines, 96 patients 
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per day (12 patients times 8 patients/day) could have a PET scan in the province, the 
PET-CT clan was arguing that it was better to have 4 machines serving 48 patients per 
day (4 centres times 12 patients /day) in Quebec, but with good quality diagnosis 
performed by competent staff. The significant underlying consequences of adopting 
one strategy or the other clearly illustrate that effectiveness is socially defined 
(Suchman 1995) and inevitably implies ethical choices. 
4.2.5 LOCAL STRATEGIC ACTIONS IN REGION A 
The need to be supplied with FDG to produce images was a major technological 
constraint preventing hospitals from adopting the technology by their own means. As 
long as a cyclotron needed to be near the scanner, acquiring this technology was 
especially difficult because of the costs and expertise required to operate a cyclotron. 
Moreover, the production of teaching hospital THB was not perceived by other 
hospitals as being sufficiently reliable to supply hospitals in the province of Quebec. It 
is only by the end of 2002 that this barrier was removed when the FDG started being 
supplied by private companies: 
“At the time, we needed a FDG source and that didn’t come instantly. We 
needed that source because even if you open a PET, if you do not have a 
reliable FDG source, you can not operate. But one supplier of FDG had been 
created in Albany NY, and it was able to feed us. […] For that reason, we 
thought: ‘OK, we have our source. Now we can proceed.” 
4.2.5.1 The First Deviant Adoption – January 2003 
The confrontation between the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine and teaching 
hospitals that followed the publication of the HTAA report as to how to diffuse the 
PET scanner was not a good omen for a quick diffusion of this technology. This 
combined with repeated informal and unanswered requests from hospitals to obtain a 
PET scanner and the fast diffusion of this technology in the USA induced 
disillusionment and cynicism in many nuclear doctors with regard to the possibility of 
obtaining a PET scanner: 
“The deployment of PET scanners, I've been hearing about that for four years, 
and another announcement arrives every 15th of the month. It's the classic 
running gag. I've stopped believing in that.” 
Since it was the most advanced detecting technology, doctors as well as administrators 
of teaching hospital THA1 understood the strategic importance of the PET scanner 
and its alignment with their mission and strategy. 
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However, being aware that no budget announcement for the deployment of the PET 
scanner would be made in the short term, Doctor Z, a nuclear doctor working at 
THA1, asked the private foundation of the hospital to buy a PET scanner. The 
stratagem consisted of renting the technology to THA1 for a symbolic sum. This 
allowed the teaching hospital indirectly to buy and have access to the technology, 
thereby evading the law which compels hospitals to have the consent of the 
government before acquiring a PET scanner or expensive technology. Because people 
in the Foundation were surprised at the deficiency of the Quebec health care system 
in the number of PET scanners, members of the board were easily persuaded by 
Doctor Z that financing this technology made sense. This was reinforced by the fact 
that THB had a PET scanner, while THA1 had none: 
“Members of the foundation were surprised. They wondered: ‘How come 
region A has no PET scanner and region B has one? And when everybody says 
‘It doesn’t make any sense!’ the legitimacy is there, with no questions asked.” 
As a result, by January 2003, THA1 acquired a PET scanner without asking for the 
authorization and even without informing the Ministry of Health. When the story 
came out in the lay press in the same month, the official version stated that the 
machine was financed by research funds and used for research purposes. Interestingly, 
the media were already announcing that privately selling services was an option if the 
teaching hospital were to lack financial resources for operating the machine. 
Because THA1 could publicly legitimate this acquisition by invoking the fact that the 
machine was for diagnosing a widespread deadly and highly publicized condition 
(cancer), it was unlikely that the Ministry of Health would denounce it: 
“Put yourself in the shoes of the Minister who comes to tell us: “Whoah! You 
are going to get the machine out of there and you are not going to use it.” 
That’s a risky business. If that went to the media, we would have several very 
sensible and logical explanations to give to the people. The government would 
look pretty silly. (…) Especially as there are so many cancer cases… [the 
government wouldn’t want to hear us] tell patients, “Well – we’re ready to offer 
you a useful service, but the Minister has decided that you can’t have it” 
Politically, you have to be careful.” 
After this adoption, doctors from various hospitals called THA1 to have information 
on how this strategic move was carried out:  
“Five or six doctors called me to know how I had done it. How I dealt with the 
board of directors, the general management staff, and the Foundation, to do it, 
and make it official. They really wanted to know how I had pulled that off.” 
Given that access to health care is a public service in Quebec, doctors cannot, by law, 
receive private payment for health care services which are insured by the universal 
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coverage. Despite this rule, THA1 had to find a way to finance the running costs of its 
PET scanner. The solution found was to offer PET scanner services at nights and on 
week-ends on a private basis to private clinics that were willing to pay. This would 
give patients or organizations access to a PET scanner within three to four days 
instead of two to six months, which corresponds to the normal public waiting time: 
“By paying 2500$ to the clinic associated with Doctor Z (the director of the 
Nuclear Medicine Department in THA1), a cancer patient can get a Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET scan) in three or four days at teaching hospital 
THA1 of region A, bypassing the usual waiting list that varies from two to six 
months.” 
- A public journal, April 30th, 2004. 
With the surplus generated from this activity, THA1 was able to fund its public 
activity, and also to charge the Quebec Health Insurance Agency for each act publicly 
performed.  
Fifteen months after the acquisition of the PET scanner, the manoeuvre which 
consisted of prioritizing private before public patients was reported in the media and 
provoked a swift reaction from deputies at the legislative and from the Minister of 
Health who asked THA1 to stop selling public services to the private sector: 
“Political actions were taken. After all, we are part of a Health System that is 
socialist. People said: ‘It’s not fair that a public hospital with public funding is 
used for activities tied to the private sector.” 
This situation had to be handled rapidly by the government because the health 
insurance law forbids organizations from the public health care network to be 
financed through private activities. Moreover, the situation was critical to the point 
that publicly paid staffs were employed to run the PET scanner to generate private 
revenue. To enable THA1 to stop financing its operation through private funds the 
Minister of Health announced that an operational budget of 1250 cases for 2004-2005 
would be allocated to them. 
In February 2003, the combination of the deviant adoption of THA1, the 
announcement from teaching hospital THA2 of its imminent intention to buy a PET-
CT scanner, and the request from the general hospital GHA to be authorized to 
acquire the same technology provoked the Ministry of Health to ask the Health 
Services Regional Agency to evaluate urgently the clinical needs of PET scanners in 
region A. This was necessary to avoid a further uncoordinated and irrational diffusion 
of PET scanners, as had happened previously with the MRI and was just starting with 
the case of THA1: 
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"The danger was that we would have rather anarchical development. It would 
be those who had the money or those who screamed the most or those who 
made the most pressure that would get the machine." 
By April 2004, the committee of the Health Services Regional Agency produced a 
document which was submitted to the Ministry of Health concluding that seven 
cameras were necessary to cover the needs of the population in oncology for region 
A. 
4.2.5.2 Analysis 
The vertical struggle between teaching hospital THA1 and the Ministry of Health is 
the expression of, on the one hand, hospitals’ interests in adopting such a prestigious 
technology (prestige, higher fee-for-service, research protocol) and, on the other, the 
cost-containment imperative of the government. Because hospitals need the 
authorization from the government to acquire this technology, the government can 
use its regulatory power to hinder any adoption by delaying the announcement of a 
dissemination plan. However, wide diffusion in the USA, the confirmation of the 
effectiveness of the technology by the HTAA report, the special status of cancer, 
which is often synonymous to a sentence of death, and patient needs, all contributed 
to build normative legitimacy of this technology and a strong pressure to adopt. 
Further, given its mission in cancer and in technology assessment, THA1 had an 
important incentive to acquire this technology. This normative legitimacy of the 
technology and the interest of THA1 to adopt advanced technology are two powerful 
incentives to acquire a PET scanner. The legitimacy of the technology was such that it 
outweighed the legitimacy of the regulation which was impeding such adoption. This 
adoption against the will of the government is a form of what I call institution testing, 
which I define as an action against regulatory constraints. 
While institution testing was a strategic move to pre-empt the adoption of the PET 
scanner, other actions in this case can also be considered deviant. For example, the 
private funding of the daily public operation of the PET scanner is questionable as 
regard to the law. The problem stems from the situation where patients willing to pay 
were jumping the waiting list, something the public and the government could not 
tolerate because it goes against equity of access. Another problem was that publicly 
paid human resources were used for diagnosing private patients. Overall, it is because 
this technology is aligned with the mission of the organization and also because 
legitimacy of the technology is greater than the legitimacy of the regulation that 
institution testing was possible. 
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Interestingly, this behaviour was successful for at least two reasons. While institution 
testing pre-empted the adoption of this technology, it also allowed THA1 to obtain a 
budget. Indeed, when the story of privately funded operations at THA1 came out in 
the lay press, the government reacted to calm the tension by providing an operational 
budget. In this case, the government was literally trapped because it could not hinder 
access to a cancer diagnosing device nor could it sanction a deviant behaviour which 
was generating inequity in the system as other hospitals did not have this technology.  
4.2.5.3 A Second Deviant Adoption – May 2004 
The new director of the Nuclear Medicine Department at teaching hospital THA2 
arrived in 2000 with the intention of obtaining a PET scanner. With the unanimous 
support from of various clinical directors, the administration of THA2 asked the 
Ministry of Health to finance the acquisition of this technology, but never received an 
answer. Instead of relying on governmental funds, THA2 started to meet with diverse 
private potential donors for this acquisition, but in vain. When the HTAA report was 
published, a new attempt was made to persuade the Ministry of Health to invest in the 
technology, but still without any result. 
Surprised by the necessity of travelling as far as teaching hospital THB to undergo a 
PET scanner, a public personality decided to open a private foundation in 2002 to 
finance the acquisition of a PET-CT scanner at THA2. Following the strategy of 
THA1, the nuclear doctor of THA2 met with the private foundation of the hospital to 
finance part of the acquisition. The new foundation of the public personality together 
with the traditional one of THA2 gathered the amount of money required to acquire a 
PET-CT scanner. Before proceeding with this acquisition, THA2 informed the Health 
Services Regional Agency, the interlocutor of the Ministry of Health, that they were 
inviting companies to tender for a PET scanner. Promptly the Health Services 
Regional Agency sent a letter to THA2 urging them to stop this acquisition process: 
“We told the Health Services Regional Agency that we were offering tenders to 
acquire the equipment. The Agency sent us a letter telling us that we could not 
do that. There were laws at the Ministry level, and they sent us a copy of those 
laws. They said that only the Minister had the right to decide new programs. We 
could not invest money in this project, and so on.” 
Although THA2 did not obtain the authorization to acquire this technology, the 
adjunct director of the hospital decided to move forward with the project. This choice 
was strategic for THA2 as the PET-CT scanner was aligned with its mission and was 
also a good way to compete against the general hospital GHA in oncology: 
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“It is part of our mission. If we want to provide the best care available for 
cancer patients, we must acquire this equipment. […] There is also this 
competition between General Hospital GHA and teaching hospital THA2. 
They both want to dominate the oncology program in region A.”  
The letter from the Health Services Regional Agency was insufficient to stop the 
movement given that adopting the technology was of little risk for THA2 because, as 
one interviewee stated, if the technology had to diffuse, it had to diffuse in a teaching 
hospital: 
“Granted, we went against the rules, but it was a calculated risk. If a machine 
was to be deployed in the province, it had to be in a teaching hospital first, as 
there were already two machines at the teaching hospital THB.” 
Interestingly, THA2 decomposed the project into smaller amounts to tender for 
building the hospital infrastructure to receive the PET-CT scanner. This was a way to 
bypass the normal regulation for invitation to tender which takes much more time 
than when a project is broken is smaller parts. As a result, THA2 pre-empted the 
beginning of the operation of their machine: 
“We played the game to a certain extent. We went through the bidding process 
but we didn’t follow all the bureaucratic rules. That would have taken too much 
time. Maybe six to eight months more if we had followed all the regulatory 
steps. […] Invitations to tender are so regulated. Here’s what we did. Instead of 
a one million dollar project, we broke it into several smaller parts. All the steps 
were worth less than a million dollars. With this approach, the bidding process 
was shortened by quite a bit, and it took much less time.” 
Once the hospital infrastructure for the PET scanner was under construction, THA2 
asked the government for an operational budget, but once again this was a dead letter. 
To finance its operation, THA2 drew on its global budget thereby increasing its 
deficit. Because generating deficit in hospitals was and is still prohibited by the law23, 
this behaviour is rather unexpected. While THA2 started operating its PET-CT 
scanner by May 17th 2004, its budget constraint limited the number of patients to 
undergo examinations to 2 patients / day instead of 12 patients / day. This precaution 
was taken to avoid ending up with a huge operational deficit if the Ministry of Health 
would not provide an operational budget. 
In the Quebec health care system, there are no specific reimbursed indications and 
doctors are free to use their equipment as they please. However, the second deviant 
acquisition of a PET-CT scanner in May 2004 by THA2 prompted the Ministry of 
                                                     
23 By reporting the deficit of a given year on the budget of the following year, the bill 107 passed in June 2000 has the 
consequence to reduce hospital deficit. This law was enforced in June 21st, 2001, by the bill 28 which states that 
hospital CEOs can be destitute if they engender deficits.  
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Health to create an advisory committee in June 2004 to recommend the indications 
for which the PET scanner should be used. To develop guidelines, the advisory 
committee followed the vein already exploited in the HTAA report and reviewed the 
literature in search of evidence that the PET scanner would improve patient 
management. By March 2005, the advisory committee sent the guidelines developed 
to inform PET scanners providers about indications supported by the Ministry of 
Health. 
4.2.5.4 Analysis 
Again, in this episode institution testing was possible because the legitimacy of the 
technology was greater than the legitimacy of the regulation, and also because the 
technology was aligned with the mission of THA2. As one interviewee noted, “if there 
was one PET scanner to be diffused, it had to be in a teaching hospital”. This 
confirmed that institution testing, a deviant adoption in this case, was a relatively low 
risk behaviour given the mission of the teaching hospital in oncology and in 
technology assessment. Moreover, institution testing spreads to this hospital for 
competitive reasons. Indeed, for THA2 to remain a reference in oncology, acquiring a 
PET scanner was necessary. 
THA2 was deviant not only in acquiring the technology, but also in the way it 
financed its operation. Because the government did not allow an operational budget, 
this hospital drew on its global budget to finance its operation despite the risk of 
deepening its deficit, an offence in the eye of the law since 2002 in Quebec. 
Finally, the way the technology was implemented was also strategically designed to 
avoid the normal invitation-to-tender procedure which would have taken much longer. 
In order to speed up the construction of the PET scanner infrastructure, THA2 broke 
up the project into smaller pieces to bypass the heavy regulations which applied to 
projects over one million dollar CND. 
Although the Ministry of Health has no control on the behaviour of doctors who 
themselves decide for which indications the PET scanner should be used, the second 
deviant adoption gave a good incentive to the Ministry of Health to develop guidelines 
in order to try to encourage an effective use of the PET scanner.  
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4.2.5.5 Private clinics adopt the PET-CT scanner – 2004 & 2006 
The impressive waiting time of two to six months to undergo a PET scanner at the 
teaching hospital THA1 was a clear indicator of the huge demand for this type of 
procedure. After having received a budget from the Ministry of Health for the PET 
scanner at THA1, Doctor Z24 intended to respond to this demand by buying a PET-
CT scanner for his private clinic PCA25. This would allow the private clinic PCA to 
have the best technology in the region A: 
“The Public Health system’s provision for PET scans was inadequate. This 
created a demand for more. We thought that people were increasingly unwilling 
to linger for months on a waiting list. And services in the Public Health System 
are not always top notch. For example, in the teaching hospital THA1, we still 
don’t have the best PET technology, which is PET-CT.”  
The acquisition of a private PET-CT scanner caused consternation in the media, and 
the complexity of the regulation was explained as being the reason behind the fact that 
a private clinic could unjustifiably offer health care services to people willing to pay. 
By and large, the debate was around the notion of medically required treatment. If the 
PET scanner is considered as being medically required, then the law states that it 
should be entirely covered by the universal public insurance and private clinics should 
not have the right to offer private PET scanner procedures reimbursed by private 
money. However, if the PET scanner does not have this status then private clinics 
should be able to offer this service on an experimental basis to patients willing to pay. 
The following two quotations express the ambiguity of the status of the PET scanner: 
“So is it legal or not? Well, yes … and no […]. The vice-president of the 
Canadian Association of Radiologists condemns this regulatory free-for-all: 
‘This is clearly illegal, but who can say that having a PET scan is not necessary, 
from a medical point of view? Government officials excuse themselves, arguing 
that the technology is still in its experimental stage. People take advantage of 
this fuzzy area, and of governmental inertia, to get a piece of the action. This 
situation is quite ridiculous.’ And this situation is not new. During the last 15 
years, private clinics offering MRI services have existed in Quebec. And no 
solution has been found yet.” 
Local newspaper, January 6th, 2005 
                                                     
24 The same doctor that made teaching hospital THA1 to acquired the first PET scanner in the region A. 
25 Because equity of access is a central value in the Quebec’s health care system, the Ministry of health did not welcome 
the opening of this private clinic in 1999. This is due to the privileged access the private clinic offers to patients willing 
to pay for health care services. However, the Government could not sanction the private clinic PCA to operate on this 
basis since the law proscribing doctors to be privately paid is only relevant for those working in the public health care 
sector. To legally generate private revenues, doctors have to be exclusively reimbursed privately and not by the 
RAMQ. 
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“At the Federal Protecting Agency, the spokesperson explains that PET 
technology is still considered experimental, and not medically necessary. It can 
be thus offered in the private sector. Once this service is considered medically 
necessary, each province will have to provide it.”  
Local newspaper, January 6th, 2005 
One month after the acquisition of the PET-CT scanner by the private clinic PCA, the 
private clinic PCQ which is situated in a city nearby also acquired a PET-CT scanner. 
Because they are sufficiently far away from one another, they did not compete for 
patients. A third private clinic PCC opened in October 2006 in the region C with the 
help of the same nuclear doctor who adopted the first PET scanner at public teaching 
hospital THA1 and the first PET scanner in the private clinic PCA. 
However, these private clinics suffer from not having enough patients to reach the 
profitability threshold. Many factors are mobilized by owners to explain this situation. 
Firstly, the unfamiliarity of the patients and doctors with the service seems to explain 
at least partly the low flow of patients these clinics experience. Secondly, some 
patients prefer to be on the waiting list and wait for their turn instead of paying for the 
service. As such, it seems that waiting lists became with time a normal phenomenon 
and people were no longer outraged by this: 
“I think that the demand here for such a service is relatively low, for the time 
being. Patients in Quebec have become accustomed to waiting for doctors’ 
services, with passing years.” 
Thirdly, patients are often not aware that they have complementary private health 
insurance which covers PET scanner procedures up to 80 to 90% of the total cost: 
“People in Quebec are not always aware … you may ask them ‘Are you 
insured?’ And they are unable to tell what type of insurance they have. They are 
not informed, even if they pay for their insurance via their employer. Most 
insurance companies pay for the larger part of a PET scan. Maybe 80 or 90%, 
depending on the company.” 
This explains why most of private clinic patients come from outside the province of 
Quebec. 
4.2.5.6 Analysis 
Despite the non-reimbursement of PET scanner procedures to private organizations, 
three private clinics acquired a PET-CT scanner. Because there was a long waiting list 
of two to six months in public hospitals for PET scans, each of these adopters 
assumed that there was a huge demand for this type of examination. By providing 
PET-CT scanner, a superior technology, to the local population, private clinics 
89 
 
calculated that the doctors in the public sector would prefer referring patients to the 
most advanced technology. However, this is not exactly what happened, partly 
because there is a strong belief in Quebec that health is a public good and so few 
citizens are willing to pay for health care despite a long waiting list. Absence of 
willingness to pay is an indication that there is no legitimized free market institutional 
logic in this health care system. This is also corroborated by the lack of knowledge 
about private insurance covering patients outside the public health care system and by 
the fact that doctors did not refer many patients to private clinics. Consequently, 
private clinics were barely surviving with one going bankrupt mainly because patient 
demand was too low in the private sector although it was high in the public system.  
4.2.5.7 A Third Deviant Adoption – October 2004 
In 2003, the general hospital GHA was approached by a citizen who wished to 
present the hospital with a major donation for the acquisition of a PET-CT scanner, 
provided that the hospital agreed to buy from a specific private company and within a 
certain timeframe. After having been informed about this unique opportunity, the 
Health Services Regional Agency, under the authority of the Ministry of Health, 
considered that other organizations in the region A would qualify for a PET scanner 
before this general hospital. Under the threat of losing the donation, the general 
hospital GHA informed the Health Services Regional Agency that it was inviting 
companies to tender for a PET-CT scanner despite the opposition of the Ministry of 
Health. An internal document reports: 
“We moved to take advantage of the unique opportunity of a major donation 
that will allow us to totally finance the purchase of this equipment, including 
installation costs. We had to prove our benefactor that the case was progressing, 
or else this financing would have been cancelled.” 
Since the Health Services Regional Agency of region A did not want to be held 
responsible for the general hospital GHA to have lost this donation, the Ministry of 
Health did not respond to this letter: 
“No one wants to be the person who will explain to the media that a benefactor 
cancelled his pledge because we waited too long, and we could not buy the 
equipment. The Health Services Regional Agency’s civil servant understood this 
perfectly. He was stuck between a rock and a hard place. So he let us proceed 
with the invitation to tender, even if it did not suit him at all.” 
Although funds were immediately available to acquire a PET-CT scanner, the general 
hospital GHA decided to wait for the authorization of the Ministry of Health. After a 
few months, the government came up with a plan of dissemination (see next section) 
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of the PET scanner technology in Quebec and since the general hospital GHA was in 
this plan, the government authorized this hospital to acquire a PET scanner. 
However, the authorization was not accompanied by the necessary operational 
budget. Applying the same strategy as the teaching hospital THA2, the general 
hospital GHA financed its operations through its global budget thereby incurring the 
risk of increasing its deficit. Nonetheless, since the risk of not being reimbursed was 
quite low, the general hospital GHA started examining patients in October 2004, 
before receiving its operational budget, but using a cautious approach and not 
spending too much on this technology. The government committed itself to pay an 
operational budget to GHA by August 5th 2005 to cover its costs since the beginning 
of its operation: 
“At the General Hospital GHA, a generous benefactor has promised to pay the 
total sum for the acquisition of a PET scanner, but the government has given 
no hint it was willing to pay for the annual operating costs of this equipment. 
The hospital has been waiting for a year and a half…” 
Local newspaper, January 6th, 2005 
4.2.5.8 Analysis 
The desire of general hospital GHA to take advantage of the donation inspired it to 
test the government institution by acquiring a PET scanner despite opposition from 
the Ministry of Health. Hence, institution testing is still an issue in this episode, 
although a milder case. The main difference with the two previous cases is that general 
hospital GHA waited for government approval before really acquiring it. While it still 
somehow forced the hand of the government to be on the dissemination plan, the 
status of this general hospital, which is not as prestigious as a teaching hospital, and its 
mission, which is not so centred on evaluating technology, may explain its more 
conservative behaviour as regard to the adoption of this technology. 
Although the donation was an important factor for adoption, competition between 
hospitals to become or to remain a local reference in oncology is clearly the motor 
that brought the general hospital GHA to acquire a PET-CT scanner. It is not the 
donation per se that seems to cause adoption but competition between actors to be a 
reference centre in oncology. Moreover, because general hospital GHA called teaching 
hospital THA1 to know how the latter managed to obtain this technology, mimetic 
isomorphism might be driving not the acquisition per se, but the process of acquiring 
a medical technology. Furthermore, because general hospital GHA does not have the 
budget to run its machine, like THA1, it drew on its global budget to do so. 
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Hence, starting the adoption process before having the authorization of the Ministry 
of Health was a good strategy to pre-empt the adoption of this technology. Most 
probably, without deviant action, general hospital GHA would have had a PET 
scanner, but at a later time; and it might not have been the more sophisticated PET-
CT scanner. 
4.2.5.9 Disseminating PET Scanners in Teaching Hospitals 
To avoid the chaotic diffusion of PET scanners, the government of Quebec had a 
strong incentive to develop a dissemination plan: 
“So, I guess government decision takers thought they better take charge of this 
matter and manage it, or else, it would manage itself by itself.” 
The Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine and the Ministry of Health finally 
reached an agreement as to how to disseminate the PET scanners and a plan was 
created giving priority to those who already had a PET scanner, i.e. those who were 
defending a quality-based diffusion approach. According to the dissemination plan of 
June 2005, the PET scanner technology would be disseminated in three phases with 
an emphasis on providing PET-CT scanners to teaching hospitals first or hospitals on 
the way to acquiring one. Thus, adopting a PET scanner without the consent of the 
government was a good strategy. As one interviewee remarks: 
“The consequence for GHA in adopting a PET scanner earlier is that they 
accelerated their case [at the Ministry of Health]. Maybe they would have 
received their authorization later.” 
Phase 1 was already in progress with the enhancement or purchase of new equipment 
in some teaching hospitals, while increasing the number of reimbursed case for them. 
Phase 2 would provide PET scanners to major centres in oncology in the region A, 
and Phase 3 would allow other important hospitals all over Quebec to have a stand-
alone PET scanner. By the end of 2004, the government announced the purchase of a 
PET-CT scanner for THC (which actually obtained its machine in May 2006) and an 
upgrade to the PET-CT scanner for THA1. Interestingly, hospitals already having a 
PET scanner were included in an earlier phase then they might have been otherwise. 
4.2.5.10 Analysis 
Not controlling the diffusion of the PET scanner might have led to a delicate situation 
where the government would have had to provide deviant adopters with operational 
budgets in order not to be discredited. Furthermore, this situation would encourage 
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inequity as some organizations having sufficient financial resources could adopt the 
technology to the detriment of others. It is the legitimacy of the technology, an echo 
of the institutional logic of quality that empowered hospitals to adopt without the 
consent of the government. To stop deviant adoption by the proponents of the 
quality-based theorization, a dissemination plan which was moulded on the actual 
diffusion pattern of the PET scanner was elaborated and even negotiated with the 
Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine. Announcing a dissemination plan had the 
effect of stopping a chaotic dissemination process that could have escalated further 
out of control. Thus, the institutional logic of quality and access succeeded in shaking 
the foundation of the governance structure in the sense that the regulation governing 
the dissemination plan was aligned with the actual dissemination of the PET scanner. 
The consequence was that the government kept its legitimacy as regulator and 
regained control over the diffusion of this technology.  
4.3 WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS – QUEBEC26 
4.3.1 STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL 
The case studies exhibit struggles for the control of the technology between the 
government and all would-be adopters. In these struggles, the government is 
constantly committed to limiting the diffusion of the PET scanner because of cost-
containment considerations. To control the diffusion of the PET scanner, the 
Ministry of Health relies on its legal authority by declining or accepting hospital 
requests. On the other hand, hospitals rely on their expertise to strive to control the 
technology by deploying different rhetoric and strategies to obtain the authorization to 
adopt a PET scanner.  
In the attempts to influence the diffusion of the technology, reports were produced by 
hospitals and meetings held to persuade the government to invest in this technology. 
Only one hospital was successful in persuading the Ministry of Health to finance a 
research project which included a PET scanner. However, to achieve this goal, a 
deviant entrepreneur used alternative channels to funds this acquisition. This is 
deviant behaviour because it defies the decision of the Ministry of Health which 
denied for years a PET scanner to this entrepreneur.  
                                                     
26 This section analyses the events that are described in the Quebec health care system case study. While this analysis is 
rather synthetic, a more detailed one is presented in chapter V. 
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While obtaining a budget to acquire a PET scanner was the first struggle for 
controlling the technology, the second struggle was related to receiving an operational 
budget. This time, struggle for control refers to the use of the PET scanner. Although 
there was theorization from THB to persuade the government to provide an 
operational budget, it was the patients going to USA to undergo PET scanner 
procedures that incited the Ministry of Health to provide a budget to THB. Because it 
is less costly to undergo a PET scan in Quebec, it is clear that the budget was 
provided because it was aligned with the interest of the Ministry of Health. 
4.3.2 STRUGGLES FOR MEANING 
Vertical struggles affect every aspect of this case study and they are also behind 
horizontal struggles. Indeed, it is because the government intends to limit the 
diffusion of this technology, thereby controlling resources, that there are horizontal 
struggles (competition) between actors to be a site of adoption. 
Hence, the struggle for control in the region B precipitated a horizontal struggle 
between hospitals. Mobilizing scientific evidence, hospitals in competition used 
different quality-based theorizations which were aligned with their mission to influence 
the Ministry of Health, at a time when the purpose of the PET scanner was still 
ambiguous. The production of competing quality-based theorizations led to struggles 
for meaning. Each theorization provides meaning on what is the nature of the 
technology, why it should be diffused, and who should adopt it, and how it should be 
diffuse (see tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6).  
The publication of the health technology assessment report from the HTAA agency 
also provides meaning to the PET scanner by defining what the technology is (a 
clinical and a research tool), why the technology should be diffused (clinical needs and 
clinical utility of the technology), how it should be deployed (progressively by 
beginning with teaching hospitals), and who should adopt it (competence and research 
activity). All these recommendations relate to the concept of quality (Scott, Ruef et al. 
2000) and are therefore based on a quality-based institutional logic. These 
theorizations respond to the interest of teaching hospitals since the report clearly 
identifies them as the prime recipients of the diffusion of PET scanners, and also 
insists on the necessity for further research effort on the technology. 
The publication of this report gave rise to intense horizontal struggles for providing 
meaning to the technology. Given the mission of the Quebec Association of Nuclear 
Medicine to represent its members, an access-based counter-theorization was 
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developed to legitimize an alternative way of diffusing the technology. The counter-
theorization defined what the technology was (a proven clinical tools), why it should be 
adopted (PET scan for all and efficiency-based logic tied to an access-based logic), who 
should adopt and how (distribution in coherence with existing oncology centres). This 
conflict over the distribution of the PET scanner in this organizational field was even 
more acute with the apparition of the PET-CT scanner. With this new technology, 
teaching hospitals started being more active by re-emphasizing the theorization of the 
HTAA report. 
At each stage of the diffusion of the PET scanner in this organizational field, the 
vertical struggle to obtain authorization to adopt a PET scanner results in intensive 
horizontal struggle for meaning; given that the meaning of the technology will 
ultimately influence who is more legitimate and competent to obtain it. Interestingly, 
these theorizations are the perfect reflection of major institutional logics in this 
institutional field. Thus, it can be assumed that actors draw on institutional logics 
which are already legitimated in the wider environment to gain organizational 
legitimacy. However, when acquiring a technology through legitimate means fails, 
some actors may have the power to shift their strategy in order to acquire a 
technology through deviant or illegitimate means. The next section analyses how 
actors in this case study used illegitimate means to obtain a PET scanner, a strategy 
that I call institution testing. 
4.3.3 STRUGGLING FOR CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTION TESTING 
It was because the technology had become so widely accepted as being a legitimate 
tool in medicine [the wide diffusion outside this organizational field; the legitimacy of 
the PET scanner granted by the Health Technology Assessment report as being an 
essential tool in diagnosing life threatening conditions (cancer); and patient needs] that 
hospitals could, in the first place, adopt the technology without the consent of the 
government. Because it was considered an essential clinical tool, the risk incurred by 
actors who adopted the technology was limited, since the government was powerless 
to respond to their actions. Indeed, any government attempt at retaliation against the 
hospital could have easily been denounced in the media as preventing hospitals from 
providing good quality technology for cancer patients, a widely publicized condition 
high in the political agenda – not a wise move. This supports the idea that the 
institutional logic of quality had such strength in this organizational field that it 
justified, on the one hand, that hospitals could adopt the technology without the 
consent of the government, with good justification to provide to the population if the 
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government dared to retaliate. On the other hand, the government adjusted its 
regulation, i.e. the dissemination plan, to the actual diffusion pattern. This suggests 
that the quality-based institutional logic forced the governance structure to adapt to its 
imperatives.  
There was basically no regulative sanction possible from the government if a hospital 
exhibited such behaviour. Moreover, the inertia of the government regarding 
horizontal struggles between professionals and which brought conflicting demands 
from nuclear doctors to obtain PET scanners stimulated the institution-testing 
behaviour by giving the impression that this was the only remaining strategy to obtain 
the technology. Thus, institution testing is a deviant behaviour according to the law but 
one which can be perceived as legitimate by professionals and the population in a 
given setting. In other words, institution testing is a strategic behaviour that is 
rendered possible when normative and cultural-cognitive forces are stronger than 
regulative ones.  
This case suggests that four conditions have to be present for institution testing to 
take place. Firstly, the state of the technology has to be sufficiently mature. Indeed, 
the supply of FDG is an essential ingredient to produce PET scanner images. It was 
only when the private companies could distribute the substance in Quebec that 
institution testing became an option for potential adopters. Secondly, only 
organizations having greater access to financial resources could undertake deviant 
strategies. Thirdly, since legitimate strategy to adopt the PET scanner was not 
successful, institution testing was the only remaining alternative. Thus, institution 
testing tends to occur when legitimate means to reach a goal have failed. Fourthly, 
actors perceived no regulative or moral sanctions in performing deviant behaviour 
because it was risky for the government to sanction this behaviour and because 
institutional deviants felt their action was not prejudicing anyone. Finally, having the 
competence to run a PET scanner inside the organization seemed to be not a 
condition but a facilitating factor as the two teaching hospitals had a nuclear doctor 
trained to use the machine. 
THA1 had an important impact on the subsequent dynamics of the diffusion of the 
PET scanner, bringing another teaching hospital in its wake. THA1 was contacted by 
other hospitals for tips on how to perform institution testing. It also forced the 
Ministry of Health to create a regional committee to address the number of PET 
scanner needed in the region. Since the Ministry of Health did not announce a 
dissemination plan for the technology, and because no sanctions were applied to the 
first deviants, another hospital adopted the same strategy. To remain competitive, it 
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became necessary to acquire the technology as quickly as possible. Indeed, 
competition between hospitals was one important drive for institution testing. Not 
adopting the PET scanner might have meant more than just delaying the acquisition 
process: it might also have implied losing reputation as a major institution in 
oncology.  
While institution testing has many ramifications in three sites of adoption, adopting 
the PET scanner without the consent of the government is probably the most defiant 
action. Other deviant behaviour includes launching the acquisition processes without 
authorization; operating the machine with private funds which is prohibited in this 
jurisdiction, increasing the deficit of their organizations which is also illicit, and one of 
them broke down the infrastructure project to prepare the room for the PET scanner 
into smaller units to bypass the normal auction rules in order to accelerate the 
acquisition process. 
4.4 THE DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN SWITZERLAND 
This case study is characterized by an intense vertical struggle which opened up the 
diffusion of the PET scanner. Indeed, while the PET scanner was confined to a 
duopoly, the extension of reimbursement to cancer indications caused a private clinic 
to challenge the Federal government to open up this technology to newcomers. In this 
struggle, while the private clinic mobilized an institutional logic of free-market to 
obtain the right to be reimbursed, the Federal government was defending an 
efficiency-based institutional logic. The action of the private clinic is a form of what I 
call institution testing that is a strategic action which contests established institutions. 
The threat of a trial under the Anti-trust Commission was sufficient to change the 
organization of the duopoly to open up the market for organizations meeting specific 
quality criteria. After the establishment of these quality criteria, the case study explores 
vertical and horizontal struggles that took place in nine cantons as well as the 
strategies deployed by organizations to bypass regulations under the public regimes. 
Figure 4.3 gives an overview of the chronology of events that marked the diffusion of 
this technology in the Switzerland’s organizational field. 
The study examines adoption in nine cantons. These cantons are designated by the 
letters D, G, N, R, S, T, U, V and Z where N and U are the most populated cantons 
with more than 900,000 inhabitants, D, R, T, V are a little less populated with a 
population ranging from 400,000 to 899,999, and G, S, Z the less inhabited cantons 
having acquired a PET scanner with a population of less than 400,000. 
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FIGURE 4.3: 
VISUAL MAPPING OF THE DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN SWITZERLAND 
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4.4.1 DEVELOPING THE PET SCANNER TECHNOLOGY 
In 1986, the first PET scanner was adopted by the Institute IR in the Canton R, a 
reputed research institute in engineering and natural sciences. Since Institute IR had 
the facility to produce radiopharmaceuticals with its cyclotron, an inter-university 
committee composed of heads of nuclear medicine selected this institution to develop 
this technology. This institution performed the first PET scanner clinical applications 
in cardiology and neurology with their own research funds. While patients were sent 
by the teaching hospital THU and by the cantonal hospital CHR to undergo this 
procedure, THU stopped sending patients when it acquired its own machine in 1992. 
The Institute IR discontinued the use of its outdated PET scanner in 1996.  
4.4.1.1 Canton V: Developing the Machine - 1971 
After an intensive development of PET scanner prototypes which started in 1971, an 
internationally renowned physicist finally came up with an almost ready to 
commercialize version in 1992 and moved to another country. To continue the local 
development of the prototype in the canton V, this physicist hesitated to keep on 
working with teaching hospital THV given that no cyclotron was functional there, an 
important element to develop the technology. However, because of this, the physicist 
was more inclined to give a PET scanner to the Institute IR.  
This threat of losing a machine was perceived by the head of the Department of 
Nuclear Medicine of THV as an opportunity to convince the State Counsellor of 
Health of the urgency of acquiring a cyclotron. In 1993, having been convinced that 
acquiring a cyclotron could enhance the chance of one city in the canton V to be 
selected for a major national event, the State Council forced each department of THV 
to draw on its budget to finance the technology, albeit without foreseeing the need for 
an operational budget. As a result of the hospital having been forced into it, neither 
the Faculty of medicine nor the administration supported this acquisition, and the 
cyclotron stayed in its original packaging for six years. Nonetheless, the promise to 
buy a cyclotron was sufficient to convince the developer to send its almost ready to 
commercialize PET scanner prototype to THV for further development.  
Later on, in exchange for bringing the patent and the know-how related to the PET 
scanner, the private company which hired the physicist offered a PET scanner to 
THV for 1/3 of its market price. With this new PET scanner, THV decided to 
discontinue the use of the first prototype because of the low demand for this type of 
procedure at the time and the absence of a nearby cyclotron. 
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4.4.1.2 Canton U: Building a Quasi-Monopoly - 1993 / 1999 
Dr Y, the head of the Nuclear Medicine Unit at teaching hospital THU, arrived in 
1987 with the firm intention of promoting what he felt was a promising diagnostic 
technology. Although he convinced his superior, the head of the Department of 
Radiology, and made a good impression on the head of the Cantonal Department of 
Health, the cost of the PET scanner technology was too high and cantonal authorities 
refused to fund this acquisition. While THU was still sending its patients to the 
Institute IR in the Canton R, the sudden donation of 12 millions from a patient 
revived the hope of acquiring a PET scanner in the canton U. The head of the 
Cantonal Department of Health, who believed THU should be the flagship of 
medicine in Switzerland, proposed not to spread this amount throughout the hospital, 
but to invest it in a PET scanner and in a cyclotron. Having secured the financial 
resources, choosing the right PET scanner manufacturer was the next step. Dr Y 
thought that acquiring the PET scanner from the Manufacturer AY, which had its 
headquarters in a foreign country, would enable THU to become the centre of 
reference in Europe for this company and even to “derive some perks from it”. 
While the first PET scanner clinical procedures were performed in December 1993 at 
THU, the cyclotron was not functional until 1996 due to the heavy infrastructure that 
had to be built. Once the cyclotron was functional, THU stopped being supplied in 
FDG (Fluorodesoxyglucose: the radio-isotope that is essential for the use of the PET 
scanner) by the Institute IR. Nevertheless, due to the absence of highly qualified staff 
to perform radio-pharmacy operations at THU, Dr Y asked the Institute IR to be 
responsible for the new cyclotron operations. To avoid competition, the Institute IR 
stopped producing FDG thereby leaving THU with a monopoly in Switzerland. 
Obtaining the funds to acquire a PET scanner was one thing, being financed through 
the reimbursement of PET scanner clinical applications was another. After long 
negotiations succeeded in obtaining the reimbursement of clinical applications, Dr Y 
was committed to extending the quasi-monopoly of THU to the whole of Switzerland, 
assuming that teaching hospital THV would continue to have a low level of PET 
scanner activity for a while: 
“If you look also at Dr Y, when he got his PET scanner he came out with: “you 
don’t need to buy one, just send your patients to the teaching hospital THU; we 
can cover all patients in Switzerland”. He was actively promoting that only 
THU should have PET, and only THU is going to be reimbursed for PET.” 
The increasing number of patients undergoing PET scanner diagnostics (around 1500 
cases in 1998) encouraged THU to adopt a second PET scanner. By September 1999, 
 100
the second machine was acquired, and with it the even more active dissemination of 
the idea that THU should have the monopoly of PET scanners in Switzerland. 
Although this second acquisition absorbed PET scanner demand, Dr Y from THU 
had the idea of asking manufacturer AY to build and commercialize the concept of a 
well-known physician who was working in Switzerland. This concept consisted of 
combining the PET scanner technology, which provides functional images, with the 
CT scanner technology, which produces anatomical images, to create the PET-CT 
scanner. 
After hard negotiations with Manufacturer AY to produce the machine, the first 
commercial PET-CT scanner was installed at THU in March 2001. Later on, in 2004, 
a second PET-CT scanner replaced the older PET scanner at THU.  
4.4.1.3 Analysis 
The high technological dependence between PET scanner and cyclotron characterizes 
the early diffusion of the PET scanner technology. As both elements were required to 
produce images, only a few centres had access to this technology. This explains the 
choice of the inter-university hospital committee to support the development of 
clinical applications at the Institute IR which had a PET scanner and a cyclotron, as 
well as the competence to run it. Since the PET scanner and the cyclotron were 
initially tightly coupled, extremely high investment was required to obtain the 
technology. The necessity for major investments may have significantly hindered the 
diffusion of the PET scanner at the outset. Clearly, the early diffusion of this 
technology is largely tributary to a researcher's intention to further develop this 
technology, whether the scanner itself or clinical applications.  
While on the one hand the Cantonal Department of Health of the Canton U was 
reluctant to fund the acquisition of a PET scanner, on the other hand, teaching 
hospital THU was eager to obtain one; the sudden donation of 12 millions CHF to 
THU relieved the vertical tension between both entities. The forced adoption of the 
PET scanner in the Canton V depicts a vertical struggle between the Cantonal 
Department of Health and the teaching hospital THV, but exceptionally in this case, 
where the former is imposing the adoption of the technology, despite internal 
resistance at THV. This was clearly due to the interest of the cantonal government to 
promote Canton V in Switzerland.  
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Although an agreement was finally reached, the adoption of a cyclotron by THU, 
while the same technology was already in service in Canton R, expresses a competition 
for the control of the production of FDG in Switzerland. To a certain extent, this 
event reflects a horizontal struggle between THU and Institute IR.  
By intending to build a PET scanner monopoly, THU is horizontally struggling with 
other centres desiring to acquire a PET scanner. This is performed by propagating the 
idea that, as a provider, THU is sufficient to cover patient needs all over Switzerland. 
This is a good strategy to maximize the PET scanner investment and to derive profit 
from this exploitation. Moreover, the adoption of two PET-CT scanners was, among 
other things, a strategy to fortify the position of THU as a quasi-monopoly. 
4.4.2 THE CHALLENGE OF REIMBURSEMENT: COLLIDING LOGICS AT 
THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
4.4.2.1 Two logics for Reimbursement: Sensitivity versus Patient 
Management 
Due to the high operational costs, the previous experience of Dr Y with an MRI 
scanner27 showed him that obtaining the compulsory reimbursement of PET scanner 
procedures by health insurance companies is a prerequisite to ensuring the 
sustainability of expensive technology, both in clinical and research settings: 
“We had a pretty strong focus on clinical applications. I had a very strong focus 
on clinical applications. I had a very clear view and I said: “We are a university 
which cannot afford to run PET scanners for research”. We need to have 
clinical justifications. […] And so I always said PET is expensive, we need a 
good application, that we can justify to run these expensive scanners, and when 
we have that, we can do research” 
To reach this target, Dr Y, who is both the head of the Department of Nuclear 
Medicine at the teaching hospital THU and the president of the PET committee at the 
Swiss Medical Association, organized a National Consensus Conference with the 
participation of international nuclear medicine experts, one representative from the 
Swiss Hospital Association28 and one from the Health Insurance Association, a doctor 
from the teaching hospital THV and an official from the Federal Department of 
Health. 
                                                     
27 Magnetic Resonance Imaging is a diagnostic device in radiology to visualize functions and structures of the body. 
28 This association represents hospital interests.  
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According to the health insurance law in effect in 1993, a new procedure must meet 
three criteria to be added to the reimbursement list: it must be considered as being 
1) effective, 2) appropriate and 3) economic. In this context, the challenge for the 
National Consensus Conference was to obtain from the federal government the 
compulsory reimbursement for some PET scanner indications, despite the lack of 
evidence on these three criteria. The previous experience of the government official 
with MRI qualified him to be critical in front of spectacular images like the ones 
produced by the PET scanner and he was insistent in demanding proof of the value of 
the technology in terms of patient management and clinical outcomes29: 
“It was for health and brain that we saw that it was good and that there was no 
risk. However, benefits for patients were not clear. We had opinions from 
experts, but not hard facts.”  
While the government official was asking for results on these dimensions, nuclear 
doctors were talking in terms of the high quality of functional images produced by the 
PET scanner: 
“I think the evidence that PET was relevant was that doctor B from NIH said 
that in brain tumors you could measure the site where tumors are with PET. So, 
this was mainly the words of Doctor B who said that there was clear clinical use 
of PET in the brain. And then, in the late 80’s, there was a publication in the 
New England Journal of Medicine by the UCLA group which demonstrated 
that you could identify hibernating myocardia with PET. And so, at the time, 
around 1990, I think the community at large had a pretty good understanding 
that PET was going to be helpful for brain and heart.” 
These positions were clearly two different ways of approaching quality in terms of the 
value of technology. 
Because the quality of images was amazing and experts’ opinions as well as their 
publications were persuasive, the government official thought that the population 
might benefit from having access to this technology. This led the government official 
to propose the elaboration of a special ordinance (amending the current Health 
Insurance Law) which would allow designated hospitals to be reimbursed for new 
technologies despite the lack of evidence on the three reimbursement criteria 
(effectiveness, appropriateness and economic value), as long as PET scanner providers 
agreed to evaluate the technology. In the long run this would allow evidence to be 
gathered on the impact of the technology in terms of patient management and clinical 
outcomes: 
                                                     
29 While patient management refers to the existence of a treatment in the case of a positive diagnostic, clinical outcome 
is related to the impact of the technology on the evolution of the disease. 
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“…Because knowledge about PET scanner in ’94 was not the same as today. 
We were not sure if it was a technology to produce good images or if it was 
appropriate to improve patient management. That’s why we elaborated a system 
which was in effect up to May 2006 to assess new technologies.” 
Given the state of the evidence in 1994, the National Consensus Conference settled the 
reimbursement for neurological and cardiac procedures with the condition that its 
eligibility for reimbursement should be reassessed by December 2005. Because PET 
providers had to evaluate the technology30, a fairly generous reimbursement rate was 
authorized. For example, while the PET scanner was initially reimbursed at a rate of 
around 2200 USD per examination, MRI was reimbursed at about 800 USD per exam. 
However, to limit cost expenditure and to ensure that the technology would actually 
be evaluated, only two centres were nominated for reimbursement: THU and THV. 
This ordinance allowing reimbursement for promising technology and specifying 
which centres would be reimbursed was introduced in the 1996 health insurance law 
called LAMal.” 
Although the reimbursement in neurology and cardiology was granted by the 
government, these clinical applications were limited to a few patients and were not 
sufficient to ensure the funding of related PET scanner research activities. Since Dr Y 
foresaw a huge potential for the technology in tumour staging31, THU in collaboration 
with other internationally renowned research institutes started investigating clinical 
PET scanner applications in oncology. Because THU published these papers in major 
journals, the reimbursement process was facilitated as it demonstrated their 
competence: 
“They said: "What you have to demonstrate is that your method works well, 
based on the literature and that you can perform it.” Since we published the 
literature essentially by ourselves, it was easy because we said: “Look, here we 
have studies in a top level imaging journal. We have evidence which we have 
acquired [ourselves]. This means [that] we are competent.” 
In January 1997, the publication of two papers in prestigious journals was sufficient to 
convince the Federal Department of Health to start reimbursing two indications in 
oncology: melanoma and bronchiocarcinoma. Later on, the Swiss Medical Association 
and PET providers asked the Federal Department of Health to further extend the 
reimbursement for PET scanner indications in oncology. However, there were still 
palpable tensions between the officials of the Federal Department of Health, who 
were much more focused on the value of the technology in terms of clinical outcomes 
                                                     
30 The obligation to evaluate the technology will finally be abandoned in 2005 when an ethical committee estimated 
that this procedure was discriminative for patients who would refuse to be part of this research protocol. 
31 Tumour staging identifies the developmental phase of a malignant disease when a diagnostic is made.  
 104
(the invasiveness of the procedure, the comparison with other diagnostic tools, the 
availability of treatment in case of positive result), and PET providers, who tended to 
evaluate the benefits of the technology in terms of the increased precision of the 
diagnostic tool without any consideration of the availability of a treatment in the case 
of positive result. Hence, for the government, the criterion of effectiveness (quality) 
which is mentioned in the law has two dimensions: the first is related to the specificity 
and the sensitivity of the procedure which were defended by nuclear doctors, and the 
second refers to the clinical value of the technology in terms of patient management 
and clinical outcomes. In order to be reimbursed, the government considered that 
these two criteria had to be met: 
“PET scanner manufacturers tended to suggest medical guidelines for 
reimbursement that went along these lines: ‘Our machines can detect this and 
that.’ But the Federal Commission of Health Insurance and the Federal 
Department of Health replied something like: ‘‘That’s not enough. Tell us how 
your procedure will finally benefit the patient.’ ” 
In 2000, a group of nuclear doctors called PET working group, which was by then the 
entity in charge of dealing with PET scanner issues (see the next section for further 
details), succeeded in persuading the government to provide additional 
reimbursements for lymphoma, breast, testicular and colon-rectal cancers. These new 
indications were reimbursed from January 2001 onwards. 
The special agreement dating from 1993 between PET providers and the Federal 
Commission for Health Insurance specified that the PET scanner was to be 
reassessed by the end of 2005. In order to get an objective evaluation, the Federal 
Department of Health ordered an independent assessment. The conclusions of this 
evaluation were striking as it stated that the PET scanner had no clinical benefit in 
neurology for epilepsy and dementia, and no clinical benefit in cardiology in terms of 
patient management (two original applications that were reimbursed since 1994), 
except for an evaluation before cardiac transplantation. As a consequence, the 
reimbursement for these indications was suppressed from the positive list in August 
2006. This decision was highly controversial as these indications were still reimbursed 
in other countries: 
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“Alzheimer’s disease was taken off the list, as were all other neurological 
pathologies. All around the world, we have clinical indications. Alzheimer’s is 
being accepted. PET scans are part of the standard preoperative strategy as a 
clinical indicator for recurrent epileptic conditions that need surgery. This is an 
approved clinical procedure all over the world. It was reimbursed everywhere, 
and it still is. But here, in Switzerland, no reimbursement is granted for that. 
Neurologists can’t believe it, and neurosurgeons are wondering what 
happened.” 
Some other sources argued that this is the result of the lobby of health insurance 
companies which were actively involved in suppressing expensive indications: 
“…[governmental] decision-making is subjected to enormous pressures coming 
from lobbyists who want to eliminate clinical indications. In fact, insurance 
companies work very hard to take as many indications off these lists as they can. 
They have an army of experts who are trained to do only that.” 
4.4.2.2 Analysis 
This episode illustrates the necessity for THU to obtain financial resources to perform 
research with the PET scanner and to further develop this technology, and it suggests 
that bottom-up championship is essential for its initial diffusion. In this case, gaining 
access to financial resources is mediated through a negotiation involving many actors, 
but with a clear vertical tension between the government officials and the nuclear 
doctors. This tension stems from the clash of two logics on what constitute the 
effectiveness of a medical intervention which is the first criterion in the law to provide 
reimbursement. The Nuclear Doctor Association argues more on the specificity and 
sensitivity of PET scanner images, while the government stresses the value of the 
technology in terms of patient management and clinical outcomes. Hence, although 
both sides draw on the institutional logic of quality, effectiveness was not defined in 
the same terms. Indeed, each actor was defining quality according to its own interests. 
On the one hand, the Federal government was concerned with patient management to 
make what would be reimbursed really worth it. This relates to the concept of “value 
for money” in the economic literature and suggests that this discourse on quality is 
grounded in an efficiency logic because the idea behind this concept is to optimize the 
use of money. On the other hand, the Nuclear Doctor Association intended to 
expand the reimbursement list to other clinical applications in order to have more 
flexibility in using the technology and to derive financial resources from it.  
In the early diffusion, this tension was resolved through the imaginative solution of 
the government officials which consisted of amending the law to allow the 
reimbursement for health technology which was not yet evidence-based, with the 
condition of evaluating the technology to establish clinical outcomes evidence. In 
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2006, cost-containment pressures and concerns for value for money brought the 
Federal Department of Health to suppress indications in neurology and cardiology, 
the same indications which were originally the factors causing the law to be amended. 
Hence, while regulations specified that a health technology must prove to be effective, 
appropriate and economic to be reimbursed, this coincidently restricted the 
reimbursement of the PET scanner and forced the Swiss Medical Association to 
negotiate with the government to be on the reimbursement list. Since the law was 
amended, the case suggests that the institutional logic of quality made the governance 
structure (the regulation) change.  
4.4.2.3 Opening up Reimbursement 
4.4.2.3.1 Canton S: Two Hospitals Collaborate 
By 1994, a nuclear doctor from the teaching hospital THS intended to acquire a PET 
scanner. The lack of maturity of the technology raised strong opposition from doctors 
who estimated that the global budget of the hospital should be spent for other 
purposes. However, things started to change from 1997 with the reimbursement of 
PET scanner procedures in oncology. Indeed, the publicly subsidized hospital32 SPHS 
reoriented its strategy to include a Nuclear Medicine Unit and asked the Federal 
Department of Health the authorization to adopt a PET scanner. In this case, profit-
making was clearly a motivation for adopting this technology: 
 “We [hospital SPHS] knew it was possible to make profit with this technology 
because the tariff was known. Teaching hospital THU had one […] We talked 
to the great doctor in THU.” 
Surprisingly, despite the proximity of one of the most concentrated collections of 
pharmaceutical companies, this factor was not crucial in the adoption of this 
technology as there was no agreement and no discussion between these entities. 
Hearing about the intention of hospital SPHS to acquire a PET scanner, teaching 
hospital THS swiftly met the cantonal government to ask for the authorization to 
acquire this technology, despite the tendency of their global budget to shrink by 33% 
in the last few years. However, because the canton is small, less than 200,000 
inhabitants, it was clear that there was room for only one PET scanner. With the 
demand from two organizations to acquire a PET scanner, the cantonal government 
                                                     
32 Publicly subsidized hospitals are privately owned, partially funded by the government and are part of the health 
provision cantonal planning. For this reason, any investment exceeding one million CHF (about 900’000 USD) have to 
be approved by the cantonal authority.  
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was not disposed to authorize two machines given the well-known phenomenon that 
health care cost increases with concentration of supply. Given the small size of the 
canton, the position of the Cantonal Department of Health was to authorize only one 
PET scanner, and strongly recommended the two hospitals to work on a collaborative 
scheme:  
“So, the political body that has authority forced us to try to make the 
investment and to collaborate with the private hospital SPHS.” 
Despite this coercive pressure, both hospitals found an interest in collaborating. While 
THS would have the financial support required, teaming up with the public hospital 
would make it easier for hospital SPHS to legitimate politically the fact that a publicly 
subsidized hospital would adopt this technology. Because there was still no national 
reimbursement for this procedure, sharing the acquisition of the machine also lowered 
the financial risks, although there was a huge potential for profit. In January 1998, the 
two hospitals submitted a joint document to the Federal Department of Health asking 
to be added to the reimbursement list.  
Because they intended to collaborate, the Cantonal Department of Health welcomed 
their initiative and was disposed to examine their request: 
“The proposition was considered favourably. It set an example that hospitals 
don’t just compete with each other, but could also sometimes work with each 
other.”  
Regardless of an embryonic collaborative scheme that was negotiated, the unexpected 
adoption from the private clinic PCXS destabilized everyone and led the Cantonal 
authorities to postpone its decision to authorize the acquisition of a PET scanner in 
the canton. The next sections describe this surprising adoption and struggle in canton 
S to acquire the PET scanner technology.  
4.4.2.3.2 Colliding Institutional Logics & Lawsuit 
With the new reimbursement for PET scanner in oncology, a condition affecting 
many people, the private clinic PCXS in Canton S foresaw an appealing business 
opportunity and unpredictably for the government bought a PET scanner in June 
1998. In spite of the clear prescription of the law that compels health insurances to 
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reimburse only the two nominated PET centres33, the clinic asked the Federal 
Department of Health to be on the reimbursement list.  
In July 1998, the Federal Department of Health met the owners of the private clinic 
PCXS. While the quality of the installation of the private clinic PCXS was impressive, 
the uncertainty related to the clinical effectiveness of the technology, which was still 
under evaluation, made the Federal Government reluctant to open up the 
reimbursement list to other providers. Indeed, this application from the private clinic 
was interpreted by the Federal government official as opportunistic behaviour with 
the aim of capitalizing on the new article in the Health Insurance Law instead of 
evaluating promising technology. As a result, the Federal Department of Health was 
not inclined to grant PCXS the right to be on the reimbursement list: 
“…because we established a new law that allowed us to introduce new 
technologies faster, Mr. X wanted to make profits and more money from it. 
And he messed up our new system of introduction for new technologies.” 
The Federal Department of Health justified its position by saying that the social 
insurance law provided access to advanced technology to the population (quality-
based institutional logic), but in way that limits cost expenditures (efficiency-based 
institutional logic). This was not contrary to the law since article 36 of the constitution 
asserts that the State can restrain free market competition if it is in the public interest. 
However, instead of directly answering the request of private clinic PCXS, the Federal 
Department of Health delayed the decision. On June 16th 1999, the private clinic 
PCXS sent a letter to the Federal Department of Health blaming them for not making 
a decision in regard to its request of June 1998.  
By June 24th 1999, the Federal Department of Health responded to this allegation by 
specifying in a letter that this subject was going to be discussed in the next meeting of 
the Federal Commission for Health Insurance34 in August 1999. Impatient, the private 
clinic PCXS hired a law firm and brought a lawsuit against the Federal Department of 
Health in front of the Federal Tribunal of Insurance35. The law firm was extremely 
active and sent a huge number of documents arguing that the ordinance was too 
restrictive and was contrary to the free practice of medicine in a free market. Table 4.7 
                                                     
33 Being on the reimbursement list compels health insurance companies to reimburse PET providers for specific 
indications. Otherwise, health providers may locally negotiate a reimbursement rate with the Cantonal Health 
Insurance Association with the risk to not reaching an agreement. 
34 Federal Commission for Health Insurance advises the Federal Department on the services that should be delivered 
in the Switzerland's health care system. 
35 The Federal Tribunal of Insurance receives and treats complaints related to insurance issues in Switzerland. 
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synthesizes the competing theorizations of both parties in their struggle to control the 
technology. 
TABLE 4.7: 
COMPETING THEORIZATIONS RELATED TO INFLUENCING REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
Theorization components Efficiency & Quality based 
Logics 
 
Government 
Free Market-based Logic 
 
Private Clinic 
What to reimburse or not?  
Definition of the innovation 
PET scanner in oncology, but 
also in cardiology and neurology 
PET scanner in oncology, but 
also in cardiology and neurology 
Why reimbursing or not? 
 
Moral legitimation essentially 
grounded in quality-based logic 
but tied to an efficiency-based 
arguments in the first case vs. 
pure free-market-based 
arguments  
 
Because the PET scanner is still 
being evaluated and as such 
should not be widely diffused 
for cost-containment purpose.  
 
“We attempted to defend a system of 
open social insurance with complete 
modern services for all citizens but at a 
reasonable financial cost.” 
Because the PET scanner should 
be available to all health care 
providers, to freely practice 
medicine. 
 
“[The firm] mobilized liberal economic 
argument, about open markets, the 
right to exercise the medical profession 
as freely and as completely as possible, 
even invoking the European 
convention on human rights.” 
Who should be reimbursed, 
and how? 
 
Moral legitimation essentially 
grounded in quality-based logic 
but tied to an efficiency-based 
arguments vs. free market-
based arguments 
To nominated centres for cost-
containment purposes.  
 
“The two centres were the initatiors. 
We wanted to limit it to the two 
centres to allow the evaluation of the 
technology.” 
To all organizations wishing to 
offer PET scanners. 
 
“Normally, everyone should be able to 
use this technology” 
 
 
In the lawsuit, the litigant asked the Federal Department of Health to stop delaying 
the decision related to authorizing the reimbursement of its PET scanner and to allow 
anyone wishing to use this technology to do so. In its complaint, the litigant advised 
the federal government to use quality criteria to allow reimbursement.  
After having examined the complaint, the Federal Tribunal of Insurance returned its 
verdict by February 2000 and concluded that the complaint lodged against the Federal 
Department of Health was inadmissible because in its letter of June 24th 1999, the 
Federal Department of Health made no decision and the Federal Tribunal of 
Insurance cannot conclude on a non-decision. 
4.4.2.3.3 Two Hospitals, but one PET Scanner – July 2000 
The sudden adoption of a PET scanner by the private hospital PCXS in June 1998 
placed the consortium composed of THS and the publicly subsidized hospital SPHS 
under great pressure to convince the cantonal authorities that the PET scanner should 
be under public control. To reach this objective, the consortium started lobbying 
many stakeholders: 
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“Word got around that a PET scanner was already installed at the PCXS clinic. 
There was an enormous pressure at the time. And we clearly played the political 
game to get the authorization before anyone else. […] We lobbied right and left 
arguing that high-tech medicine belonged in principle to teaching hospitals. […] 
Finally, we fought side by side [i.e. hospitals THS and SPHS].” 
When the consortium finally obtained the authorization from the cantonal 
government to obtain a PET scanner, they informally met the Federal Department of 
Health to be added to the reimbursement list. However, the Federal Department of 
Health refused arguing that two PET scanners were enough in Switzerland and that 
there would be too many PET scanners in this small canton. In this case, too many 
PET scanners increased the risk of social security costs going up: 
“There were suddenly two centers in a fairly small region [who wanted to be on 
the reimbursement list]. We feared that too many PET scans would be 
performed and which would have increased social security costs.”  
However, since in Switzerland health insurance companies can accept to reimburse 
some medical procedures or companies at the cantonal level, the consortium and the 
Cantonal Health Insurance Association came to an agreement as to the 
reimbursement of some indications with the PET scanner: 
"The insurance companies are organized on a cantonal level, and they’re 
organized on a federal level; and you have these cantonal concordats of the 
insurance companies, and they have agreed to come to…if it was not opened 
federally, they agreed to have a contract between the PET supplier [the hospital 
SPHS and the teaching hospital THS in the canton S] and the cantonal 
insurance concordat, so that they would reimburse their patients to have PET." 
At this point, for the consortium, acquiring a PET scanner was only an administrative 
formality. The technology was adopted in July 2000. 
4.4.2.3.4 New PET Concept: Quality Imperative 
If the lawsuit did not provide the private clinic PCXS with a victory, it made the 
Federal Department of Health realize that the position of the government would be 
difficult to defend before the Swiss Anti-trust Commission. Because many centres 
were by then already sending letters to the Federal government to be added to the 
reimbursement list, the head of the Federal Department of Health considered re-
evaluating the concept of having a positive list of two PET centres: 
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“The government worried that centres which were not included on this list 
would complain to the Anti-Trust Commission. This would have challenged the 
legitimacy of federal authorities to designate centres […]. It would have been 
tough to defend this list during a trial.”  
In August 1999, the Federal Commission for Health Insurance entrusted a unit of the 
Federal Department of Health to create a PET Study Group with the mission to find a 
new PET concept. In other words, the group would have to come up with an innovative 
way to nominate PET centres. Since the Federal Department of Health lacked the 
required human resources to work on a solution, the task was delegated to the Swiss 
Medical Association which had the expertise to deal with this issue. The PET Study 
Group was composed among others of Dr Y who was both the head of the Nuclear 
Medicine Department in THU and the president of the Nuclear Medical Association, 
a representative from the Swiss Health Insurance Association, a Federal Department 
of Health official, the head of the Nuclear Medicine Unit from the Cantonal Hospital 
SPCHT, and the owner of the private clinic PCXS. 
After long discussions, the PET Study Group proposed that PET centres should be 
nominated on the basis of quality criteria. Quality was perceived by actors as being the 
most powerful argument to persuade stakeholders since no one can be against this 
virtue: 
“I guess the best argument was to establish quality criteria. No one will dare say: 
‘We’re against quality.’ So that was the main argument that made them change 
their mind.” 
By June 2000, the PET Study Group published quality guidelines specifying the 
conditions to fulfil in order to be added to the reimbursement list. Among other 
things, centres must meet minimal technical requirements for the performance of the 
PET scanner, having a competent nuclear doctor to interpret clinical results and 
maintaining a registry of PET scanner procedures for evaluation purposes. These 
criteria were to be in force by January 2001. 
Unfortunately, although the head of the private clinic PCXS was part of the PET 
Working Group, four years were necessary to find a nuclear doctor willing to work in 
his clinic. To permit the reimbursement of its PET scanner, the Federal Department 
of Health suggested that the private clinic PCXS should work with the consortium of 
hospitals in the same canton S. However, the consortium refused to collaborate for 
personal conflict issues and because the private clinic had already bought a PET 
scanner which would provide it the control of the technology over the two other 
partners. The situation was so critical that even the manufacturer AY was involved in 
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asking Dr Y to find a nuclear doctor for this private clinic by arguing that having one 
more clinic buying FDG would be profitable for THU.  
4.4.2.4 Analysis 
This episode is characterized by a mixture of vertical and horizontal struggles at the 
cantonal and federal levels. At the cantonal level, the governance structure required 
health care providers to have authorization from the cantonal authority before 
acquiring expensive technology. This rule constrained hospital behaviour regarding 
investment and constituted the local conditions for an initial horizontal struggle 
between hospital SPHS and THS for control of the technology and led both hospitals 
to ask for the cantonal authorization to acquire a PET scanner. Aware of the supply-
induced demand phenomenon, the cantonal government was worried that having two 
PET scanners in such a small canton would increase cantonal health care expenditure. 
With the resistance of the cantonal authority, both hospitals were therefore vertically 
struggling to convince cantonal authority. Finally, instead of continuing struggling, the 
cantonal authority came up with the idea of forcing collaboration between the two 
hospitals, to which they agreed. Despite the good will of both hospitals, the 
unexpected acquisition of a PET scanner by a private clinic delayed the cantonal 
authorization because there was still a possibility of having too many PET scanners in 
Canton S. The spectre of seeing the PET scanner technology being controlled by the 
private clinic PCXS to the detriment of both hospitals was unthinkable and led the 
consortium to intensify its horizontal struggle by actively lobbying with the Cantonal 
Department of Health to have the authorization to acquire a PET scanner. To 
convince authority, the consortium argued that PET scanner facilities should be 
offered by public institutions and not by private institution motivated by profit.  
Although the cantonal governance structure requires health care providers to be 
authorized to adopt a technology, the possibility of being reimbursed by health 
insurance companies can be obtained at both cantonal and federal levels. Once the 
consortium received a negative response to be on the federal reimbursement list, it 
still had the possibility of negotiating a tariff to be reimbursed locally with the 
Cantonal Health Insurance Association. This bi-cephalous structure allows actors an 
alternative in the case of failure to convince the federal government and reflects the 
fragmentation of the governance structure in this jurisdiction. This particularity of the 
governance structure did not help authorities to control the diffusion of technology.  
At the federal level, there was an intense vertical struggle between the private clinic 
PCXS and the Federal Department of Health which ultimately led to a lawsuit. 
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Interestingly, each entity drew on different institutional logics to defend their 
respective positions. Hence, an institutional logic of free-market was mobilized by the 
private clinics by invoking arguments related to the free practice of medicine and to 
opening up the market. On the other hand, the federal government was theorizing its 
position by mobilizing a quality- and an efficiency-based institutional logic (see table 
4.7 for further details). It was trying to defend its new procedure of introducing 
promising technology at a reasonable cost while assessing it.  
The legal threat of potential adopters to sue the Federal Department of Health under 
the Anti-trust Commission was a powerful determinant in changing the nomination of 
PET centres. Indeed, the Federal Department of Health thought it had a chance of 
losing its case in court. This reflects the power of the free market institutional logic 
embedded in this jurisdiction. Indeed, it appears that the weight of this institutional 
logic is so important that it bent the governance structure in such a way that the law 
was amended to allow the reimbursement to health care providers fulfilling quality 
criteria instead of being nominated by the government. This new legislation drew on 
the institutional logic of quality and is supported by a strong normative argument: "no 
one can be against quality". Because a logic of quality was aligned with the free-market 
institutional logic, it allowed organizations to become PET centres which was aligned 
with the interest of every would-be adopter.  
By attempting to change the law through a lawsuit, the private clinic PCXS was testing 
the legislation and its regulator. This is a form of institution testing because this lawsuit 
was an attempt to change the governance structure. It is because the government 
wanted to avoid a confrontation before the Anti-trust commission and to keep its 
legitimacy that it readjusted its legislation according to the market-based institutional 
logics, but through quality-based criteria.  
4.4.3 LOCAL STRATEGIC ACTIONS TO OBTAIN A PET SCANNER 
4.4.3.1 Canton T: A Fluid Adoption - May 2001 
In one of the most important oncology centres in Switzerland, oncologists and nuclear 
doctors asked the management board of the publicly subsidized cantonal hospital 
SPCHT to acquire a PET scanner in 1997. Because the reimbursement was still 
confined to only two providers, the board denied this request and consequently there 
was no chance to make profit. However, this situation changed with the new PET 
concept which was developed with the participation of nuclear doctors from the 
hospital SPCHT. As soon as the new PET concept was published, nuclear doctors 
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met the management board which was inclined to examine their demand if a business 
plan was produced. The Department of Finance of the hospital SPCHT was 
mandated to evaluate the economic aspects of the PET, while doctors were assessing 
its effectiveness. Given that the business plan was favourable for the adoption of a 
PET scanner, the hospital SPCHT acquired a machine in May 2001. Because there 
was no law in this canton requiring the cantonal hospital to ask for authorization 
before making a major investment, the acquisition of a PET scanner was financed 
from their annual budget. 
For this hospital, competition for professionals and for patients is a major incentive to 
adopt the PET scanner in the Cantonal Hospital SPCHT. Indeed, adopting an 
advanced technology attracts patients and reduces the risk of losing them to THU in 
the Canton U. The PET scanner also attracts nuclear doctors from Austria, Germany 
and the Canton U. In January 2006, the cantonal hospital SPCHT upgraded its PET 
scanner to a PET-CT scanner. 
4.4.3.2 Analysis 
What is striking in this case is the absence of vertical struggle between local authorities 
and the cantonal hospital. This is due to the absence of regulation compelling the 
cantonal hospital SPCHT to obtain the authorization of the cantonal authority for 
major investment. However, the motivation for adopting a PET scanner is highly 
related to the revenue the technology can generate and that is why managers were not 
interested in funding this technology as long as there was no compulsory 
reimbursement. To justify the adoption of the PET scanner internally, a business plan 
had to be produced and profitability demonstrated. With the new reimbursement in 
oncology, the business plan proved the technology to be profitable. This shows that 
the notion of profitability is crucial in this jurisdiction and that staying competitive in 
order to attract patients and nuclear doctors is important. 
4.4.3.3 Canton N: Setting up a Private Company - August 2001 
In teaching hospital THN, the Nuclear Medicine Unit had not been operational since 
1993 as the only position in nuclear medicine was vacant since then. However, in 1999 
the increasing interest of other teaching hospitals in adopting the PET scanner 
prompted the Department of Radiology to elaborate an economic evaluation of the 
pertinence of developing this specialty. This was motivated by the competition 
between teaching hospitals in Switzerland. As one interviewee notes:  
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“It was somehow related to these PET scanners [in other cantons] because the 
knowledge about PET scanners came to these cantons, especially from the 
Canton U, and I think there is ongoing competition between the teaching 
hospitals of the Canton U, S and N. And THN, not having the financial support 
of the cantonal government N, it wanted to keep up with the other two cities to 
have a PET scanner.” 
The conclusions of the economic evaluation report were unequivocal: a Nuclear 
Medicine Unit would add economic value to THN. At that point, a procedure to 
recruit a chief of the Nuclear Medicine Unit began. To attract a good academic 
candidate, the CEO of THN knew that obtaining a PET scanner was a key element: 
“So, the CEO of the teaching hospital THN needed a new boss for the Nuclear 
Medicine Department, and he had to offer a PET scanner [to make the hospital 
attractive].” 
However, in this canton the acquisition of a PET scanner by THN is tied with the 
decision of the Cantonal Department of Health to authorize this acquisition. Due to 
the important deficit of the Canton N and to the high costs engendered by the 
previous chaotic diffusion of no less than around 40 MRI in this canton, the 
Department of Health of the Canton N refused to finance another expensive 
technology which would contribute to the increase of health care costs. To justify its 
position, the cantonal government invoked the already high number of PET scanners 
in Switzerland: 
“The official line was that five PET scanners in Switzerland are enough, so they 
[the politicians of the Canton N] didn’t want to have a PET scanner in the 
Canton N.” 
Because cantons U, V, T and S already had this technology and PET scanner 
procedures were reimbursed if quality criteria were met, the CEO of THN was 
determined to overcome this obstacle. After having met with a local private hospital, 
PHN1, both hospitals agreed to build a private company, the PET PCN Company, with 
the unique mission to offer PET scanner procedures. Given the relatively small 
population to be served (despite the fact that this is one of the most populated canton 
in Switzerland), this arrangement is a wise strategy to reach the profitability threshold. 
Indeed, , diluting the limited number of patients through many centres would lower 
the number of case per machine. Since the price of FDG radically decreases with the 
number of doses ordered, gathering patients on the same site engenders important 
economies of scale. Moreover, to amortize the machine before it becomes obsolete, a 
certain average number of patients per day has to be reached. While this arrangement 
allowed THN to have access to a PET scanner, it substantially decreased the financial 
risk for both hospitals for two reasons. First, it would avoid local competition:  
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“With three PET scanners here in the Canton N, no PET scanner would have 
reached break even, and so, it made no sense [to compete]. The idea was to 
have one PET scanner for everyone who wants to use it, and to have a 
successful business. [... Moreover], there was quite a high probability that no 
other clinic would really come up with another PET scanner for competition 
reasons.” 
Second, since there was no guarantee that the PET scanner would be reimbursed by 
local insurance if it was an unapproved acquisition, it was wise for the private hospital 
to collaborate with the public hospital to be more legitimate as regard to health 
insurance companies and to share the financial risk in case there were no profit: 
“In the Canton N, only public hospitals need authorization from the 
government before buying an expensive technology. Private hospitals are not 
constrained by this. As a consequence, insurance companies can refuse to pay 
for a procedure following from the acquisition of an unapproved acquisition.” 
To fund the PET scanner, the president of the PET PCN Company who was also the 
newly appointed head of the Nuclear Medicine Unit at THN, signed a lease with the 
manufacturer Z and acquired the PET scanner in August 2001. The machine was 
installed at THN site because it was where the competence lay, and it was more 
legitimate to put high-cost technologies in a public teaching hospital:  
“Because they have the manpower there. [...] And politically it’s better in the 
university hospital than in a private hospital.” 
However, the Canton N still disapproved this acquisition and an increase in the health 
care cost was anticipated as a consequence: 
“…the Cantonal Department of Health, they were disappointed and angry 
about the PET scanner here in Canton N, because they thought it would 
increase the cost of health care. So, they didn't want it.” 
While profit may be an argument for adopting the technology, the intention was not 
to split it between owners of the private company, but to reinvest in the company to 
acquire other technologies such as a PET-CT: 
“We don’t split it [the profit]. It rests in the company for our new investments. 
It’s how we upgraded to a PET-CT with the profits made.” 
In 2002, another major private hospital, PHN2, explored the possibility of acquiring a 
PET scanner to perform cancer staging. The idea was to adopt a PET scanner to 
attract radio-therapy patients. However, quick estimations from the CEO caused him 
to abandon this project. He believed that there were not enough patients and clinical 
applications in the Canton N for a second PET scanner. Consequently, instead of 
competing with the two other hospitals with the financial risks that this implied, the 
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private hospital PHN2 asked to become a member of the PET private company. By 
December 2003, this company had a new partner. With the profit generated, the PET 
PCN Company upgraded their machine to a PET-CT in July 2005. 
4.4.3.4 Analysis 
The adoption of this technology by other hospitals appears to be one important factor 
that incited the Department of radiology to ask for an economic evaluation. With the 
distance between THN and other hospitals, the hospital was not primarily adopting to 
compete for patients, but much more to keep up with other teaching hospitals, i.e. to 
imitate other teaching hospitals in order to maintain their teaching hospital status in 
Switzerland. However, imitation was certainly not an argument to convince the 
hospital and the authorities that the project was worthy. An evaluation had to 
demonstrate that the project was financially viable.  
Despite a positive evaluation, the obligation of THN to ask for authorization to invest 
in an expensive technology, combined with the need for financial resources from the 
canton, provoked a vertical struggle between the cantonal government and the 
cantonal hospital. Indeed, the cantonal authority was reluctant to invest in this 
technology due to its important debt and to the preceding chaotic diffusion of MRI. 
This struggle ended with the refusal of the cantonal government to authorize this 
acquisition and forced THN to find an alternative way to adopt this technology. The 
co-existence of a public and a private regime eased the elaboration of a stratagem to 
adopt a technology legally by setting up a private company. Hence, in Switzerland, 
when the public regime obstructs entrepreneurial initiatives, there is the possibility for 
public actors to find a safe refuge under the private regime. 
Not being financially supported by the Canton N and with no budgetary surplus, 
THN had to find a collaborative arrangement with the private hospital PHN1. 
Teaming up was lowering the financial risk that competition may have caused by 
impeding profitability. Hence, there was no horizontal struggle in this canton because 
actors had an incentive to collaborate. This is confirmed by hospital PHN2 joining the 
PET PCN Company instead of acquiring a PET scanner for itself and competing with 
the two other hospitals.  
Moreover, collaboration was believed to be a good strategy to attract the sympathy of 
the health insurance companies. Indeed, because there was still no uniform tariff at 
the time, tariffs had to be locally negotiated with the Cantonal Health Insurance 
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Association. This was the case until TARMED came into force in 2004 with a 
uniform tariff for ambulatory services across Switzerland.  
4.4.3.5 Canton D: Controversial Adoptions - November 2002 
From the eighties, nuclear doctors at the teaching hospital THD were desperately 
trying to obtain a PET scanner. The rumours that hospitals from the canton S were 
asking the Federal Department of Health to be on the reimbursement list combined 
with the waiting list of the closer incited THD to create an internal working group to 
acquire a PET scanner. By March 1999, the group sent a document asking the Federal 
Department of Health to add THD to the reimbursement list. The main argument 
presented in this document was related to the incapacity of the closer THV to meet 
local demand. Moreover, THD argued that adopting a PET scanner would reinforce 
the collaboration between cantons D and V since the cyclotron in canton V would 
supply their PET scanner. Initially, the Federal Department of Health did not grant 
them the right to be on the reimbursement list; however, the criteria to be nominated 
as a reimbursable PET scanner provider changed before the cantonal government 
authorized this acquisition. 
Because the budget of THD had been blocked for years, the working group knew that 
it would be difficult to convince the cantonal government36 to authorize the 
acquisition of a PET scanner. To convince the Cantonal State to provide this 
authorization, a financial-economic study was performed to prove that the PET 
scanner could add value to THD and to estimate the temporal horizon for 
profitability. Since the chief of the Department of Radiology refused to use part of his 
budget to acquire this technology, a special financial strategy had to be agreed upon. 
Building on his previous experience with MRI, the Director of Finance proposed the 
creation of an auto-financed PET Unit which took these constraints into 
consideration. This solution implied that THD would loan money to the PET Unit. In 
exchange, the latter would reimburse the hospital with the profit it generated in the 
same way as a bank would loan money to an enterprise.  
By December 2000, the financial-economic study demonstrated that there was a 
return on investment after 8 to 9 years of operation: 
                                                     
36 The Teaching Hospital THD has to request the authorization of the Cantonal Council of State when investing on 
projects of more than 500'000 CHF. 
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“The pay-back, or investment recovery rate, varies between 8,15 years in the 
best scheme, and 9,44 in less favourable conditions. It can thus be predicted 
that the initial 2,500,000 investment will undoubtedly be recovered between 
years 2007 and 2009, depending on interest rates.” 
In February 2001, given the positive result of the financial-economic study, the Board 
of Directors of THD agreed that a request to invest in this technology should be 
lodged with the Cantonal Council of State. However, after having informally discussed 
with the Cantonal Government Official, the General Director understood the timing 
was not good and did not pass the document on to the cantonal authority. Indeed, 
since the private clinic PCV2 intended to acquire a SPECT37 scanner, the cantonal 
government preferred to study carefully whether a PET scanner would actually 
perform the same type of diagnostic as the SPECT scanner. This precaution was taken 
in order to avoid an over-diffusion of this technology in the canton: 
“The intent was to check if there was not too much equipment in this region.” 
The norm in this canton is that when the private sector is providing a service, the 
cantonal government would be disinclined to let the public hospital duplicate it, as it 
would by acquiring a PET scanner: 
“The PET file stayed on the General Director’s shelves for a long time, because 
the State Counselor was not convinced easily. He didn’t trust new technologies, 
and was more open to requests from the private sector. This is the way things 
work in Switzerland. When the private sector takes charge, there is a feeling that 
the public sector should step aside.” 
Nearly one year after having received the financial-economic study of the PET 
scanner, THD finally sent the document to the Cantonal Government in January 
2002. The approval came shortly after the Cantonal government realized that the 
SPECT scanner was not a technical equivalent to the PET scanner. Consequently, this 
technology was missing in the Canton D which provides a rationale for the cantonal 
government to authorize this investment.  
With the acquisition of a SPECT scanner by the private clinic PCD2 a few months 
before THD, doctors operating in the private sector started sending their patients to 
this private clinic. Interestingly, when a PET scanner was operational at THD in 
November 2002 it did not change the behaviour of doctors in the private sector who 
continued to send their patients to the private clinic, despite the technically less 
                                                     
37 The SPECT (Single-photon emission computed tomography) is a machine used in radiology to measure blood flow. 
This type of camera functions on the same principal than the PET scanner, but produces far less precise images.  
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performing machine. The competition for patients between the private sector and the 
public sector might explain this behaviour:  
“There is a SPECT at private clinic PCD2. […] Doctors from the private sector 
will instinctively send their patient to another private institution, rather than at 
the [public] hospital because they fear […] their patient will be taken away from 
them, and private doctors also support each other.” 
For a teaching hospital to buy a stand-alone PET scanner when a PET-CT scanner 
was available is surprising. Two reasons seem to explain this choice. First, the PET-
CT integrates the work of a nuclear doctor and a radiologist. In order to avoid 
confusion as to which professional should interpret PET-CT scans, the head of the 
Department of Radiology encouraged the acquisition of a stand-alone PET scanner: 
“He also wanted only a stand-alone PET. He did not want a PET-CT. As this is 
a scanner, he thought it concerned the radiology department. Since then, the 
situation has evolved. There have been several demonstrations of the use of 
PET-CT at the international level that were justifying this technology inside a 
nuclear medicine service and that it’s not always competing with scanners in 
radiology. But when things started, there were fears, and everyone was trying to 
defend his own territory.” 
Also, given the uncertainty related to the market, choosing less expensive technology 
was more reasonable. Moreover, the financial-economic study of the PET-CT scanner 
may not have been favourable: 
“We had to choose between a stand-alone PET or a PET-CT. We thought 
about it for a while. The exorbitant price of the latter made us opt for the stand-
alone machine. […] The market was yet untested, and there was no guarantee 
things would work. At the time, reimbursement laws for PET and PET-CT 
exams were still limited to a few types of exams.” 
In 2004, as more patients and more indications were reimbursed, the head of the 
Department of Radiology realised that the PET-CT was not going to compete with 
other scanners in radiology. Consequently, THD elaborated another report to upgrade 
their machine to a PET-CT. Since there was a limit set by the manufacturer AY to 
upgrade PET scanner to PET-CT scanner without having to buy a new machine, 
THD had a strong incentive to act quickly. The upgrade took place in April 2005.  
4.4.3.5.1 A PET-CT at the Private Clinic PCD2 - September 2005 
In parallel to this upgrade by teaching hospital THD, the private clinic PCD2 decided 
to acquire a PET-CT scanner. In 2003, a new nuclear doctor trained in radiology was 
appointed at PCD2. Realising that SPECT scanner does not provide good quality 
images; he started militating for the clinic to buy a PET-CT scanner. After a 
consensus was reached inside the clinic to buy a PET-CT scanner instead of a stand-
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alone PET scanner, a request was sent to the private Foundation of the clinic to fund 
this acquisition. The PET-CT scanner was preferred because it would send a powerful 
marketing signal of the quality of services offered by the clinic. After having examined 
the business plan produced by the administrator of the Department of Radiology, the 
Foundation agreed to invest in this technology, based on many supporting factors. 
First, by acquiring this technology, the private clinic PCD2 would have the first 
private PET scanner in canton D which would confer an advantage over other clinics 
since it would saturate this small private local market:  
“Obviously, we were afraid of the competition. I talked earlier that we managed 
to buy a PET-CT pretty quickly because we wanted, to use the marketing 
terminology, to padlock the region. We followed what private clinics did in the 
region V where they installed 3 PET-CT in this small geographical region. We 
wanted to avoid this situation. [However], we were scared when we heard that 
[a private clinic nearby] was getting information as regard to this modality.” 
However, the intention of the clinic PCD2 to acquire a PET scanner was not 
welcomed by THD which put enormous pressure on the clinic to stop this adoption. 
This hospital lobbied the Nuclear Medicine Association to delay as much as possible 
the accreditation of the private clinic PCD2 which would certify its conformance to 
the new PET concept quality criteria established in 2000. Interestingly, at the time, the 
newly appointed president of this association was precisely the head of the Nuclear 
Medicine Unit of THD and was actively militating, with a group of nuclear doctors 
working in teaching hospitals, to stop the spread of the PET scanner to private clinics. 
The danger these doctors perceived was that there would not be enough demand to 
make this technology profitable. The private clinic PCD2 acquired a PET-CT scanner 
in September 2005. 
4.4.3.6 Analysis 
As in the preceding case of adoption in canton N, the requirement for would-be 
adopters to have the authorization of the cantonal government is the structural 
component that caused vertical struggles between teaching hospital THD and the 
cantonal government. This vertical struggle was fuelled by the desire of THD to 
acquire a PET scanner; the last teaching hospital to adopt one. However, the cost-
containment commitment of the cantonal government – which is reflected by the 
frozen budget of the teaching hospital and the necessity to prove the financial viability 
of this acquisition – incited the former to be reluctant to invest in this technology. 
This is even more acute since there is potentially a private clinic which may offer this 
service to the population of the canton D. According to some respondents, there is a 
norm in this canton stating that if the private sector can provide a service, the public 
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sector should not compete with them. The vertical struggle between the cantonal 
government and teaching hospitals is coloured by this norm as the former delayed the 
authorization precisely to inquire if this technology is already available in the canton, 
in this case at the private clinic PCD2 with their intention to acquire a SPECT. It was 
only when the cantonal government realized that this camera would not perform the 
same job that the authorization was granted to THD. Hence, it appears that the 
weight of the private sector in this canton is impressively strong. Interestingly, 
although the PET scanner in THD is in the public sector, it is managed as if it were in 
a private sector with the necessity to prove its profitability. 
The choice of adopting a PET instead of a PET-CT scanner at THD is also related to 
vertical struggle. Indeed, the higher price of the PET-CT would have delayed the 
break-even point in terms of the return on investment and would have been 
insufficient to convince the authority of the viability of the project. Moreover, the 
reimbursement for the PET scanner was still limited to only a few pathologies, which 
lowered its profitability. However, to avoid competition between nuclear doctors and 
radiologists inside THD, adopting the PET scanner was a safer choice. 
There was also a fierce horizontal struggle between the private and the public 
hospitals in this canton. The adoption of a SPECT scanner is more probably pressing 
THD to adopt a PET scanner to avoid losing patients who may be taken in charge by 
the private clinic. Private practice doctors preferred to send their patients to the 
private clinic PCD2 despite the higher performing machine at the public hospital. The 
competition between the teaching hospital and the private clinic PCD2 is also 
expressed by the action undertaken by the former to impede the adoption of the 
technology by the latter, and by slowing down as much as possible the accreditation 
process from the Nuclear Medical Association. Underlying these horizontal struggles 
is the necessity for the independent PET Unit at THD to break even in its budget and 
for the private clinic to generate profit; a target that is more difficult to attain with 
more competition.  
4.4.3.7 Canton R: Convincing Authorities for Adoption - September 
2003 
The cantonal hospital CHR, having one of the largest oncology divisions in the 
country with a cantonal population of about 550,000 inhabitants, naturally became 
interested in adopting a PET scanner as the increasing use of the PET scanner in 
oncology caused an increasing number of their cancer patients to be referred to the 
teaching hospital THU: 
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“...they saw of course how many patients they sent meanwhile to the teaching 
hospital THU for the PET scan, so they saw that they would lose patients if 
they have no PET scanner and that was actually the basis of the business 
plan...”that there would be a demand for this type of procedure.” 
The nuclear doctors and the hospital management board met the cantonal 
government at the beginning of 1999 to obtain authorization to buy the technology. 
Despite a strong consensus within the 17 members of the board of directors of the 
Cantonal Hospital CHR, the head of the Cantonal Department of Health was 
unwilling to fund this acquisition which would cost 2,450,000 CHF to the State, as he 
was also against the acquisition of MRI by smaller hospitals. To justify his position, he 
argued that he preferred to wait until this technology was more mature before 
adopting it. Also, he wanted to evaluate the tendency in the diffusion of this 
technology in the surrounding cantons: 
“The head of the Health Department said: “we should wait for this technology 
to develop in other cantons before adopting one in the Canton R. In general, he 
thought that medicine in this canton should stay at a lower level in terms of 
medical technology and that we should keep health care costs low in the 
canton” 
“Officially, the government position was that the canton did need such a 
technology and that the cantonal government did not want to become a major 
player in health care. “ 
Apparently, these reasons hide a cost-containment agenda on the side of the cantonal 
government: 
“He preferred to leave big ticket technologies to canton U, V, D and the like. 
Behind this discourse is the idea of saving costs and to keep the insurance 
premium costs low.” 
The election of June 1999 brought a technologically open-minded candidate to head 
the Cantonal Department of Health. After having discussed with the new director, 
CHR renewed its request for the acquisition of a PET scanner to the cantonal 
government in November 2001. After an evaluation by the Cantonal Department of 
Health and the approval of the Great Cantonal Council, the authorization arrived in 
August 28th, 2002.  
The 10-year-old cantonal hospital plan of the Cantonal Department of Health still 
specified that patients should be sent to the institute IR for PET scanner applications, 
despite the fact that the research institute IR had already discontinued its use in 1996. 
Thus, this procedure had first to be changed before adoption. However, it was the 
responsibility of the Parliament to amend this planning and, since it was not a priority 
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for the parliament, the change was finally approved in 2003. By November of the 
same year CHR acquired its PET scanner through its global budget.  
Once implemented, CHR was surprised to observe that the other nearby cantonal 
hospital CHR2 did not refer its patients there, but continued to send them to THU. 
While some argue that this was due to the fact that THU had a PET-CT scanner, 
others saw a historic rivalry between not only two hospitals, but between two distinct 
regions within the canton: 
“There’s a big rivalry between these two hospitals, but actually, I’m working at 
both hospitals. […] This is really an old story between these two cities, and it’s 
not only the hospital, it’s not only the PET scanner, it’s also for surgery, the 
school systems, etc.” 
No matter the reasons underlying this rivalry, CHR intended to upgrade to the PET-
CT scanner apparently to attract patients that might be referred to THU.  
4.4.3.8 Analysis 
In this case, the vertical struggle for controlling the technology was a long process that 
lasted over three years. With its imperative for cost-containment, the government 
clearly had no short term interest in supporting adoption of this technology and 
postponed authorization until after re-election. However, the election turned out 
differently and brought a new person into power who opened up the adoption 
process. While CHR finally obtained the authorization, the hospital planning had to be 
changed by the parliament. This struggle for the control of the technology was 
particularly beneficial to the government which succeeded in postponing the 
acquisition for at least three years.  
The motivation to obtain a PET scanner is clearly related to a horizontal struggle with 
THU which was draining oncology patients from the canton R. By acquiring this 
technology, the cantonal hospital CHR thought patients living in the canton R would 
be less often referred to THU, and to some extent that was the case. Nevertheless, 
historical rivalry made another nearby hospital continue to send patients to THU. In 
this canton, competition is not just a matter of patient management but seems to be 
related to profound historical causes. 
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4.4.3.9 Canton V: Private Clinics Competing with Teaching Hospital 
THV 
4.4.3.9.1 Private Clinics PCV1 and PCV2 adopt a PET-CT – 2004 
Due to the obsolescence of the PET scanner of the teaching hospital THV, the 
private clinics PCV1 and PCV2 – two independent entities operating in the Canton V 
– began receiving repeated requests from oncologists in private practice to have access 
to a PET-CT scanner in the region. Moreover, the imminent change of the unified 
ambulatory tariff (TARMED) in 2004, which was going to be applied homogeneously 
for all providers across all cantons, was going to guarantee the same tariff for private 
clinics as for public hospitals. This significantly lowered the risk for private clinics to 
buy an expensive technology because the universal tariff would be known before the 
acquisition. 
Considering that private doctors tend to send patients to private clinics; both private 
clinics perceived a business opportunity to acquire this technology: 
“The private sectors offered none of these services. There was a competition 
between the private and the public sector in oncology in canton V. At the 
teaching hospital THV, the technology had been obsolete for quite a long time 
already. Since budgets were blocked and there was no plan for a PET scanner in 
the public sector, and because we did not know the situation prevailing in 
private clinic PCV2 at the time, we thought there was a terrific potential with 
private oncologists, and even with the other oncologists at the hospital.” 
Acquiring a PET-CT scanner would also allow both private clinics to offer a complete 
range of services to doctors and patients: 
“Very rapidly, everyone concluded that even if the PET was not profitable by 
itself, there would be other paybacks. With a PET in the place, there would be a 
demand for other exams. Patients could come in, get several types of exams at 
the same clinic and have a complete clinical assessment in the same building.”  
While there is clear competition between private and public health organizations, there 
is also a competition for patients between the two private clinics. Whereas the private 
clinic PCV1 was the first to begin an acquisition process to obtain a PET scanner, the 
long delay it experienced before obtaining the authorization from the Federal Nuclear 
Regulation Department, due to the fact that it was situated in an inhabited building, 
made them lose their first-mover advantage as the private clinic PCV2 opened its 
stand-alone PET scanner just one month after clinic PCV1. 
Because Dr Y helped the private clinic PCV1 to install its PET-CT scanner, which 
was bought from the Manufacturer AY, the FDG was bought from THU where Dr Y 
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worked. These private clinics never reached the threshold of profitability due to the 
high number of PET scanners in this area. 
4.4.3.9.2 Private Clinic PCDV Adopts - December 2004 
Although administratively belonging to the Canton D, the private clinic PCDV is 
geographically closer to teaching hospital THV and to the private clinics PCV1 and 
PCV2 than to THD which makes it more in competition with its nearer neighbours 
than with this last. This is corroborated by the fact that patients of the private clinic 
PCDV mainly came from the Canton V and from foreign countries.  
The director of radiology and the nuclear doctor of the clinic were the first to be 
convinced of the necessity for the clinic to acquire a PET-CT. Indeed, there was an 
increasing demand for this type of procedure: 
“This is when I realized that finally, there was a demand for PET-CT exams, 
and that demand was increasing all the time. I thought getting this type of 
machine here really worth the trouble.”  
Because the clinic PCDV specialized in oncology, adopting such a complementary 
diagnostic tool for its Centre of Oncology as a PET-CT scanner became imperative to 
allow patients access to all services inside the house. As such, the PET-CT scanner 
was an important asset for its owner to be well positioned in the local health care 
market: 
“…we had a clinic with a developing oncology centre. It was essential for us to 
acquire a PET-CT to be able to provide patients with a complete diagnostic. 
And for a technological park in a radiology institute like ours, a PET-CT 
machine was becoming indispensable. (…) We had to position ourselves on the 
market.” 
This last reason became the only tangible advantage for having a PET scanner as the 
fierce competition between providers annihilated the chance for profit. Moreover, the 
expectation of the clinic PCDV of attracting patients from Canton D was abandoned. 
Indeed, given that there was no private PET-CT scanner in canton D and that private 
doctors tend to deal primarily with private clinics, the clinic PCDV counted on private 
doctors from this canton to send their patients, which did not happen: 
 127
“At the start, I thought I could count on more prescribing oncologists coming 
from Canton D. As always, in big cities, there are oncologists from the private 
sector, and oncologists from the public sector. The two sectors do not often 
collaborate effectively with each other then I thought there were opportunities 
with PET in the private sector. And at the beginning I thought we would drain 
more people from Canton D that would be coming to our clinic, as there were 
no other private clinics in the canton.” 
4.4.3.9.3 Teaching Hospital THV Reacts – 2006 
In the Canton V, the head of the Nuclear Medicine Unit who convinced the Cantonal 
Government to invest in a PET scanner and a cyclotron retired in 1997. Due to the 
way the PET scanner was funded in 1993, the new head was not successful in 
implementing a PET scanner as the chief of the Department of Radiology was 
radically against any investment in nuclear medicine: 
“The problem was that radiology and nuclear medicine are in the same 
department. And as such, they share the same budget envelop. So, by principle, 
radiologists wanted us to invest in MRIs or scanners and not at all in PETs. 
They thought that if they could keep the others from developing their PET, 
they stood a better chance to get a third MRI (…) There was an enormous fight 
on that account.” 
In February 2003, many intestinal wars that had been going on for months incited the 
head of the Nuclear Medicine to leave THV for the private sector. At about the same 
time, the head of the Department of Radiology quit, leaving space for new staff.  
In only a few months, three private clinics near THV started offering PET-CT 
scanners and all these clinics hired nuclear doctors who had left THV. With its 
obsolete machine, THV was no longer competitive. The intensifying competition 
from the private clinics combined with the vacant positions of chief of the 
Department of Radiology and of chief of the Nuclear Medicine Service forced the 
management of THV to find someone quickly to lead the development of the whole 
Department of Radiology. In 2005, a double board certified doctor (in radiology and 
in nuclear medicine, and specialized in cardiology) accepted the challenge. Aware of 
the obsolescence of the PET scanner, the double board certified doctor negotiated 
before his arrival an upgrade of the technological park inside the Department of 
Radiology including the acquisition of a PET-CT scanner. To persuade the Cantonal 
Department of Health to invest in a PET-CT scanner, the future head of Department 
of Radiology argued that THV was late in its technological development and, 
implicitly, that the private clinics were attracting more patients than the hospital THV:  
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“The main argument is that we were way behind the competition. We no longer 
had an adequate park to provide for patient care.”  
In addition to this, two things seem to have persuaded the State Council to upgrade 
the technological park of the hospital with a PET-CT scanner: 1) the exodus of 
doctors to the private sector and 2) competition for patients: 
“[The private sector] certainly contributed [to get things going] in two ways: 
first, by competing and then, by draining away all the doctors.”  
Private clinics near THV did not welcome this initiative and lobbied the cantonal 
government to stop the process of adoption. Indeed, this abundance of PET-CT in 
this relatively small canton represented a threat that they would lose patients to THV: 
“There was some opposition, with a PET-CT already bought. Not so much at 
the hospital level, but outside, in the private sector, there was some lobbying 
going on. They said there were enough machines. Two had already been 
installed inside the city. They did not want a third one. They had already gone 
through the same situation with the MRIs, where the private sector got their 
machines before the hospital. And as a result, the hospital was sending their 
patients in the private sector. Or they said the investments were too costly. 
They had already invested in the technology, and they wanted to provide the 
service for the hospital, and so on.” 
The project was submitted to the State Council in November 2004 and was rapidly 
authorized. The first PET-CT was adopted by March 2006.  
Taking advantage of his contacts with the industry, the newly appointed head of 
radiology obtained a second PET-CT in exchange for developing new applications in 
cardiac imagery. The decision to acquire a second PET-CT was accepted in December 
2006 by the State Council: 
“I negotiated with Manufacturer Z. I wanted a second PET-CT at my disposal 
almost simultaneously. That was a great move, from a strategic standpoint. […] 
The hospital did the investment, and I brought the second one in with a pledge 
to buy. So we acquired two PET-CTs. [With one of those] we would develop 
new imagery strategies for cardiology applications.” 
Besides modernizing the medical imaging equipment of THV, the newly appointed 
head of radiology had the ambition to refurbish the cyclotron which was never used. 
This was perceived as a competitive threat by THU which lowered by 30% the selling 
price of its FDG. This price was actually lower than the production cost and was 
economically imperilling the viability of the cyclotron at THV: 
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“There is a fierce competition in Switzerland. There are four providers in the 
Canton U which want to monopolize the whole market […] Three months after 
our certification; teaching hospital THU lowered its prices by 30% to break the 
market. […] If we lowered our own prices by 30%, we were no longer meeting 
our costs. THU does not care if it no longer meets its costs. It has a university 
(so it doesn’t have to be profitable). As for us, we did not have to care because 
we had not been meeting our costs for ten years anyway, but the private 
company that distributed our products could not take it.” 
4.4.3.10 Analysis 
The obsolescence of the PET scanner of THV and its location in a public hospital 
seems to have increased the demand for PET-CT scanners from private practice 
doctors specialized in oncology. This led private clinics to perceive a nice business 
opportunity. Indeed, three private clinics acquired PET-CT scanners in a relatively 
short period of time. The horizontal struggles between private clinics aimed to attract 
patients and doctors, and to be the first in the market. What mattered for these clinics 
was to be well-positioned in the market. However, with the high concentration of 
PET-CT scanners in the canton, no private clinic reached the profitability threshold 
although the PET scanner was still considered important as it was perceived as a 
complementary asset.  
Horizontal struggles intensified when the teaching hospital decided to add a PET-CT 
scanner to its Department of Radiology. This gave rise to intensive lobbying activities 
from the private clinics to stop this process, because they had already made an 
important investment which was not profitable in itself although it increased their 
prestige. At the federal level, there was a horizontal struggle between THU and THV 
for the control of the supply of FDG in Switzerland. Indeed, once the cyclotron of 
THV was refurbished, THU lowered its price by 30% which was even below the 
production cost of THV. This is clearly the expression of a horizontal struggle. 
With the catastrophic situation of having many resignations from nuclear doctors in 
the Department of Radiology and its complete lack of competitiveness with the 
private sector, the Cantonal Council was aware that there was a need to attract nuclear 
doctors to THV. With so many doctors having left THV and with the outdated PET 
scanner, there were no real vertical struggles in this canton.  
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4.4.3.11 Canton G: A Tempting Opportunity - June 2004 
With a small Department of Nuclear Medicine and a small population (around 
200,000 inhabitants), the cantonal hospital CHG did not plan in advance to acquire a 
PET scanner. While shopping for two gamma knives38, the newly appointed nuclear 
doctor received an offer from the manufacturer Z which offered one gamma knife 
and one refurbished PET scanner for the same price as two gamma knives. This was a 
unique chance for this small hospital to obtain a PET scanner. With this offer in hand, 
CHG contacted the manufacturer W and got a better price.  
Enthusiastic, the nuclear doctor of the hospital decided to present this unique 
opportunity to the administrative board which was chaired by the head of the 
Cantonal Department of Health. To be persuasive, the doctor elaborated a business 
plan where he argued that while the canton would offer an additional service, this 
opportunity to acquire a PET scanner would be funded through the current global 
budget already dedicated to the Nuclear Medicine Unit, a sum that is symbolically 
already spent: 
“The root argument was that we had to offer a complete array of services to a 
population that did not have nuclear medicine, where supply was really quite 
scarce […]. The main argument was that we could do better with the same 
money. Budget did not have to be increased. […] The final argument was that 
the machine was not that expensive. With the annual budget, we could do all of 
those things, and that really convinced them.” 
Relying on his previous experience, he estimated that within two to five years, the 
machine would be profitable. Moreover, to facilitate the overall adoption process, a 
uniform tariff across Switzerland named TARMED came into effect by January 2004. 
This relieved the Cantonal Hospital CHG of the obligation to negotiate tariffs with 
health insurers. The adoption of the PET scanner occurred in June 2004. 
4.4.3.12 Analysis  
This process of adoption was particularly smooth with no real struggle between 
hospitals or with the cantonal government. It seems that the adoption of this 
technology suited everyone. The low price and the fact it was funded through the 
global budget of the hospital satisfied the cantonal government, the cantonal hospital 
was happy to increase its prestige and to offer an additional service to the population. 
What is interesting though is that the introduction of the national tariff for ambulatory 
                                                     
38 By using high dose radiation, this device is mainly used to remove or shrink brain tumours. 
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medicine actually eased the process of adopting the PET scanner because there was 
no need for CHG to negotiate locally with the insurers.  
4.4.3.13 Canton U: Hindering Regional Competition 
While teaching hospital THU did not succeed in keeping the monopoly of the PET 
scanner technology in Switzerland, it clearly tried to maintain control at least 
regionally. Indeed, in 2005, the second most important cantonal hospital of Canton U 
met Dr Y to ask if he would support the acquisition of a PET-CT scanner by this 
cantonal hospital. The answer was straightforwardly negative because it would have 
been detrimental to THU which might have lost between 400 to 500 patients: 
“I was not in favour just because of the commercial aspects, because they would 
probably take 400 or 500 patients away from us, which means that the cost 
structure wouldn’t be the way I like it.” 
Considering the strong influence of Dr Y in Switzerland combined with the fact that 
this cantonal hospital is public and therefore required the authorization of the 
cantonal government before any important investment, the Cantonal Department of 
Health would not have allowed them to obtain this technology because Dr Y would 
have been against this initiative. 
4.4.3.14 Analysis 
This episode in the Canton U is symptomatic of the harsh horizontal struggle between 
hospitals where the PET scanner incumbent strives to defend its territory by not 
allowing local competition. This indicates that horizontal struggles took place at 
different levels even for organizations that still did not possess a PET scanner. 
4.4.3.15 Canton Z: Adopting a PET-CT Scanner - August 2005 
Canton Z represents a linguistic minority of around 300,000 inhabitants, and has one 
of the highest densities of private clinics in Switzerland. In 1999, this Canton passed a 
certificate-of-need law forcing public and private providers to require authorization 
from the Cantonal State Council to acquire technologies figuring on a positive list 
which included the PET scanner. 
In 2001, the Cantonal State Council received a request from the publicly subsidized 
cantonal hospital SPCHZ to adopt a PET scanner. Because SPCHZ is the main centre 
in oncology in this Canton, oncologists in the canton strongly supported this 
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adoption. One of the main arguments invoked was that they were afraid of losing their 
position of leader in the Canton if a private hospital bought a PET-CT scanner before 
them. Indeed, there was a fierce competition for patients between the cantonal 
hospital SPCHZ and private clinics: 
“We concluded that, from a health effectiveness perspective, [the acquisition] 
would improve our position. We were competing fiercely with private clinics in 
Canton Z. We estimated that we were doing around 65% of the cases, and them 
35%. We had to be on time not to lose the opportunity to get this technology.” 
Only a few months later, the private clinic PCZ informed the cantonal government of 
its intention to acquire the same technology. Because it was previously estimated that 
Switzerland needed no more than 5 to 7 PET scanners, the Cantonal Department of 
Health suggested that the two claimants collaborate on this issue. In 2003, the 
Cantonal Department of Health received notification from SPCHZ that it was still 
intending to adopt this technology, despite the impossibility of reaching an agreement 
with the private clinic PCZ. Meanwhile, the private clinic abandoned its intention to 
adopt a PET scanner, leaving the cantonal hospital as the only would-be adopters.  
If remaining a regional leader in oncology was vital, attracting research money and 
participating in pharmaceutical research protocols to test new drugs was also a strong 
motivation for obtaining this technology: 
“We moved to position ourselves from a strategic point of view to respond to a 
demand that existed inside the Oncology Institute, to position ourselves 
towards research activities that did not grant drugs projects to institutes that did 
not own a PET.” 
The likelihood of obtaining authorization from the cantonal government was 
increased because the hospital was funding the PET-CT on their global budget. 
However, due to the certificate-of-need regulation, the Cantonal hospital had to 
demonstrate the clinical need for the population to have access to a PET-CT scanner. 
In a letter addressed to the Cantonal Department of Health in December 2003, 
SPCHZ estimated at 1,000 the number of PET-CT scanners required in the canton. 
Since authorities felt that it would not be wise to asphyxiate a centre of research 
excellence in order to control supply-induced demand, the former proposed to limit 
the number of procedures to be reimbursed in the canton to 1000 per year: 
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“There is a certain risk involved. But at the same time, we do not want to say 
no. We do not want to kill a research and an excellent clinical site like the 
Oncology Institute of the [Canton Z]. And so finally, this sentiment […] 
prevailed on the other. To avoid any excesses of supply-induced demand, we 
hold the volume of acts down to a maximum of 1000 exams each year for the 
next three years – 2005, 2006, 2007.” 
Another reason that favoured the acceptation of the request from the hospital was 
that the Cantonal Department of Health feared that the law proposed by the Federal 
Intercantonal Commission for the Concentration of Specialized Medicine39 would 
come into force in a relatively short time. This would have impeded any attempt at 
promoting the technology in the canton because this law might have limited the 
number of PET scanners all over Switzerland, which might have definitively excluded 
the possibility for Canton Z to have access to this technology locally. Hence, the 
authorities felt they had to act quickly: 
“The risk existed that, if the law bill submitted by the Group of Specialized 
Medicine was passed, Canton Z would not get its machine. We thought it was 
advisable to authorize the acquisition of the PET scanner before that bill 
became law, because then, Canton Z could have lost this opportunity.” 
The final authorization from Cantonal authorities came in March 2004, and the 
machine was acquired in August 2005. 
4.4.3.16 Analysis  
The PET scanner started to be of interest in this canton after the new reimbursement 
criteria came into force in 2001, two years after the certificate-of-need regulation. This 
regulation probably affected the diffusion of this technology as it compelled both the 
private clinic and the semi-public hospital to ask for an authorization. Given the 
relatively small size of the population, it did not make sense to authorize two PET 
scanners in this small area. Consequently, there was a vertical struggle with the 
cantonal government which did not want to provide the authorization to two 
organizations, and a horizontal struggle where each actor was competing to obtain the 
authorization. Without being able to reach an agreement, the private clinic finally 
abandoned this project estimating there was not room for two PET scanners in this 
canton Z and that it would be tough to compete against the semi-private cantonal 
hospital. 
                                                     
39 This group has the purpose to propose amendments to the health insurance law (LAMal) to concentration highly 
specialized medical procedures. 
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The vertical struggle between the cantonal government and the cantonal hospital is 
also reflected in the limitation of the number of examinations allowed per year to 
control health care expenditure in the canton. However, because of the threat of the 
application of the Federal Inter-cantonal Commission for the Concentration of 
Specialized Medicine, the cantonal Department of Health was inclined to provide the 
authorization to the cantonal hospital in order not to lose the opportunity to obtain 
this technology in the canton. Indeed, the amendment of the Federal health insurance 
law (LAMal) might have limited the number of PET scanners in Switzerland thereby 
depriving Canton Z from the possibility of obtaining a PET scanner. 
Motivations for obtaining a PET-CT scanner were multiple: having a PET-CT 
scanner would increase the number of research contracts from pharmaceuticals which 
could increase the prestige of the cantonal hospital; the canton would be able to offer 
one more service to the population.  
4.5 WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 STRUGGLES FOR QUALITY AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
Regulations on the reimbursement of medical procedures are of federal competence. 
The Health Insurance Law of Switzerland required that any new medical interventions 
must be effective, economic and appropriate in order for the government to oblige 
health insurance companies to reimburse for health care interventions. This regulation 
gave rise to vertical struggles between the federal government which was striving to 
control the diffusion of the PET scanner and the health care providers which were 
promoting the reimbursement of the PET scanner procedures. 
In 1993, despite the lack of evidence on the effectiveness of PET scanner procedures, 
teaching hospital THU asked the Federal Department of Health for this procedure to 
be reimbursed. On the one hand, the teaching hospital and international experts were 
arguing that the PET scanner was destined to have clinical applications in many fields, 
and that this technology was already producing spectacular images in neurology and 
cardiology. On the other hand, the Federal Department of Health was looking beyond 
simple detection by insisting on the need for the technology to show how the PET 
scanner could change patient management. Hence, each of these factions was drawing 
on the institutional logic of quality to defend their points of view, but focussed on 
different definitions of quality. While, for hospitals, quality was defined in terms of the 
performance of the diagnostic tool (i.e., sensitivity and specificity), the government 
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insisted on the value of the technology (i.e., patient management). Hence, this episode 
illustrates a struggle for providing meaning to this technology by considering it either 
as increasing image precision or as improving patient management. 
Because the teaching hospital was legally bound by the decision of the Federal 
Department of Health, it can be argued that this struggle for meaning in defining PET 
scanner was related to the governance structure of this health care system through a 
struggle for control which underlay the struggle for meaning. Thus, this struggle for 
meaning which used theorizations that drew on the institutional logic of quality 
mediated a struggle for control of the technology. Indeed, struggle for control 
involved the action of the government which slowed down the diffusion of the 
technology by nominating two centres and by asking for an assessment of the 
technology. 
This struggle for meaning was resolved in an innovative way involving a win-win 
solution. Since the Federal Department of Health felt that the PET scanner was 
promising, an agreement was reached to create an ordinance which would allow the 
reimbursement of promising technologies if a limited number of centres were 
committed to evaluating the value of technology. By nominating only two centres, the 
Federal Department of Health was ensuring the control of cost expenditure at least to 
a certain extent. Hence, while the Federal Department of Health compels hospitals to 
demonstrate how the technology may improve patient management, this rhetoric is 
also a cost-containment strategy. 
4.5.2 STRUGGLES FOR MEANING: EFFICIENCY VERSUS FREE MARKET 
LOGICS  
4.5.2.1 Federal Level 
The new ordinance allowing the reimbursement of procedures that are not yet 
effective, appropriate or economic was strategically used by a private clinic to be on 
the reimbursement list for PET scanner procedures. The private clinic used an 
institutional logic of free market to argue that the PET scanner should not be the 
exclusive right of two teaching hospitals, but ought to be a technology available for 
whoever intends to offer this type of diagnostic. However, animated by an imperative 
of cost-containment, the Federal Department of Health mobilized an institutional 
logic of efficiency to justify the rejection of the demand of the private clinic. While the 
private clinic argued that the PET scanner was an object for commerce, the Federal 
Department of Health defended a prudent approach to limit the diffusion of this 
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technology. These institutional logics were mobilized in theorizations that address the 
questions of what, why and who to reimburse, and how this should be achieved. For 
further details please refer to table 4.7.  
Finally, the threat of failure in the face of the Anti-trust Commission brought about a 
revision of the nomination of centres which was performed under the umbrella of 
quality, but which was clearly tied to the free-market institutional logic. This appears 
to reflect the power of the free-market institutional logic which lies at the heart of the 
health care system of Switzerland. Indeed, quality criteria favoured the promoters of 
the free market approach as, from 2001, any organization having a PET scanner and 
meeting these requirements was almost automatically added to the reimbursement list. 
Thus, like the deviant adoptions in Quebec, this initiative is what I call institution testing 
which in this case took the form of contesting the law by mobilizing a market-based 
institutional logic (the concept of institution testing is further discussed in Chapter 5 and 
6). Facing contestation, the government had to adjust its regulation to suppress 
discrepancy between the governance structure and the institutional logics. 
Antecedents of institution testing are similar to the one in the Quebec health care 
system. First, the legitimacy of the PET scanner is expressed by the reimbursement of 
two centres for at least 5 years as well as the fact that the PET scanner is used to 
diagnose cancer. Another dimension of legitimacy is its profitability. Indeed, it was 
already well-known that the PET scanner was generating interesting profit per scan. 
Given that the PET scanner was conceptualized as a profitable machine, the private 
clinic clearly had interest in adopting. Regarding the necessary conditions; because 
FDG could be delivered throughout Switzerland, the technology was mature enough, 
the financial resources were available to buy the machine and there was no normative 
or regulative disincentive to pursue the Federal Department of Health against the 
Antitrust Commission. 
Overall, the clash between the Federal Department of Health and the private clinic 
clearly represents a struggle for controlling the PET scanner which is revealed by the 
desire to enhance and to limit diffusion, and which is mediated by a struggle for 
meaning materialized by the interplay of theorizations and counter-theorizations.  
4.5.2.2 Cantonal Level 
While the federal level of analysis was the seat of strategy deployed by actors to obtain 
financial resources for operating the PET scanner, the cantonal regulation compelling 
public organizations to obtain the authorization of the cantonal government before 
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making major investment is designed to help authorities to restrain the diffusion of 
medical technologies. This regulation brought vertical struggles between would-be 
adopters and cantonal governments in cantons N, D, R, Y, and S. This contrasted 
with the adoption of a PET scanner where there was no such regulation, as in the 
canton T, or for private clinics in most cantons. In this situation, there was no vertical 
struggle.  
However, hospitals and private clinics are not passive entities and they may adopt 
different strategies to deal with this regulation, varying from waiting passively for the 
authorization to negotiating a solution or by simply acquiring a PET scanner under a 
private banner. Having an imperative of cost-containment, several cantonal 
governments used an institutional logic of efficiency to hinder adoption. Justifications 
of why not adopting are related to the fact that there were enough PET scanners in 
Switzerland. However, other cantonal governments agreed that a PET scanner would 
be an asset for the canton, but forced a partnership between public and private 
organizations in order to minimize the number of PET scanners. On the other hand, 
would-be adopters mainly justified this acquisition to the authority by demonstrating 
the financial viability of the PET scanner (i.e. it will not cost anything to the canton) 
and by arguing that there is a demand from patients. In using demand arguments and 
economic viability, potential adopters are mobilizing a market institutional logic40.  
This struggle for the control of the technology was resolved in different innovative 
manners. In the canton S, vertical struggles brought the cantonal government to force 
a partnership between a public hospital and a publicly subsidized hospital. This was 
intended to reduce health care costs in the canton. In the canton N, the vertical 
struggle ended with a radical refusal for the teaching hospital to adopt a PET scanner. 
As a result, the teaching hospital formed a partnership with a private hospital and 
together created a private joint venture to acquire and provide PET scanner 
procedures. In the canton D, because the global budget was blocked, the teaching 
hospital had to demonstrate the economic sustainability of an independent PET Unit. 
However, it was the absence of PET scanners in private organizations that made the 
government changed its mind. In the canton R, the cantonal hospital had to wait three 
years before obtaining from parliament the authorization to buy this technology. In 
the canton V, it was the cantonal government that forced the adoption of the PET 
scanner. However, many doctors in this canton had already dispersed to private clinics 
                                                     
40 Readers might be inclined to see here an access-based institutional logic. However, as I will argue later on, there is a 
fundamental difference in the argument. While the market-based institutional logic defends the right for providers to 
compete, access-based institutional logic defends patient’s right to be treated near their household. 
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to access a PET scanner. In the canton Z, the cantonal government did not intend to 
authorize two PET scanners and forced cooperation although only the publicly 
subsidized hospital finally obtained a PET scanner. In the canton U, the tension 
between the teaching hospital and the cantonal hospital was exceptionally resolved 
due to a sudden generous donation. The only exceptions to vertical struggle and its 
resolution were in the cantons T and G. In the canton T, the cantonal hospital CHT is 
not obliged to ask for authorization before buying expensive technology, so there was 
no reason for having a vertical struggle. In the canton G, because this acquisition was 
late, the PET scanner was already fairly well institutionalized in medical practice, the 
cantonal hospital had a good bargain in buying a refurbished machine, and 
furthermore the State did not have to pay for it since it was a cost that had already 
been budgeted for another medical technology. Overall, the dynamic of vertical 
struggles at the federal and cantonal level can be summarized in this quotation: 
“Everybody was fighting at the local level to get the machine, and at the federal 
level to get the reimbursement.” 
4.5.3 HORIZONTAL STRUGGLES BETWEEN HOSPITALS IN DIFFERENT 
CANTONS 
Although would-be adopters and cantonal governments are vertically struggling with 
one entity devoted to restraining the diffusion of medical technology while the other is 
promoting it, horizontal struggles (competition) take place between similar actors (at 
least in terms of their mission) whether to obtain the technology before rivals or to 
create obstacles for them to obtain it. 
For example, early in the diffusion process, teaching hospital THU argued that there 
was no need to have more PET centres in Switzerland. This reflects the intention of 
this hospital to keep its quasi-monopoly41 on this technology at the national level. 
Later, the way THU thwarted another hospital in its own canton which wanted to 
adopt a PET scanner is also a sign that this hospital intended to dominate horizontal 
struggles in this health care system: 
“Dr Y was mounting a plot, saying that there was a need for one centre in 
Switzerland, and only one: teaching hospital THU. That is his goal and his 
political mandate.” 
If dominating an organizational field or a market is one manifestation of horizontal 
struggles, attracting patients to the detriment of other hospitals is a motivation for 
                                                     
41 Although teaching hospital THV was using PET scanners, it was not really clinically active and had a very low 
volume of patients undergoing this procedure. 
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hospitals to adopt a PET scanner as early as possible. This justification was relentlessly 
mentioned in the data set of this research. Because THU was attracting most patients 
before 2001, there was room for other hospitals to acquire a PET scanner to compete 
for attracting patients closer to their location and to derive financial benefits from it: 
“Health institutions compete with each other in Switzerland […] to recruit 
patients. Teaching hospital THD is trying its best to recruit [patients] from 
Canton X1 and X2. I am currently negotiating to draw contracts with Canton 
X3, and I have totally taken back Town X4 and recruited more patients for 
PET. Canton X5, for example, is completely swallowed up by THN; THU tries 
to steal these patients. So there is an awesome competition for patients.” 
Moreover, having a PET scanner is a market advantage since it reduces patients’ 
references to other organizations thereby retaining financial resources tied to the 
patient inside one’s organization. Finally, hospitals may benefit from adopting a PET 
scanner as it attracts research funds from pharmaceuticals. This seems to be a 
prerequisite to being selected by the pharmaceutical firms to conduct research 
protocols: 
“We could never have retained our competitive edge, especially in the domain 
of new medications for oncology, if we did not own a PET scanner. Businesses 
which finance studies put as a prior condition that we have a PET scanner, as 
you doubtlessly know.” 
4.5.4 HORIZONTAL STRUGGLES AT THE CANTONAL LEVEL 
While the vertical struggle between hospitals and the cantonal authorities slowed 
down the adoption process, horizontal struggles at the cantonal level certainly 
concurred to increase the speed of adoption, as was also true at the federal level: 
“That element had to be taken into consideration, because losing this 
technology meant weakening our Oncology Institute relative to the 
competition. And we cannot afford that, if we want to stay leaders in this 
sector.” 
Although teaching hospitals are generally struggling at the federal level to attract 
patients, less prestigious would-be adopters are competing at the local level in order to 
achieve a first-mover advantage. This strategy is beneficial since being the second to 
acquire a PET scanner in a canton increases the risk of not reaching the threshold of 
profitability, given the small size of cantonal populations. For example, there were at 
least two private clinics that were striving to obtain a PET-CT scanner before other 
organizations in the canton V. The unfortunate simultaneous acquisitions of two 
PET-CT scanners combined with the three other PET-CT scanners in this canton led 
to a difficult situation where none of the scanners could reach the threshold of 
profitability as there were not enough patients for this type of procedure in this 
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canton. Moreover, there is still the hypothetical risk of not being perceived as 
legitimate by the authority to adopt this technology. 
Besides first mover advantage, there was a clear rivalry between the public and the 
private sectors, especially after the introduction of TARMED. With this new tariff 
system, health insurance companies had to reimburse private clinics at the same tariff 
as public hospitals in the ambulatory setting. This brought a large movement towards 
acquisition of PET-CT scanners from private clinics and a quick reaction from 
teaching hospitals to stop this proliferation. This phenomenon was especially stringent 
in the canton D where the head of the Nuclear Medical Unit pressed the Swiss 
Medical Association to postpone the authorization of a private clinic to be reimbursed 
by health insurance companies.  
By and large, competing for the PET scanner seems to be much more related to the 
need to control the technology and the benefits it generated for the hospitals and the 
doctors than to serve the population as the following excerpt suggests: 
“So, there’s some kind of PET competition and it’s a very stupid fight of having 
the power over these things and sometimes it’s much more a game of power 
than the power of necessity for the needs of people.” 
The next section compares diffusion processes in both health care systems.  
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5 CHAPTER V 
 
COMPARING DIFFUSION PROCESSES IN TWO 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
In this chapter, I highlight the main results of the comparative analysis of the 
diffusion processes in Quebec and Switzerland health care systems. I examine how 
institutional logics are involved in struggles for meaning, how the governance 
structure is involved in struggles for control, and how institution testing pre-empts the 
diffusion of innovations. I conclude this chapter by evaluating the performance in 
terms of efficiency and access of both institutional environments. 
5.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT SHAPES THE DIFFUSION PROCESS  
Neither case suggests a highly ordered diffusion process governed primarily by a 
rational evaluation of patient needs, the equitable distribution of resources and cost 
effectiveness calculations, although such considerations were explicitly and extensively 
invoked at different times by different actors. Rather, in both cases, the spread of the 
diffusion process over time is marked by two kinds of competitive and political 
struggles: horizontally between different health-care institutions competing to acquire 
the technology faster than their rivals and vertically between would-be adopters and 
regulatory bodies attempting to influence diffusion, often by restraining it. These 
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conflicts manifest themselves in two distinct but interacting forms of action, called 
here struggles for control and struggles for meaning. 
Actors engage in struggle for control that is the fight to obtain and use a technology 
despite efforts deployed by other stakeholders to impede adoption, by strategically 
mobilizing power in the form of material resources, authority and expertise. While the 
power of both governments lies mainly in their authority to allow adoption or 
reimbursement, expertise often lies with potential adopters, giving them legitimacy in 
the struggle to control the diffusion of this technology. Material resources take the 
form of the capacity of actors to mobilize financial resources for the acquisition of a 
PET scanner. For example, in Quebec the Ministry of Health has the authority to 
allow the adoption of expensive technology but also often provides acquisition and 
operational budgets. On the other hand, prestigious teaching hospitals can counteract 
government control through their private Foundations which can buy a technology 
and rent it to the hospital. In Switzerland, authority is diluted between the cantonal 
and the federal governments; while the former has material power to fund and to 
authorize acquisition, the latter has the authority to permit the reimbursement of 
health insurance. Hence, the governance structure determines who has access to 
material resources, authority and expertise thereby assigning roles, identities and 
responsibilities to institutional actors. In this jurisdiction, many strategies can be used 
to bypass government control including the intervention of private Foundations. 
The struggle for the control of the diffusion of the PET scanner takes place in relation 
with struggles for the meaning of the technology. Struggle for meaning is the attempt by 
actors to gain legitimacy by providing an interpretation for a material object which is 
aligned with their own values and interests, and which manifests itself in the interplay 
of theorizations and counter-theorizations. Theorizations are strategically mobilized 
arguments aimed at legitimizing the purpose of a technology, the adequacy of a 
potential adopter to acquire such a technology, and the appropriate way to disseminate 
it. In turn, institutional logics provide a repertoire of cultural-cognitive resources 
which may be mobilized in theorizations. 
The case studies suggest a number of ways in which the institutional contexts 
influence the technology diffusion process. It is clear that institutional logics and 
governance structures interact and are mutually supportive in these cases. However, 
they are separated initially for analytical purposes in the next section. 
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5.1.1 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS & STRUGGLES FOR MEANING 
This study identifies different kinds of theorization involved in the legitimation of the 
diffusion of complex technologies. Some theorizations rely on scientific evidence to 
support them. Because science provides procedural legitimacy (Suchman 1995), a 
special type of moral legitimacy, and because science is a cultural-cognitive institution 
in our modern society, evidence-based theorization that is further sanctioned by a 
reputed scientific body embedded in a regulatory structure (such as the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency in Quebec) can be an extremely powerful force for 
legitimation. This type of theorization draws on an institutional logic associated with 
quality (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000) as was clearly apparent in this study. Theorizations 
which focus on competence are again based on the professional discourse of quality, 
this time associated with buying the best available technology (PET-CT scanner) 
although it may be more expensive. Finally, theorizations based on patient 
management also rely on scientific evidence, but more on how technology would 
change the way patients are treated. 
In contrast, access-based theorizations rely on the institutional logic of access (Scott, 
Ruef et al. 2000), a logic that has had currency in both institutional environments since 
the introduction of universal coverage in these health-care systems. Arguments 
surrounding this type of theorization are infused with moral elements (Suchman 1995) 
to support the wider diffusion of the less expensive form of the technology thereby 
democratizing access to it. This theorization was particularly intensively mobilized in 
Quebec. Although it is present in Switzerland, it was not instrumentally selected in 
struggles for meaning. However, the free market-based institutional logic was 
particularly apparent in Switzerland and was absent in Quebec. This is different from 
the access-based institutional logic in the sense that while the latter defends the right 
of patients to have access to a technology, the former is related to the right of doctors 
and hospitals to access the market freely. Market-based institutional logic is also 
infused with moral elements i.e. it provides an appropriate way (“the right thing to 
do”) to organize and perform activities (Suchman 1995).  
That the efficiency-based institutional logic is more present in Switzerland than in 
Quebec; is seen especially in the endeavour of the Swiss Federal government to limit 
the diffusion of the technology. Theorizations based on this institutional logic were 
manifest when the federal government struggled to keep the technology in a duopoly 
instead of widely opening up its diffusion. In Quebec, efficiency-based institutional 
logic was also used in some theorizations, but more in a supporting role than as a 
central component. This is rather ironic given the high cost of this technology and the 
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obvious impact of economic concerns in the dynamics of diffusion. Again, moral 
elements permeated these theorizations. 
This suggests the simultaneous co-existence of multiple logics of legitimation, such as 
those of quality, efficiency, access and market. This analysis confirms the theoretical 
work of scholars who identified multiple institutional logics at different levels of 
analysis (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), whether at organizational level (Thornton 2002; 
Zilber 2002), at the organizational field level (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000) or at the societal 
level (Friedland and Alford 1991; Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Zilber 2006). It is also 
aligned with the nascent interest for institutional pluralism which assumes that the 
institutional environment is heterogeneous i.e., composed of different regulatory 
regimes, multiple institutional logics and several normative orders (Kraatz and Block 
2008). 
Because the PET scanner is a complex technology whose applications were not 
initially clear, this technology left room for professionals to provide meaning to the 
PET scanner in ways that suited their interests. Although a quality-based institutional 
logic was initially mobilized to legitimate the PET scanner and potential adopters, 
different institutional logics available in each institutional environment were used by 
actors to justify the way the PET scanner should subsequently be diffused. In each 
case, the legitimation strategy utilized was in the form of theorizations and was aligned 
with the would-be adopter’s interests. In Quebec, it was assumed by actors that 
grounding the purpose of the technology in scientific evidence would increase the 
likelihood of obtaining the PET scanner or orient the diffusion of the PET scanner 
according to the interest of certain actors. The publication of the Health Technology 
Assessment Agency’s report on the PET scanner legitimated it as a useful clinical tool 
which needed to be further developed by research. This theorization was sanctioned 
by teaching hospitals who mobilized a quality-based institutional logic by underlining 
the importance of their competence to interpret PET scanner results, to disseminate 
this technology slowly, and to perform further research. However, the limited 
resources available for PET scanners generated struggles for the meaning of the 
technology. In this context, the quality-based theorization was counter-theorized with 
an access-based institutional logic by the medical professional association and regional 
hospitals to ensure that smaller hospitals would obtain this technology. The 
theorization and counter-theorization between two factions tended to paralyze 
decision-making at least initially given that the government was not inclined to fund 
the acquisition of two PET scanners in the same region.  
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In Switzerland, while the government developed an efficiency-based and quality-based 
theorization by contending that the reimbursement of PET scanner should be 
restricted to nominated centers for cost-containment and quality purposes, and 
because it was still under evaluation, the private clinic used a free-market counter-
theorization by arguing that providers should be able to practice medicine freely and 
that all organizations wishing to offer this service should be allowed to do so. In other 
words, the free-market institutional logic was instrumentally mobilized by a private 
clinic to build a theorization challenging the efficiency-based institutional logic 
defended by the federal government. Thus in each jurisdiction, institutional actors 
mobilized the institutional logic which best suited their values and interests; and 
through the interplay of theorization and counter-theorization they competed on 
institutionally established legitimate grounds to capture resources. Table 5.1 
summarizes the theorizations mobilized in each jurisdiction to influence the diffusion 
of the PET scanner technology. 
TABLE 5.1: 
THEORIZATIONS & COUNTER-THEORIZATIONS INFLUENCING DIFFUSION IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS 
Theorization 
components
Quality-based Logic Access-based Logic 
Efficiency & Quality-
based Logic 
Free Market-based 
Logic 
Proponents Teaching Hospitals
Professional 
Association
Government Private Clinic
What to adopt or to 
reimburse? 
Definition of the 
innovation
PET-CT as a proven 
high-performing clinical 
& research tool
PET as a proven clinical 
tool needed by all 
regardless of location
PET in oncology, 
cardiology & neurology
PET in oncology, 
cardiology & neurology
Why adopt? Why 
reimbursing PET?
Better quality diagnoses 
Lower cost per 
examination with higher 
quality
Inevitability of PET-
CT.
PET scan for all 
Low purchase costs and 
lower travel costs with 
greater equity and 
access.
Federal: PET still being 
evaluated; should not 
be widely diffused to 
contain costs. 
Cantonal: Enough PET 
in Switzerland; 
to limit chaotic 
diffusion of PET; 
Expensive.
Federal: PET should be 
available to all 
providers, to freely 
practice medicine. 
Cantonal: Demand 
from patients
Profitability of the PET.
Who should adopt or 
be reimbursed? And 
how dissemination 
should occur?
Competence has to be 
developed first before 
allowing adoption
PET for all, coherence 
with prior distribution 
of oncology centres
Federal: Already 
nominated centres 
Cantonal: Refusal or 
delay before 
authorization to contain 
cost.
Federal: To all 
organizations wishing 
to offer PET scanners.
Cantonal: Alignment 
with organizational 
mission.
SwitzerlandQuebec
 
Because the governance structure of Quebec is closer to a state-based model, there 
was no room for theorizations stemming from a market-based institutional logic, 
although this type of logic exists in other forms of economic activity in Quebec. 
Mobilizing a market-based institutional logic is indeed absent from the rhetorical 
repertoire of institutional actors because market competition and profit are relative 
institutional taboos in this jurisdiction. In contrast, market competition in health care 
is institutionalized in Switzerland and institutional actors may draw on this 
institutional logic to defend their interests or to become institutional entrepreneurs 
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(DiMaggio 1988), basing their action on institutional logics to adapt the institutional 
environment to their needs.  
In short, while institutional logics structure the behavior of actors by providing them 
with cognitive templates for the organization of social life (Friedland and Alford 
1991), they also enable actors to select institutional logics instrumentally so as to 
influence the perception of actors according to their own values and interest.  
Proposition 1: Institutional logics structure the institutional field by restraining 
the rhetorical possibilities, but also enable actors to gain legitimacy or provide 
legitimacy to objects by instrumentally selecting the logic that best suits their 
values and interests. 
While actors may instrumentally select one among multiple institutional logics 
available in the institutional environment in their struggles for meaning, theorizations 
may also be elaborated within the same institutional logic. In both jurisdictions, the 
initial institutional battles to legitimate the technology and to define its purposes 
occurred within a quality-based institutional logic. To win these institutional struggles, 
proponents gathered different bodies of scientific evidence that were aligned with 
their own interests and values, but also defined quality according to other criteria such 
as patient management (the way patients can be treated). For example, in the early 
diffusion of the PET scanner in Quebec, the hospital which specialized in cardiology 
and in lung cancer was grounding its arguments in the scientific literature by referring 
to the number of studies in cardiology and in lung cancer; meanwhile the teaching 
hospital specializing in oncology based its arguments on one meta-analysis , insisting 
on the larger number of applications in oncology (18 applications) and the limited 
number of applications in cardiology (only one application). In Switzerland, the 
federal government based its arguments for limiting the diffusion of the technology 
on the value of the technology i.e., on how the technology would change patient 
management, while teaching hospitals were also founding their arguments on scientific 
evidence and expert opinions to show the diagnostic power of this technology in 
terms of image quality.  
Consequently, it appears that institutional logics can be interpreted in various ways. In 
this study, the dimensions of theorizations which were founded on quality-based 
institutional logic included scientific arguments on image precision, patient 
management, the number of clinical applications and the number of publications in a 
given medical discipline. Since various dimensions of institutional logics can be 
interpreted and mobilized in struggles for meaning, competing theorizations can be 
elaborated within the same institutional logic.  
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Proposition 2: Competing theorizations can be elaborated within the same 
institutional logic because it can be interpreted by institutional actors along 
various dimensions which they rely on in their struggle for meaning. 
5.1.2 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL 
As noted earlier, the jurisdictions of both Quebec and Switzerland share governance 
structures which to some extent pit organizations against one another in the 
competitive struggle to adopt new technology, while at the same time setting bounds 
on this struggle through the use of regulatory bodies. However, some important 
distinctions between the governance structures produce effects which are evident in 
the patterns of diffusion described in this study.  
The governance structure of the Swiss health-care system is highly fragmented and has 
two main cleavages: 1) the co-existence of market and public regulative regimes, and 
2) the partial decentralization of the governance structure with responsibilities diluted 
between the cantonal and the federal governments and the health insurance 
companies. This has the effect of diluting the power of government by providing 
more freedom to other actors in their struggles for control and for meaning. 
The public-private fragmentation of the Swiss health-care system allows public 
organizations to bypass the regulation demanding that they have authorization from 
the cantonal government before acquiring a PET scanner. Because private 
organizations are not subject to this law, some public hospitals found a strategy to 
acquire a PET scanner by subscribing to a private regime not by changing their legal 
status by starting up a company or collaborating with private hospitals. For example, 
the presence of the private sphere helped teaching hospital THN to acquire the 
technology in the face of denial or hesitation from government by starting up a private 
company to install the PET scanner. Hence, in Switzerland, since the public (state 
model) and the private (market model) structures are two complementary and 
legitimate regimes, institutional actors may position themselves under the regime 
which best suits their interests.  
If the public-private fragmentation in this health-care system constitutes the first 
cleavage, decentralization between the federal, the cantonal governments and health-
insurance companies constitutes the second one. Fragmentation of the accountability 
between the federal government, the cantonal government and health insurers lowers 
the incentive to limit diffusion and reimbursement, and provides institutional actors 
with more freedom to act. Indeed, although the federal government was reluctant to 
offer reimbursement, the absence of accountability as regard to the payment of the 
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machine or reimbursement certainly contributed to enabling initial reimbursement to 
the duopoly despite the lack of clinical evidence related to the PET scanner. 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that the teaching hospital THS was not initially on the 
federal reimbursement list, the decentralization of the governance structure allowed it 
to pass a contract with the cantonal health insurance body to have PET scanner 
procedures reimbursed.  
Overall, it is clear that the relative fragmentation of the Swiss governance structure 
provided greater freedom to institutional actors to mobilize laws and rules strategically 
to suit their particular interests.  
Proposition 3: The fragmentation [public-private and federal-cantonal] of the 
governance structure provides regulative slack or freedom to institutional actors 
who may choose which regime to comply with, thereby seeking their own 
interest while still being within the letter of the law. 
Whereas the Swiss health-care system is largely fragmented, Quebec’s health-care 
system is more coherent as decision-making processes are centralized. Authorization 
for acquiring expensive technology as well as obtaining an operational and acquisition 
budget is granted by a single central authority. Therefore, most actions by would-be 
adopters are directed toward governments given that they control material resources 
and authority to allow acquisition. This provokes institutional actors to engage in 
legitimate discursive battles through the interplay of theorizations and counter-
theorizations which draw on major institutional logics. Because there is no alternative 
legitimate mode of action such as switching from a public to a private regime in the 
case of government opposition, actors’ freedom is significantly lowered, at least in the 
short term, in more coherent governance structures.  
Proposition 4: The coherence of the governance structure allows the state to 
control the diffusion process of expensive technologies, at least in the short 
term, because the power to allocate resource is concentrated in the hands of 
one entity. 
If struggle for control may occur vertically between governments and would-be 
adopters, horizontal struggle for controlling the technology takes the form of 
competition for scarce resources between providers in both governance structures. 
While this behavior is typical in market settings, it was surprising to find intense 
struggles for control in the more state-oriented health-care system of Quebec as this 
type of system is believed to be more rational in the way resources are allocated 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Nonetheless in both contexts, horizontal struggle for 
controlling the technology is the result of actors’ desire to gain competitive advantage, 
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in this case through a technology, by attracting scarce resources such as patients, 
nuclear doctors, prestige and financial resources.  
The higher the number of institutional actors who was striving to capture the same 
resources, the more intense the horizontal struggle is likely to be. In regions or 
cantons where many organizations were engaged in acquiring a PET scanner, fierce 
rivalries were observed between providers seeking to control the technology. For 
example, in region C of Quebec, there were intense horizontal struggles for control 
between hospitals THC and GHC in order to convince authorities as to which 
hospital was the more adequate site to acquire a PET scanner. In Switzerland, the 
absence of a good quality PET scanner in canton V encouraged private oncologists to 
ask private would-be adopters for this technology. Responding to this demand, three 
private clinics adopted PET-CT scanners with the idea that being the first to have a 
PET-CT scanner would be profitable. However, three PET scanners were later 
adopted by nearby private clinics with the consequence that none of the six was 
profiting, although they were able to offer the whole spectrum of diagnostic tools. To 
complicate this situation, the teaching hospital THV which saw its patients going to 
private clinics decided to acquire two PET-CT scanners. As a result, canton V has 5 
PET-CT scanners for a population of around 400,000 inhabitants. In canton D, 
competition between THD and PCD2 drove the former to lobby the Nuclear Medical 
Association to postpone as far as possible the accreditation of PCD2.  
These examples suggest that local horizontal struggles are more intense and apparent 
than national-level rivalries such as those taking place between far away teaching 
hospitals. This may be explained by the fact that, unlike widely separated 
organizations, those geographically close to each other are in competition for the same 
resources. Nevertheless, competition occurs only between organizations having an 
interest in adopting a PET scanner (e.g., having a Nuclear Medicine Unit or intending 
to open one) and not between all organizations within a certain geographical area. 
Therefore, geographical closeness is not the only criterion that should be use to assess 
competition.  
These results contrast with those of regions and cantons where only one organization 
was intending to adopt a PET scanner, such as region B in Quebec and cantons T and 
G in Switzerland, where there was no horizontal struggle between providers. Hence, 
the number of institutional actors striving for the same resources in a given 
organizational field affects the level of struggle for control, whether action takes place 
in a market or a non-market setting. 
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5.1.3 INSTITUTION TESTING 
5.1.3.1 When Institutional Logics Preempt Governance Structures 
Although the governance structures in both jurisdictions gave theoretical control to 
regulatory agencies over certain key decisions (e.g., the authorization of adoptions in 
Quebec and reimbursement rules in Switzerland), this study shows in both cases that 
when regulatory bodies found themselves in positions where their actions placed them 
in contradiction with dominant institutional logics embedded in the field, they were 
unable to sustain their positions. 
In Quebec, at the point where the PET scanner had acquired strong quality-based 
legitimacy through the Health Technology Assessment Report and through extensive 
diffusion in USA, it was no longer possible for the government to sustain objections 
to deviant adoptions without losing credibility and political capital. To maintain face, 
the government was obliged to generate a dissemination plan which largely satisfied 
potential adopters. The deviant and pre-emptive behavior by adopters was rendered 
legitimate when normative and cultural-cognitive forces were stronger than regulative 
forces.  
Similarly, the Swiss federal government was faced with a potential revolt concerning 
its reimbursement rules. While the private clinic PCXS which legally contested these 
rules on the grounds of a market-based logic did not win its case, the Federal 
Department of Health was sufficiently worried about anti-trust issues to modify its 
rules about diffusion, setting new rules that allowed the market-based logic to flourish 
within a quality-based framework.  
Note that in both cases, entrepreneurial action which contravened current rules was 
required by health-care providers to achieve adjustments in regulatory attitudes and 
requirements to concord with dominant institutional logics. This type of 
entrepreneurial action is labeled here institution testing. This is a strategic behaviour 
which pre-empts the diffusion of innovation. It is rendered possible when normative, 
cultural-cognitive or economic forces supporting a technology are stronger than 
regulative ones. A proposition is formulated: 
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Proposition 5: Institution testing is a strategic behaviour that may speed up the 
diffusion of expensive and complex technology in highly regulated 
environments and may result in change of regulatory constraints when the 
normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacies of the position defended are 
grounded in dominant institutional logics and have acquired sufficient force to 
outweigh regulatory legitimacy. 
Of course, in some circumstances, the government may not model its regulation to 
what actors already did, but may change payment incentives or mechanisms to 
influence actor’s behaviour. However, this is not what I observed in my data set. 
Besides the normative and cultural-cognitive forces which were stronger than 
regulative ones and which are the necessary conditions for institutional testing to take 
place, diverse incentives behind bandwagon technology also explains this behavior. 
The case studies reveal that competition was behind deviant adoption in Quebec and 
that the desire to be on the reimbursement list lied behind this behavior in 
Switzerland. In the former jurisdiction, organizations were afraid to lose their 
legitimacy in the domain of oncology and to lose their budget in subsequent years as a 
consequence; in the latter institutional environment, there was fierce competition in 
canton S and the perspective of making a profit was an incentive to be on the 
reimbursement list. The first to obtain the reimbursement might have impeded the 
other party from obtaining this technology. In both jurisdictions, the issue was to 
compete (struggle horizontally) to continue obtaining financial resources, although the 
situation in Quebec was less oriented toward the use of institutionalized means to 
acquire a PET scanner as the legal framework is bypassed by actors. As one 
interviewee in Quebec stated: 
“It is those who cheat that succeed in having the most advanced technology 
before others.” 
Although interest for a technology is one reason for institution testing to occur, the 
legitimacy of the technology also influenced this phenomenon. In Quebec, institution 
testing happened when technological legitimacy was taken for granted by 
professionals, and when illegitimate behavior was the only remaining alternative when 
legitimate ways to acquire the technology were exhausted or when waiting was no 
longer possible. In this case, the wide diffusion of the technology outside the 
jurisdiction, the perceived adequacy of the technology in the organizational field 
through the support of a health technology assessment report, and, maybe even more 
importantly, the type of disease the technology was diagnosing (i.e., cancer) were 
pushing the diffusion of the PET scanner. Indeed, the nature of the disease the 
technology addressed weakened the recourse for the government to retaliate against 
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deviant adopters because this condition was (and is still) high in the political agenda. 
Thus, it would certainly not be a wise move for the government to restrain the use of 
the technology. In Switzerland, two factors legitimated the PET scanner. First, the 
government was already allowing two PET centres to be reimbursed for the use of 
this technology and even changed the law to grant this reimbursement. Second, 
although it was not mentioned in interviews, the authorization for reimbursing PET 
scanner examinations for lung cancer by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services in USA certainly influenced the adoption of this technology by a private 
clinic. Hence, a certain number of conditions had to be present for institution testing 
to take place. In both jurisdictions, potential adopters gathered financial resources to 
buy this expensive technology and also the FDG was easily supplied to adopters.  
If the interests of hospitals and doctors as well as competition in the Swiss health-care 
system are powerful motors for the adoption of the PET scanner, the situation in 
Quebec is not dissimilar, with the variant that there, when legitimate means of 
acquiring this technology are no longer effective, illegitimate means becomes the only 
alternative. In Quebec, experience of not having been sanctioned for past deviant 
adoptions also helped organizations to adopt without the consent of the government. 
Table 5.2 synthesizes underlying causes and necessary conditions for institution testing 
which are present in each jurisdiction. The next section assesses the effectiveness of 
each health care system to rapidly diffuse the PET scanner and its efficiency in the use 
of this technology. 
TABLE 5.2: 
CAUSES & NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR INSTITUTION TESTING  
TO OCCUR IN EACH JURISDICTION 
Causes & Necessary 
Conditions
Factors Quebec Switzerland
Legitimacy of the 
technology 
Large diffusion abroad Yes Yes
Adequacy of the technology inside this organizational field Yes Yes
Cancer is high on the political agenda, a priority disease Yes Yes
Interest in the 
technology
Profitability, attracting budget Yes Yes
Necessary Conditions? Evolution of the technology i.e. FDG supply Yes Yes
Financial resources Yes Yes
No other legitimate ways available to adopt Yes Yes
No regulative or normative sanctions Yes Yes  
Comments: “Yes” indicates that causes or necessary conditions were present when institution 
test occurred in each jurisdiction; “No” indicates they were not present. 
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5.2 EFFECTIVENESS IN THE DIFFUSION AND EFFICIENCY IN 
THE USE OF THE PET SCANNER IN EACH HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 
In this section, results as regard to the speed of diffusion and the efficiency in the use 
of technology of both health care systems are displayed and an explanation of these 
phenomena is sought.  
5.2.1 DIFFUSION CURVES 
Figure 5.1 shows that the PET scanners diffused faster in Switzerland than in Quebec. 
Why should this be? Both jurisdictions are characterized by intense early involvement 
of entrepreneurs who pushed for the development, acquisition or reimbursement of 
the PET scanner. For example, Dr Y was involved in calling for a National Consensus 
Conference on this issue in Switzerland and in Quebec a doctor had to find funds from 
 
FIGURE 5.1: 
DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC AND SWITZERLAND 
WITH MAIN EVENTS AND PRIVATE-PUBLIC STATUS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
different sources to persuade the Ministry of Health to participate in this acquisition.  
Thus, the presence of active entrepreneurs does not seem to be sufficient to explain 
the more aggressive initial diffusion in Switzerland. Indeed, the case studies suggest 
that the fragmentation of the governance structure in the Swiss health-care system is 
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the most probable reason for the more aggressive early diffusion of the PET scanner. 
This fragmentation diffuses the accountability for health-care costs between the 
federal and cantonal governments and insurance companies. While the federal 
government provides authorization for reimbursement, insurance companies cover 
out-patients’ medical procedures and cantonal governments pay for the machines 
themselves and part of the cost of in-patient procedures. This diffusion of 
accountability certainly facilitated the amendment of the law to allow experimental 
procedures to be reimbursed. In Quebec, the dispute over the purpose of the PET 
scanner in region C and the many unanswered demands from the entrepreneur of 
region B reflect the capacity of a centralized government to control the early diffusion 
of a technological innovation by delaying adoption as much as possible. This tends to 
reinforce propositions 3 and 4 on the role of the coherence/fragmentation of the 
institutional environment.  
However, the diffusion process in Switzerland really opened up as a result of 
institution testing which led to the domination of the market-based institutional logic 
and suppressed the legal barrier which was limiting the right to be reimbursed to only 
two PET scanner centers. This brought in the new PET concept which allowed any 
providers satisfying quality criteria to be reimbursed. The effect of the suppression of 
this barrier is apparent in figure 5.1 from 2001 and corresponds to an increase in the 
speed of the diffusion of this technology mainly in public hospitals. This episode is an 
indicator that market-based institutional logic had a profound effect on the barrier 
that was hindering the diffusion of the PET scanner. This contrasts with the effect of 
competition in the more centralized Quebec health care system where it actually 
restrained diffusion at least in the short run. 
Besides the domination of the market-based institutional logic, the introduction of the 
TARMED regulation in Switzerland in 2004 widely opened the door to private clinics 
(figure 5.1 shows how TARMED speeded up the adoption from private PET 
providers), and especially in cantons V and D where there were intense horizontal 
struggles between providers (refer to table 4.6 for further details). With the 
introduction of a uniform reimbursement tariff all over Switzerland, private clinics 
were guaranteed to be reimbursed at the same rate as public hospitals, rather than a 
lower rate as allowed by the previous system.  
However, although TARMED significantly lowered the reimbursement risk, gaining 
competitive advantage was what actually drove diffusion in these private clinics. 
Timing was also a critical issue since having too many PET scanners in a small area 
would not bring in enough patients, thereby impeding the profitability of each 
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machine. Therefore, it appears that risk of not generating sufficient revenue is an 
important factor that may have impeded diffusion in private clinics before the 
introduction of TARMED. 
In Quebec, the legitimacy of the technology which was sanctioned by the health 
technology assessment agency report, combined with actors’ disillusionment and the 
availability of FDG from private suppliers, precipitated deviant adoptions. This 
institution testing is the main mechanism which opened up the diffusion of the PET 
scanner in Quebec. Its effect can be seen in figure 5.1 inside the oval. In contrast to 
Switzerland, where FDG was available from the beginning and did not really impede 
the diffusion of the PET scanner, the supply of FDG by private companies enabled 
deviant adoptions. In this jurisdiction, institution testing was clearly what sparked the 
diffusion process and what led the government to create a dissemination plan which 
was adjusted to the actual diffusion at the time. This plan came into force in June 
2005 to stop eventual deviant adoption.  
Overall, while the fragmentation of the Swiss governance structure is already central in 
the early diffusion, market forces and horizontal struggles are more at the base of the 
wider diffusion which occurred later on, and regulation guaranteeing uniform 
reimbursement (TARMED) was the last barrier to be removed for private clinics. In 
contrast, the coherence of the governance structure in Quebec and the rigidity of the 
system left actors with the only option to test institution in order to acquire this 
technology. Because institution testing in Quebec involves adopting a technology 
against the law, this action was undertaken as a last resort and explains the slower 
diffusion process. Conversely, in Switzerland actors could immediately find refuge 
under a private regime to adopt this technology, even when cantonal governments 
were against such acquisition.  
5.2.2 THE USE OF PET SCANNERS 
According to table 5.342, the number of PET scanner examinations increases steadily 
in each jurisdiction to reach approximately the same number in both by 2006. The 
number of PET scanners in use43 for clinical purposes is also constantly increasing in 
both health-care systems. However, what is striking in this table is the difference 
between the average numbers of PET scanner procedures per machine performed in 
                                                     
42 Data are available in both jurisdictions from 1999 only. 
43 Note that the number of PET scanners in use is lower than the total number of PET scanners acquired in each 
jurisdiction. This is mainly due to the substitution of PET scanners by PET-CT scanners which tends to decrease the 
number of PET scanners in function because buying a PET-CT scanner often incites organizations to sell or stop 
running their stand-alone PET scanner.  
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Quebec versus Switzerland. Except for the first three years, this difference is largely 
and increasingly in favor of the Quebec health-care system44. Considering that 8 
examinations per day per PET scanner can be performed on an average of 250 
business days, each PET scanner has a potential of approximately 2000 PET scans per 
year. In this respect, although both systems are underutilizing this technology, 
Quebec’s health-care system is closer to an optimal use of this technology, at least for 
2006.  
TABLE 5.3: 
NUMBER OF EXAMINATIONS IN ONCOLOGY PER PET SCANNER IN EACH JURISDICTION 
 
Year
Number of 
Exams
PET 
in use
Number 
exam/PET
Number of 
Exams
PET 
in use
Number 
exam/PET
1999 573 1 573 1891 2 946 -373
2000 1223 1 1223 2937 3 979 244
2001 1402 2 701 4415 6 736 -35
2002 2081 2 1040 5027 7 718 322
2003 3941 3 1314 6792 8 849 465
2004 5733 5 1147 8092 12 674 473
2005 8483 6 1414 10124 15 675 739
2006 11945 7 1706 11887 15 792 914
Differences 
Qc - Swit. 
Number of 
exam/ PET 
scanner
Quebec Switzerland
 
The impact of the mechanisms behind the diffusion of this technology can be 
observed not only in the diffusion curves of figure 5.1, but also on the number of 
PET scanner procedures performed in oncology (by far the most common PET 
scanner application) in each jurisdiction (see table 5.3). The effect of institution testing 
is apparent in Quebec in 2004 with an initial decrease in the average number of 
examinations per PET (from 1314 to 1147 examinations). In Switzerland, the number 
of PET scanner procedures per machine decreased in 2001 with the opening of the 
market (from 979 to 736 examinations). This is also the result of institution testing. 
There is another drop in 2004 with the introduction of TARMED (from 849 to 674 
examinations) which significantly reduced the financial risk to private clinics of 
adopting a PET scanner.  
How can we explain these differences between health-care systems? It is clear that for 
a given number of examinations, if the number of PET scanners increases the number 
of examinations per scanner will decrease. Consequently, the same mechanisms as 
those mentioned for the higher rate of diffusion in Switzerland may explain the lower 
number of scans per machine in the more market-oriented health care system as well 
                                                     
44 In Quebec, only publicly reimbursed PET scanners were computed as the number of non-reimbursed PET scanner 
procedures is unknown. 
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as the lower efficiency of the overall system (for a given demand which is assumed to 
be constant across jurisdictions) as compared to Quebec.  
Quebec’s health-care system provides a limited budget to hospitals to perform a 
certain number of PET scanner procedures. While this financial strategy entails the 
risk of not fully responding to patient demand, it has the advantage of limiting health-
care costs in an elegant manner. On the other hand, Switzerland, which has the 
second most expensive health-care system in the world, has, not surprisingly, much 
more difficulty in controlling expenditure related to the PET scanner. Indeed, because 
insurance companies are paying for most of these procedures, there is basically no 
financial limit on their use. Thus, the facts that Quebec’s health-care system has fewer 
PET scanners, has a higher average number of procedures per machine and has a 
limited budget associated with each machine may suggest that less fragmented health-
care systems are more efficient in limiting the use of technology.  
On the criterion of the average number of PET scanner procedures per machine, the 
Quebec health-care system has a higher efficiency. However, assessing the 
performance of a system always entails relying on certain values to the detriment of 
others. It is clear that when access becomes the criterion for assessing these systems, 
Switzerland would be far better than Quebec, with almost no waiting list for PET 
scanner procedures (0 to 7 days in Switzerland as compared to approximately 3 
months in Quebec) and a good distribution of this technology all over the country (15 
PET scanners in use in a relatively small geographic area such as Switzerland 
compared with 7 PET scanners in use in the huge Quebec territory); two dimensions 
of the access criterion in which Quebec’s health-care system’s performance is 
relatively low.  
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6 CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, the results of my study are discussed in order to identify how they 
contribute to the literature. I begin this chapter by showing that my results confirm 
that institutional environments are composed of multiple institutional logics. This is 
followed by identifying the role of institutional logics as being both constraints and 
enablers, and by the fact that competing theorization can be elaborated by mobilizing 
the same institutional logic. Examining the coherence and fragmentation of the 
governance structure is also confirming the work of health economists. I further argue 
that institution testing and readjustment is a mechanism that maintains institutions as 
long as the governance structure can adjust to the mobilization of dominant 
institutional logics. This chapter closes with the limitations of this thesis, directions for 
future research, and practical implications before concluding. 
As might have been expected, the PET scanner diffused more rapidly in Switzerland 
than in Quebec. The competitive environment of the Swiss health care system in 
which private and public health care institutions coexist and where there is relatively 
limited centralized decision making did enable hospitals to acquire the technology 
earlier. This appears to confirm the conclusions of the economic literature on the 
diffusion of innovations which states that environments conducive to competition are 
more prone to higher rates of diffusion (Lee 1971; Rapoport 1978; Hillman, Neu et al. 
1987; Foote 1992; Vogt, Bhattacharya et al. 1995; Chou, Liu et al. 2004). This study 
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also appears to confirm that strong incentives can lead to intense diffusion of 
innovations (McClellan and Kessler 2002) and sometimes overdiffusion (Foote 1992). 
However, this broad global portrait hides several similarities in the dynamics of the 
diffusion processes. Specifically, both cases were characterized by horizontal and 
vertical struggles as seen by attempts to define the technology in ways that favored 
particular actors and by strategic behavior aimed at mobilizing material resources, 
authority and expertise to ensure desired outcomes.  
If the benefits of a technology are obvious, multiple and, more importantly, are 
aligned with interest and values of an adopting system (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002), 
diffusion occurs in such a way that efforts to stop the bandwagon generated by strong 
incentives may be difficult. The label bandwagon technology has been used to characterize 
a technology which cannot be stopped from diffusing because of the perceived 
benefits it generates for powerful actors despite system-wide economic considerations. 
My cases suggest that bandwagon technology diffuses not only because it is perceived 
as technically efficient (Rogers 2003) or fashionable (Abrahamson 1991), but because 
adopters may derive benefits in various ways ranging from gaining competitive 
advantage in terms of profit, positioning or attracting different resources to strengthen 
their legitimacy or prestige. The next section explores how my results confirm the 
literature on institutional logic. 
6.1 MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC 
The study of the health care systems in Quebec and Switzerland suggests that both 
institutional environments are composed of multiple co-existing institutional logics 
thereby indicating that organizational fields may be more complex than what is often 
documented in empirical studies. In Quebec, actors relied on logics of quality, access 
and efficiency to build their theorization, and in Switzerland the logics of quality, 
market and efficiency were mobilized. Although my results are at the organizational 
field level, they empirically confirms the theoretical work of Friedland & Alford (1991) 
and of Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) which states that societies are composed of 
multiple institutional orders, each with its own institutional logic.  
However, the majority of empirical works on institutional logic simplify the 
institutional environment by assuming that one institutional logic dominates at a time 
(DiMaggio 1988; Kitchener 2002; Lounsbury 2002; Thornton 2002; Reay and Hinings 
2005). For example, Thornton and Ocasio (2002) show how professional-based 
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organizational structure adopted divisionalized organizational forms in higher 
education editing as a consequence of a shift from an editorial-based to a market-
based dominant institutional logic. In a similar way, Kitchener (2002) argues that the 
mergers of academic health-care centers in the US is the fruit of a shift in dominance 
from a professional-based logic to a market-managerialism-based institutional logic. 
However, few empirical researches focused on the influence of multiple institutional 
logics at the organizational field level. Instead of conceptualizing institutional 
environment as being stable and homogeneously affected by dominant institutional 
logics, they assume that the institutional environment is heterogeneous and composed 
of multiple constituencies. For example, Lounsbury’s (2007) results indicate that 
competing institutional logics can affect practices in the mutual funds industry, but 
that diverse logics dominate different geographical areas. The effort of Zilber (2006) is 
also impressive as she documented the interrelationship between multiple institutional 
logics at the societal level and their impact at the organizational field level. Finally, the 
concept of institutional pluralism goes one step further in the complexity of 
institutional environment by suggesting not only to integrate multiple institutional 
logics, but also to simultaneously take into consideration the logics, norms and 
regulation (Kraatz and Block 2008).  
Closer to my result is the work of Scott (2000) who segments the evolution of the 
health care system of the San Francisco Bay area into three eras; each with its own 
dominant institutional logic. Chronologically, the domination of the professional logic 
of quality was subordinated to the logic of equity of access when the State 
institutionalized this logic. Then, with the explosion of health care costs, a market-
managerial institutional logic emerged and prevailed. Thus, Scott et al. (2000) 
recognizes the co-existence of multiple institutional logics, but in each era one logic 
dominates the others.  
In opposition to Scott et al. (2000) who mingled efficiency-based and market-based 
institutional logics, this study suggests that these two logics are clearly distinct as 
indicated also by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). While market logics insist on the 
importance of freedom to compete according to instrumental interests, efficiency-
based institutional logics give precedence to efficiency and economy, things that are 
not necessarily guaranteed by a market perspective as shown by my results in the 
previous chapter. Given that this study compares the same type of economic activity 
(i.e., the health care sector), one interesting corollary is that identical economic sectors 
in different countries can carry different institutional logics affecting the content of 
the rhetorical field.  
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Thus, this study suggests that not only institutional environments are more complex 
than institutional theory usually assumes, but that identical contemporary economic 
activities may be grounded in different institutional logics and that the dominant 
institutional logic may be related to a specific sector of activity or object within an 
organization field. Having recognized that institutional environments are composed of 
multiple institutional logics, the next section shows how this thesis contributes to the 
literature on institutional logics. 
6.2 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AS CONSTRAINING 
THEORIZATION AND ENABLING LEGITIMACY 
If institutional environments are composed of multiple institutional logics, what are 
their impacts on the behaviour of actors? My results show that institutional logics 
structure the institutional field by restraining the rhetorical possibilities for actors to 
gain legitimacy for themselves or to provide legitimacy to a technological innovation 
(see proposition 2). Hence, actors cannot spontaneously elaborate theorizations which 
are not deeply embedded in their institutional environment without imperilling the 
legitimacy of their claims. Consequently, actors’ theorizations are constructed within 
institutional logics because these provide the criterion of legitimacy (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005). In my cases, struggles for meaning were always embedded in the 
mix of institutional logics (Scott, Ruef et al. 2000) which underpinned the different 
health care systems. For example, the most intensive struggles for meaning in Quebec 
involved competing theorizations about quality of care and equity of access. In 
contrast, in Switzerland, struggles for meaning developed around rights to compete in 
a free market (and profitability) and quality of care. Given that the market institutional 
logic has been an institutional taboo in the Quebec health care system, institutional 
actors did not mobilize this logic in this particular institutional field. 
The constraining effect of institutional logics has been documented in different 
contexts. They are recognized to shape actors’ cognition (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), 
to define the source of power (Friedland and Alford 1991), to provide interpretive 
schemas (Ranson, Hinings et al. 1980; Barley 1986) and to sculpt organizational action 
and behaviour (Friedland and Alford 1991). While a previous study indicated that 
institutional logics shape discourse (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005), my results show 
specifically that, although institutional logics do constrain actors’ theorization, at the 
same time the multiplicity of institutional logics allows actors to select one which 
better serves their interest out of the pool of alternatives. This implies that actors may 
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have much more freedom to act according to their interest than is assumed by the 
theory that prevailing institutional logic and institutional pressures force actors to bow 
to adapt to the iron cage (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
Thus, in their struggles for meaning, institutional actors in my cases were 
instrumentally selecting logics that were aligned with their interests in order to provide 
legitimacy for the technology and to justify themselves for adopting it (see proposition 
2). In their struggles for meaning, actors manipulate institutional logics in order to 
generate a “generalized perception or assumption” that the adoption of the 
technology by an entity was “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). 
Therefore, struggles for meaning that I observe are indeed a struggle for legitimacy. 
Since the seminal paper of Meyer and Rowan (1977), institutionalists argue that 
organizations must conform to their institutional regime or moral imperatives in order 
to gain legitimacy and derive material resources. Thus, legitimacy can itself be a 
resource for organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Different strategies of acquiescence have been identified, 
ranging from following taken-for-granted norms, imitating organizations or complying 
with rules (Oliver 1991) to selecting the environment with which to conform 
(Suchman 1995). By selecting an institutional logic to gain legitimacy, institutional 
actors in Quebec and Switzerland are being agents who decide with which part of 
their institutional environment they comply with. Because institutional logics are 
normative elements, selecting these logics signal actors’ conformance to specific 
norms and allow organizations to gain legitimacy. 
Whereas organizational legitimation processes have been extensively studied (Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994; Suchman 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara, Tienari et al. 
2006; Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Scott 2008), the way technology gains legitimacy 
has been documented only rarely. Hargadon & Douglas (2001) suggest that Edison 
relied on existing installation such as gas lighting for electricity to gain acceptance in 
the public. Thus, referring to an institutionalized technical system is a strategy to 
legitimize innovations. Leblebici (1991) shows how actors were trying to legitimize 
and control radio frequencies through the use of analogies (i.e., public school system, 
magazine in the air or waterways) which refer to existing institutions. Munir & Phillips 
(2005) demonstrate that legitimating new technologies involved discursive battles 
between incumbents who were engaged in legitimating the chemical-based technology, 
while new entrants who were trying to introduce the digital-imaging technology were 
striving to legitimate it by grounding it in existing institutions. While some studies 
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demonstrate that legitimacy can be provided to technology by connecting it to shared 
cultural understanding (Strang and Soule 1998), my work contributes to these by 
showing how institutional actors mobilized institutional logics for legitimating the 
diffusion and adoption of technology, and by illustrating how struggles for meaning 
and struggle for control affect the diffusion of bandwagon technology. 
These struggles for meaning are echoed in the literature where legitimation processes 
are often found to be characterized by socio-political struggles (Munir and Phillips 
2005; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara, Tienari et al. 2006). For example, Vaara 
et al. (2006) point out that the legitimation processes involve contradictions and 
ambiguities which are exploited by institutional actors to legitimize industry 
restructuration. Rivalry in legitimating new institutional order also resonates in the 
work of Suddaby and Greenwood (2005). They found that contradictions between 
institutional logics are resources on which actors rely in their attempts to deconstruct 
or reiterate institutional logics. Thus, exploiting contradictions between and within 
institutional logics is the main mechanism used by institutional entrepreneurs to bring 
about a shift in institutional logics and it is also the tool used by opponents to hinder 
any attempt at institutional change.  
In the same manner, my study shows that legitimation processes may be highly 
competitive, may entail that some organizations are more legitimate than others 
depending on who is winning struggles, and are heterogeneous as not all organizations 
are affected in the same way by their institutional environment due to the multiplicity 
of institutional logics. Thus, legitimacy does not appear to be fundamentally non-rival, 
dichotomous and homogenizing as Deephouse and Suchman (2008) suggest. While these 
authors view legitimacy as a property, I conceptualize it as a process (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1996). These two dimensions of legitimacy cannot be split since legitimacy can 
be lost through delegitimation. Thus, legitimacy is not a stable property, but 
something that has to be constantly reiterated and maintained, and this path may be 
fraught with pitfalls.  
Selecting institutional logics to generate competing theorizations that provide 
legitimacy might not be sufficient for struggles for meaning to take place. In their 
theoretical work, Phillips et al. (2004: 643) emphasize that texts are more likely to be 
embedded in the discourses of actors, “who have a legitimate right to speak, who have 
resource power or formal authority, or who are centrally located in a field”. My results 
echo this assertion by showing that actors who theorize are, on the one hand, doctors 
having an expertise in nuclear medicine and, on the other, the government having 
authority to deal with the adoption of technology. This provides an indication that not 
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all actors can pose a serious threat to established institutional orders and not all actors 
can be involved in struggles for control and struggles for meaning. Only those who 
are sanctioned by the governance structure and have power in the form of expertise, 
authority or material resources can intervene in such matters.  
While actors can select from a pool of various institutional logics to build their 
theorizations and in the meantime they do constrain actors’ choice in terms of the 
type of justification that are available to them, they can also mobilize different 
arguments within the same institutional logic as we should see in the next section. 
6.3 COMPETING THEORIZATIONS WITHIN THE SAME 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC 
Competing institutional logics have received considerable attention in the literature 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). However, the way institutional logics can be interpreted 
in different ways in the literature comes under label of the “translation” perspective. 
From this view, agents interpret and adapt logics to their local settings (Czarniawska 
and Joerges 1996; Creed, Scully et al. 2002; Zilber 2006).  
In my cases, the institutional logic of quality was mobilized within competing 
theorizations in different innovative manners within and across organizational fields 
(see proposition 2). In Switzerland, actors interpreted the quality-based institutional 
logic according to their interests. Indeed, while professionals were invoking the 
performance of the technology as being the organizing principles underlying the 
diffusion of the PET scanner, the government was pushing for patient management as 
being the good organizing principle that should support the diffusion of this 
technology. In Quebec, a hospital was relying on the number of studies in cardiology 
while its competitor built its theorizations on the number of applications in oncology 
in order to demonstrate that the technology was more legitimate (effective in this case) 
in this discipline.  
These examples suggest that institutional logics are not unambiguous rigid constructs. 
Rather, they are unstable and ambiguous constructs which may be interpreted in 
different ways through various theorizations. While actors are all talking about quality 
in health care systems, this organizing principle is interpreted differently by each actor 
in order to promote its own interests. This is closely related the concept of translation 
which relates to the interpretation of cultural accounts (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996; 
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Creed, Scully et al. 2002; Zilber 2006). This brings me to the issue of agency in the 
diffusion of innovations.  
These cases confirm that institutional actors are also institutional carriers (Scott 2008). 
Indeed, by mobilizing the logics, institutional actors reproduce different institutional 
orders and contribute to maintaining the legitimacy of institutional logics. My results 
support the recent claim (Zilber 2002) that actors are not simply passive in the 
diffusion process as was assumed in the early development of the neo-institutional 
theory, but are actively involved in legitimizing their position in the system and 
defining the technology by mobilizing arguments that are legitimate in the 
environment (Greer 1988; Greer 1994). Indeed, actors are not mere passive 
reproducers of institutions they are also active interpreters and meaning providers 
(Zilber 2002). While institutions define power, interests and rationality, they also 
enable actors to manipulate institutional logics to their benefit (Friedland and Alford 
1991). However, in my cases, actors mobilized institutional logics not to transform 
institutions, but to gain the necessary legitimacy to win struggles for meaning and 
struggles for control over technology. Thus, my study suggests that institutional actors 
are deeply aware of the institutional logics that shape their environment and have 
enough freedom to manipulate theorizations in order to embed them in dominant 
logics. This implies that agents are not only aware but also intelligent at manipulating 
symbols, discourse and legitimation processes.  
This strategic behavior of actors also resonates with the socio-political perspective 
which places agency at the centre of the scene. I concur with the view that actors 
whose interests and values correspond to the benefits and risks of a technology are 
more prone to adopt it (Meyer and Goes 1988; Denis, Hébert et al. 2002). However, 
my results extend this view in at least two respects. Firstly, the socio-political 
perspective tends to focus more on power, dominance relations, interest and values 
(Denis, Hébert et al. 2002) and do not consider elements such as theorization, 
institutional logics or struggles for meaning in the diffusion of complex innovations. 
Since my analysis suggests that legitimation processes play a role in the diffusion of 
complex innovations, my work contribute to the socio-political perspective by 
shedding light on legitimized meanings and on the rhetorical dimension of diffusion; 
although the diffusion of innovation was largely influenced by the capacity of actors to 
act without the consent of the government or by challenging the government through 
institution testing. Second, it extends this approach by highlighting that the 
governance structure has to be included in analysis since it defines who can 
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legitimately enter into political struggles. The next section addresses issues related to 
the coherence and fragmentation of the governance structure.  
6.4 COHERENCE AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
The notion of coherence and fragmentation of the institutional environment 
characterizes the degree of structuration of an organizational field (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). For DiMaggio & Powell (1983) this notion is mainly related to the 
connectedness between the totality of relevant institutional actors in a given field, i.e. 
1) the extent of interaction between actors; 2) the presence of sharply defined 
interorganizational structures; 3) readily available information; and 4) the development 
of mutual awareness. These four indicators of structuration or cohesion are shaped by 
three homogenizing forces which are coercion, imitation, and professional norms. 
While these authors focused on the inter-organizational aspects of the structuration of 
an organizational field, Scott (2004) added three dimensions of the structuration of a 
field45 by focusing on the governance structure. According to him, funding centralization, 
unity of governance and public/private modes of governance influence the coherence of a field. 
Scott et al. (2000) provide an example of the fragmentation of a health care system in 
the San Francisco Bay Area. These writers mentioned that the development of 
medicine engendered the emergence of various specialties forming new medical 
associations which started competing with each other, thereby creating competing 
norms and in consequence an increasing fragmentation of this health care system. 
Extending this reasoning to governance structure, we can assume that fragmentation 
increases as it is characterized by various funding sources, multiple levels of 
governance (i.e. accountability is diffused) and shared funding between private and 
public sources.  
In my cases, I observed a higher rate of diffusion in Switzerland than in Quebec 
probably because the former is more fragmented than the latter. This higher rate does 
not appear to be peculiar to the PET scanner and is thus unlikely to be merely 
idiosyncratic. Indeed, the higher number of MRI and CT scanners (see table 3.6) in 
Switzerland suggests that the diffusion pattern of the PET scanner may reflect 
struggles and opportunistic behaviors that may be generalized to other technologies.  
                                                     
45 Scott (2004) adds a further dimension of the coherence of a field, namely the consensus in institutional logics. This 
dimension does not concord with our observation that many institutional logics can co-exist in an institutional 
environment and that consensus appears to be unlikely. 
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In Switzerland, the higher degree of fragmentation of the governance structure in 
financial accountability and in availability of public and private regimes allows more 
freedom and regulative slack to institutional actors which enabled them to select the 
regime they wanted in order to accelerate adoption (proposition 3). The more 
fragmented picture of the Swiss governance structure contrasts with the more 
coherent governance structure of Quebec where decision-making and financial 
processes involved in the adoption of complex technology are largely centralized. In 
this case, the coherence of the governance structure restricted the diffusion of the 
PET scanner, at least in the short term, because authorities had financial incentives, 
and the power, to keep control over this technology (see proposition 4). Thus, it 
appears that both fragmentation and an environment conducive to competition 
facilitate the diffusion of innovation: if the former generates a higher number of 
opportunities for eluding government restrictions, the latter provides incentives.  
Some health economists echoed this concept of fragmentation in terms of an 
increased participation of private funding, private insurance, and private delivery 
which is expected to lower controls in health care systems and implicitly to diminish 
the efficiency of the system. As Evans (1984: 336) remarks: 
“Canadian past and United States present experience with multiple funding 
sources, mixed public and private insurance and self-pay, suggests that such a 
shift [dismantling Medicare i.e. universal coverage administrated by the State] 
would significantly redistribute wealth from ill to well, high-risk to low-risk 
people, and patients to providers. It would probably expand the volume of 
services provided, while making access more dependent on income. The key 
thing it would not do, however is constrain expenditure. It would not answer 
the question of how much to spend, other than by the professionals’ answer – 
more.”  
Thus, dismantling the centralized Medicare program is equivalent to increasing 
fragmentation by encouraging the provision of care, health insurance and funding 
through private sources. Although not directly invoking the impact of private 
participation on the diffusion of medical innovations, Evans’ thoughts suggest that 
abandoning this centralized program may encourage opportunistic behavior from 
professionals.  
Besides increasing the diffusion rate of innovation, fragmented governance structure 
seems to be less efficient in the use of expensive and complex technology. Indeed, 
given the number of PET scans in each jurisdiction, it is apparent that the number of 
scans per machine is lower in Switzerland than in Quebec. As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, this implies that Switzerland under-uses its machines, with the 
consequence that health care costs are unduly increased by the duplication of services 
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(Robinson, Garnick et al. 1987; Dranove, Shanley et al. 1992; Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 2000), as the result of a medical arms race (Foote 1992; Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 2000). 
My results on the higher rate of diffusion and the lower efficiency in the use of 
technology of fragmented governance structure echoes the work of health economists 
who claim that more centrally governed health care systems are more effective in 
controlling costs than more market-based health care systems (Intignano 2001). 
Hence, my observations may serve as a hologram of what happens at a macro level. 
Indeed, fragmented health care systems such as those in the USA (15.0%), Switzerland 
(11.5%) or Germany (11.1%) have the tendency to show higher health expenditure as 
a share of GDP than centralized health care systems such as those in the UK (7.7%) 
or Canada (9.9%) (OECD 2006). 
Having described in the first sections how institutional logics constrained and enabled 
actors and how the degree of coherence of the governance structure affected actors’ 
behavior, the next section explores how governance structure and institutional logics 
interact through institutional testing. 
6.5 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
ALIGNED THROUGH INSTITUTION TESTING 
Beyond the pragmatic issue of the spread of technological innovations, the approach 
and findings of this study have some broader implications for institutional theory. The 
study shows how institutional structures and meanings may manifest themselves in the 
context of specific decisions within an organizational field. The particular decisions 
considered here required interactions and negotiations among multiple institutional 
agents embedded within the same environment. Thus, the type of analysis conducted 
in this study could be extended to multi-agent decisions in other institutional settings 
concerned with similar or different kinds of economic activity. Specifically, I argue 
that governance structures influence these processes by determining the patterns of 
material resources and authority available to actors in their struggles for control over 
decisions that concern them, while institutional logics constitute the discursive 
resources on which agents may legitimately and creatively draw to give meaning to 
their actions.  
My results show that the making of meaning through theorization was an important 
activity. While meaning systems are indeed crucial in institutional analysis, I argue with 
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Scott (2008) that attention should also be paid to the structural arrangements 
surrounding and supporting them and to the multiple ways in which institutional 
logics and governance structures interact. This interrelation (between governance 
structures and multiple institutional logics) in these health care organizational fields 
generated both struggles for control and struggles for meaning within and between 
institutional logics. The nature and outcomes of these struggles, as well as the way in 
which they are resolved (through discourse or through the mobilization of material 
resources) may provide hints as to the direction of future institutional shifts or 
institutional maintenance. I now identify the possible implications of the study for 
institutional maintenance and institutional change.  
In this study, I focused mainly on how institutional environments influenced the 
dynamics of technology diffusion rather than on how these processes might eventually 
influence institutional environments. Yet the phenomenon of institution testing 
identified in both Quebec and Switzerland where entrepreneurial actors contested 
existing regulatory constraints (through unilateral action in one case and legal 
challenge in the other) suggests that there are potential reciprocal influences.  
In these particular cases, the underlying normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy of 
the institution testing actions ultimately overruled regulatory legitimacy (see 
proposition 5). Faced with a contest they felt they could not win, government actors 
quickly adjusted regulatory constraints to realign them with dominant institutional 
logics, preserving rather than fundamentally changing underlying belief systems and 
governance structures. Thus the process of institution testing and adjustment 
described here largely reproduced the institutional order.  
In the literature, entrepreneurial actions which contest institutions in order to create 
new or transform extant institutions have generally been labeled institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988; Maguire, Hardy et al. 2004). Institutional 
entrepreneurs mobilize meanings and material resources and engage in battles over 
practices, resources and meaning in order to create, disrupt or transform institutional 
orders (Hardy and Maguire 2008). I believe that the connotations of this term are too 
strong for it to reflect the kinds of institution testing which I have observed.  
Although they were entrepreneurs in the sense of proactively pushing back regulatory 
boundaries, the people involved seemed motivated more by the short-term 
instrumental goal of acquiring a technology, than by a determination to disrupt 
institutions. Nevertheless, through their strategic actions and their theorizations, they 
were – though perhaps unwittingly – doing a form of “institutional work” (Lawrence 
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and Suddaby 2006) which had the potential to generate incremental institutional 
adjustment. So, too, were the government actors who moved to preserve the integrity 
of their regulations (and their own credibility) in the face of this testing. Institution 
testing and institutional work share similarities in that they assume actors are culturally 
competent and are being aware, skilful, and reflective (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) 
enough to mobilize meaning to their advantage. Like institutional entrepreneurs, 
institutional testers can construct legitimacy by adapting the innovation to wider cultural 
accounts (Hargadon and Douglas 2001).  
In their typology of institutional work, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) distinguish 
between actions which aim at creating, maintaining or disrupting institutions. Each of 
these dimensions of institutional work is composed of various forms of mechanisms. 
For example, advocacy and educating are two forms of institutional effort which are 
associated with the creation of institutions; enabling work and policing encourages the 
maintenance of institutions; and disconnecting sanctions or dissociating moral 
foundations are related to the disruption of institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). 
The assumption behind these mechanisms is that there is a political drive (DiMaggio 
1988; Oliver 1991) which explains the dynamic and change of institution and it is in 
this trend of institutional theory that my contribution lies.  
In my cases, institution testing took the form of unilateral action in Quebec and legal 
challenge in Switzerland. Both of these actions are strategic responses to institutional 
processes which defy, challenge or contest rules (Oliver 1991). While this behavior can 
be associated with the disruption of institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) or 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992), it can also contribute to the maintenance of 
institutions as long as the government, when confronted with institution testing, 
responds by incrementally adjusting its regulations to fit the new configuration 
generated. This readjustment behavior is thus a mechanism that reproduces 
institutions. This form of contest has to be distinguished from enabling work which 
refers to “the creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions” 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 230) and is typically associated with the creation of 
roles or agencies having the responsibility to ensure the ongoing legitimacy of 
institutions (Leblebici, Salancik et al. 1991). If enabling work and readjustment serve 
the same type of objectives i.e. they both preserve the integrity of rule systems, the 
former fulfils this role through coercion and by reinforcing rules, for example, by 
creating new institutional components such as agencies, while the latter adapts the rule 
system in order not to lose face. Thus, altogether institution testing and readjustment 
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complements the typology of institutional maintenance proposed by Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006).  
I suggest that episodes of institution testing and adjustment at the margins constitute 
one mechanism by which institutional frameworks may be stretched, reproduced and 
ultimately redefined in an organic and gradual manner as concrete problems and 
controversies succeed one another. Such a perspective contributes a much needed 
dynamic and recursive element to institutional analysis (Scott, 2008; Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2006). In other words, while struggles for meaning and struggles for control 
surrounding specific issues within an organizational field clearly reflect the 
institutional contexts in which they are embedded, they may also contribute to the 
recursive reproduction and adaptation of those contexts, especially when the 
boundaries of legitimate struggle are tested.  
We have seen that institution testing is a form of contestation which combined with 
readjustment constitutes a key mechanism for aligning governance structures with 
dominant institutional logics. However, the antecedents and conditions for institution 
testing need further explanation. Examining the common variables in both cases, it 
appears that the technology was legitimized and it was associated with powerful 
incentives to create a bandwagon which was stronger than regulatory forces 
(proposition 5). Besides having strong incentives and a legitimate and sufficiently 
mature technology, the availability of financial resources and the absence of sanctions 
were characteristics in both cases. The absence of sanctions and the divergence 
between the prescription of the governance structure and interests of would-be 
adopters are also factors recognized in the literature as being part of the repertoire of 
deviant behavior using defiance responses to institutional pressures (Oliver 1991).  
Merton (1957 (1949)) suggested that deviant behaviours can emerge from the 
rejection of legitimate means, legitimate cultural goals, or both. In the case of Quebec, 
institution testing is closer to what Merton calls innovation as the institutional means to 
obtain the technology was not legitimated. However, this way of categorizing deviant 
behaviour and institution testing does not hold for Switzerland. In this jurisdiction, 
institution testers used institutionalized means and had legitimated goals, but were still 
testing the governance structure. Their contestation consisted in mobilizing 
institutional logics against the governance structure. By showing that even when 
means and goals employed by actors are institutionalized, the multiple logics of 
legitimation available in the environment allows contestation to occur, which 
ultimately may stretch, reproduce, redefine or test institutional frameworks.  
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Over time, such contests can lead to more fundamental change if 
deinstitutionalization of some rules in favor of others occurs. Thus, one might 
hypothesize that in future, institution testing will be easier since there are successful 
precedents which have been tolerated and which make this type of action more 
acceptable. As Lawrence and Suddaby remark (2006: 232): 
“…without such [institutional] work, the coercive foundations for institutions 
are likely to crumble, becoming empty threats or promises rather than self-
activating means of institutional control.” 
Hence, it is possible that in time such institution testing leads to more profound shifts 
not only in structures but also in institutional logics. Moreover, institutional change 
engendered by institution testing is more likely to appear if there is no external 
sanction (Oliver 1991). For example, the fragility of the government’s stance in 
blocking technology adoptions in the Quebec health care system is starkly revealed by 
this case study. This is similar to the institutional work of disconnecting sanctions which is 
associated with disrupting institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).  
6.6 LIMITATIONS, DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
It would be inappropriate to judge this type of inductive work using deductive criteria. 
However, generalization is always at the hub of qualitative research debate. While 
inductive study can make theoretical generalization (Yin 2003), statistical 
generalization is not realistic. Consequently, the conclusions of this research do not 
have the pretentiousness to be applicable to the diffusion of all innovations, although 
it certainly finds an echo in the diffusion of expensive diagnostic medical technology 
such as MRI and CT scanners. Furthermore, the dynamics of contestation and 
readjustment can probably be observed in many other situations where institutional 
actors mobilize institutional logics for purposes of self-interest to make governments 
bow before demands from different stakeholders. As Tuohy (1999: 116) remarks:  
“In very broad terms, state actors function within systems in which those in 
command ultimately are dependent upon political support and therefore seek to 
accommodate a range of interests and opinions sufficient to maintain a coalition 
of support.” 
Thus, although such generalizations must be made with circumspection, I suspect that 
this study reflects a multitude of situations engaging actors competing for scarce 
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resources and, more importantly, it calls for more research on the struggles for 
meaning and for control.  
One strength of this comparative study is the similarity of the size of the population 
and life expectancy in both jurisdictions. This resemblance renders the comparison 
attractive. Although I strictly follow the traditional guidelines of scholars in qualitative 
analysis and case studies (Eisenhardt 1989; Langley 1999; Patton 2002; Yin 2003), 
comparing two jurisdictions necessarily entails differences that may have colored the 
dynamics of the diffusion of innovations. For example, one major difference between 
jurisdictions is the size of their territory. In Quebec, the distances between centres are 
huge. This may have influenced struggles for meaning and the type of theorization 
privileged by actors. The stronger financial capacity of Switzerland may also have 
impacted on the diffusion pattern of the PET scanner. This capacity might have been 
translated into a wider and faster diffusion of the PET scanner. Nevertheless, since 
strong vertical struggles were observed between the governments and professionals 
and actors relied on strategies to bypass regulations in both cases, it seems that the 
difference in financial capacity does not invalidate my results. 
Participation in interviews was excellent. Only one person in each jurisdiction refused 
to be interviewed. Given that many interviewees had Swiss German as their mother 
tongue, language was one of the main issues affecting interviews surrounding data 
collection. Indeed, the use of English might have impoverished their narrative. Also, 
the translation of narratives from French speaking interviewees to English may 
contain some imperfections. Despite this limitation, interviews and narratives were of 
sufficiently good quality to generate valid theory. 
Directions for future research. This thesis is one of the few studies which considers how a 
wide range of institutional logics affects the struggle for meaning involved in the 
diffusion of innovations. In my view, more research on how institutional environment 
affect the diffusion of different types of innovations is required. Finer-grained analysis 
is further needed to achieve a better understanding of how different institutional 
logics may clash in competing theorizations. While the fragmentation of the 
governance structure is somehow the corollary of multiple competing institutional 
logics, scholars have been more inclined to study institutional change and institutional 
logics. Clearly, the literature shows important deficits as to the study of the impact of 
fragmentation of governance structure and institutional logics on the diffusion of 
innovations. Further study of the interaction between governance structure and 
institutional logics is also necessary. Although studies on the structuration of 
organizational fields have been made, much more work is required in this direction.  
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While this thesis answers the call from scholars to investigate further the role of the 
institutional environment on the diffusion of innovation in health care (Fitzgerald, 
Ferlie et al. 2002; Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2004; Gelijns, Brown et al. 2005), the wide 
variety of jurisdictions, governance structure, institutional logics, and institutional 
actors can produce different patterns of negotiation and diffusion and these would 
also need to be documented. 
The legitimation of technology is also clearly under-studied. With only few exceptions 
(Leblebici, Salancik et al. 1991; Hargadon and Douglas 2001; Munir and Phillips 
2005), legitimation as a discursive strategy would need much more attention from 
scholars. I also rejoin Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 234) who claim that most of the 
institutional literature focuses on institution diffusion and that few scholars have 
investigated institutional maintenance. This issue needs also more study. 
Consequently, more work is required on institution testing. While contestation and 
readjustment constitutes one key mechanism behind institution maintenance, more 
studies are needed to observe how this mechanism play out in other settings. 
Furthermore, antecedents of institution testing deserve more attention from 
researchers. More cases have to be explored to identify the characteristics of institution 
testers, and under which conditions this behavior appears. 
Practical implications. Given that struggles for control and struggles for meaning seems 
to be inherent to the diffusion of expensive and complex innovations, governments 
could invite organizations to submit proposals in order to better identify which 
technology should be bought and by whom. This would allow interested hospitals to 
elaborate arguments to convince the government that they should be the recipient of a 
specific technology and it may also help government to establish priorities. Another 
avenue could be to involve different stakeholders (doctors, insurance companies, 
patients, government) in the decision process to adopt different technology. Clinical 
and economic criteria could be elaborated to assess the state of evidences related to 
specific innovations. If these criteria are not met, reimbursement of procedures 
involving this technology should not be granted.  
Regulations like certificate-of-need should also be harmonized and embrace both the 
private and the public sector. As long as regulations are not harmonized, actors will 
always prefer to operate where they can derive more benefits. Moreover, my cases 
clearly show that the absence of sanction is a signal that institutional actors can act in 
their own interest without suffering negative consequences. Therefore, it is clear that 
without sanctions authorities cannot control or encourage the dissemination of 
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innovations in a rational way. These practical implications for authorities can clearly 
contribute to better control the sometimes chaotic diffusion of innovations and as a 
consequence decrease unjustified health care expenditure.  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have examined the diffusion process for a bandwagon technology, the 
PET scanner – a complex medical technology –, in two different health care systems, 
one of which is more market-oriented and the other more centrally managed by a 
public agency. I find that diffusion proceeded more rapidly in Switzerland than in 
Quebec, but that processes in both jurisdictions are characterized by intense struggles 
among providers and between providers and public agencies.  
While governments in both jurisdictions tried to manage the diffusion process, intense 
bandwagon pressures undermined these attempts, though in different ways. For 
example, in Switzerland, public hospitals found innovative ways to bypass opposition 
from cantonal authorities by creating private initiatives and collaborations where 
different rules applied. In Quebec, government inertia prompted one teaching hospital 
to adopt the technology without official government consent. The forms of strategic 
behavior used by adopters can also be related to institutionalized value systems. In 
Quebec, the high legitimacy of quality-of-care considerations established by the health 
technology assessment report was sufficient to override regulatory constraints, 
rendering institution testing possible. In Switzerland, shared beliefs in the values of 
the free market contributed to legitimizing the behavior. In both cases, the normative 
legitimacy of the technology and powerful incentives that were associated with it were 
sufficient to override regulatory forces.  
My results suggest that the institutional environment influences these processes by 
determining the patterns of material resources and authority available to actors in their 
struggles to control the technology strategically, and by constituting the discursive 
resources or institutional logics on which actors may legitimately draw in their 
struggles to give meaning to the technology in line with their interests and values. This 
reasserts that attributes of technology are not the only determinants of diffusion 
(Munir and Phillips 2005), but that the whole spectrum of interests surrounding 
diffusion has to be considered (Denis, Hébert et al. 2002; Fitzgerald, Ferlie et al. 
2002). This study shows how institutional structures and meanings manifest 
themselves in the context of specific decisions within an organizational field, and 
reveals the ways in which governance structures may be contested and realigned when 
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they conflict with interests that are legitimized by dominant institutional logics. It was 
argued that this form of contestation, that I call institution testing, and readjustment at 
the margins constitute one mechanism by which institutional frameworks are tested, 
stretched and reproduced or redefined. 
In order to understand the dynamic of institutional environment and its impact on 
diffusion, cultural and structural elements have to be taken into account (Scott 2008). 
While the former provide interpretive schemas (Ranson, Hinings et al. 1980; Barley 
1986), the latter define the position and power of actors in a given organizational field. 
If I had considered only structural elements, my results would have suggested that 
only the position of actors in the systems matter and I would have concluded that the 
adoption by small private clinics, which opened up the diffusion, was idiosyncratic to 
this case. By considering only cultural elements, I might have wrongly concluded that 
institutional logics alone are sufficient to explain the dynamics of the diffusion of 
innovations.  
Overall, the study shows that institutional contexts do indeed influence the patterns of 
diffusion and adoption of technologies through their impact on decision structures 
and available meanings. However, the underlying pressures for adoption associated 
with the bandwagon technology remain, giving rise to intense vertical and horizontal 
struggles whose form and outcomes may change but whose processual dynamics are 
remarkably similar. 
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Interview Guide for the Diffusion of the PET scanner in Switzerland 
1. Présentation 
1.1. Cheminement de carrière? 
1.2. Responsabilités actuelles / à l’époque de l’adoption du TÉP? 
2. L’innovation 
2.1. Qu’est-ce que la TÉP? 
2.2. Pour quels patients (indications) recommanderiez-vous le TÉP? 
3. Réseau 
3.1. Quelles connaissances ou expérience aviez-vous de la TÉP avant son adoption par 
votre organisation?  
3.2. Quelles ont été vos sources d’information qui vous ont convaincu ou non d’adopter 
la TÉP? 
3.3. Qui avait les connaissances / l’expérience de la TÉP à qui vous ou votre 
organisation s’est référées avant l’adoption? 
3.4. Que représente cette personne au sein de l’organisation (compétence, charisme…)? 
4. Processus d’adoption 
4.1. Qu’est-ce qui a stimulé l'intérêt de la TÉP comme nouvelle technologie 
diagnostique : 
4.1.1. en Suisse? 
4.1.2. dans la région? 
4.1.3. dans votre établissement?  
4.1.3.1. Données scientifiques 
4.1.3.2. Qualité des soins 
4.1.3.3. Diminution des coûts hospitaliers 
4.1.3.4. Meilleure efficience 
4.1.3.5. Stakeholders 
4.1.3.6. Réputation 
4.1.3.7. Profits 
4.2. La position de votre organisation face à cette innovation? 
4.3.   département? 
4.3.1. Pourquoi?  
4.3.2. Depuis quand? 
4.4. Pouvez-vous identifier les groupes internes impliqués dans le dossier? 
4.5. Votre rôle dans l’adoption de la TÉP au niveau de votre organisation, de la Suisse? 
4.6. Décrire comment s’est déroulée l’adoption de la TÉP en Suisse?  
4.6.1. Événements clés 
4.6.2. Acteurs clés 
4.7. Comment en êtes-vous arrivé à adopter la TÉP dans votre établissement?  
4.8. Qui sont (ont été) les promoteurs / à l’adoption de la TÉP?  
4.9.  opposants? 
4.9.1. Radiologues, médecins, infirmières 
4.9.2. Commune 
4.9.3. Canton 
4.9.4. Confédération 
4.9.5. Groupes de patients 
4.10. Quels bénéfices perçoivent ces groupes dans l’adoption de la TÉP?  
4.11.  risques 
4.12. Quel est (sont) l’argument clé qui a convaincu vous ou vos collègues?  
4.13. Le ou les éléments qui ont soulevé le plus de enthousiasme / face à l’adoption de la 
TÉP? 
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4.14. Le ou les éléments qui ont soulevé le plus de résistance / face à l’adoption de la 
TÉP? 
4.15. L’adoption de la TÉP se fait-il par des canaux formels ou informels? Comment? 
5. Impact de l’adoption 
5.1. La TÉP a engendré quel type de changement dans la pratique des professionnels 
(médecins, infirmières, préposés) ? 
5.1.1. Organisation du travail 
5.1.2. Heures de travail 
5.1.3. Charge de travail 
5.1.4. Relation avec le patient / intervenant 
5.1.5. Responsabilité médicale envers patients 
5.1.6. Coûts pour le système de santé 
5.1.7. Coûts assumés par les patients 
5.1.8. Rémunération des professionnels 
5.2. En quoi l’adoption de la TÉP change-t-elle les rôles, responsabilités et pouvoir des 
acteurs (changement organisationnel)? 
6. Environnement institutionnel 
6.1. Pouvez-vous identifier la position des principaux groupes / organisations 
institutionnels qui interviennent dans ce dossier? 
6.2. Quel a été le rôle […] dans l’adoption de cette technologie par votre organisation? 
6.3. pour les autres organisations? 
6.3.1. Confédération Suisse 
6.3.2. Cantons / Santé publique 
6.3.3. Communes 
6.3.4. Politiques de santé 
6.3.5. Incitatifs financiers 
6.3.6. Incitatifs politiques 
6.3.7. Hôpitaux de la région  
6.3.8. Association des hôpitaux / professionnelles / de médecine nucléaire (AMN) 
6.3.9. Organismes privés 
6.3.10. Organismes communautaires 
6.3.11. Organisations de patients 
6.3.12. Réseau / Agence d’évaluation des technologies 
6.3.13. Office fédéral des assurances sociales 
6.3.14. Compagnies d’assurance 
6.3.15. Institut Suisse des produits pharmaceutiques 
6.3.16. Organisme régulant le nucléaire 
6.4. La TÉP a engendré quel type de changement pour le système de santé Suisse?  
6.4.1. Coûts pour le système de santé 
6.4.2. Coûts assumés par les patients 
6.5. Quel impact a eu l’adoption du TÉP sur la dynamique régionale? 
7. Controverses, bénéfices et désavantages  
7.1. Selon vous, existe-t-il suffisamment de preuves scientifiques et/ou cliniques 
concernant l’efficacité de la TÉP? Pourquoi? 
7.2. Quels sont les aspects du TÉP qui sont controversés ou qui pourraient l’être? 
7.2.1. Coûts 
7.2.2. L’efficacité d’autres méthodes diagnostiques 
7.2.3. Relations entre les professionnels / spécialistes 
8. Autres 
8.1. Qui au Canton, industrie privée, Direction générale 
8.2. À quels endroits la TÉP est-elle utilisée? Depuis quand? Autres informateurs? 
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CONSENT FORM – PET SCANNER 
 
Being asked to participate to this research project, please read carefully the following 
text. Feel free to ask any question you might have to the interviewer before taking 
your final decision to participate to this research.  
 
Title of the Research: Institutional Environment and the Diffusion of Complex 
Innovations in Health Care 
 
Identification of the Research Team Members: 
 
Ann Langley, HEC Montreal, Full Professor; 514-340-7748; ann.langley@hec.ca 
Alberto Holly, HEC Lausanne, Full Professor; +41 (0)21 692 34 82; alberto.holly@unil.ch 
Stéphane Guérard, HEC Lausanne, PhD student; +41 (0)21 692 33 18; 
stephane.guerard@unil.ch 
  
Short Description of the Research Project: 
 
This research will develop a better understanding of the dynamic of contextual factors 
intervening in the diffusion pattern of complex innovations in the health care sector. It will 
strive to appreciate why an apparently desirable complex innovation - the PET scanner - 
diffuses more easily in one jurisdiction over another. To do so, Switzerland and Quebec 
institutional environments are to be compared. Taking into account the institutional 
environment, this study will certainly lead to defining more realistic health care policies. 
 
In this context, you are invited to participate to an interview of 60 to 90 minutes which will be 
recorded. The themes of the interview will be: the mechanic of the PET scanner technology; 
the adoption and diffusion process of this technology; the impact of the institutional 
environment; the actors involved in the adoption; its impact on the organization of work; and 
controversies, benefits and disadvantages of the PET scanner. 
 
The Respect of Ethical Principals: 
 
You can be sure that all information you provide will stay confidential. All persons who will 
have access to this information have already signed a confidentiality commitment. These 
persons are Ann Langley, Alberto Holly, Stéphane Guérard, and the person in charge of 
transcribing the interview. The files containing data and transcriptions are to be kept in a safe 
place. Moreover, no information allowing retracing the identity of participants will be divulged 
at any moment. Considering the themes that will be explored and the measures of 
confidentiality taken, participating to this research project should be without prejudice to you, 
and should not provide you with direct benefits. 
 
Finally, in the eventuality that the management of your organization gave its consent for this 
research to take place, and that your name was suggested for you to participate, you must not, 
in any case, feel you have to participate to this research. If you refuse to participate, your 
decision will not be communicated to your employer. Your participation is totally voluntary. 
 
Signature of the Participant: 
 
Having read and understood the above text, and having had the opportunity to receive 
supplementary information, I consent to participate to an interview lead by Stéphane Guérard. 
I know that I can refuse to answer any question. Also, I know that I can put an end to the 
interview, which will cancel my consent and will forbid the researcher to use the collected data 
in this interview.  
 
 
Name and first name of the participant:  ______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signature of the participant: ________________________ Date (dd/mm/yyyy) : _________ 
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EXAMPLES OF DATA ANALYSIS 
  1
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
Stand-alone PET 
Access-based logic 
Promoters: Regional hospitals, Association of Nuclear Doctors 
PET-CT 
Quality-based logic 
Promoters: Teaching hospitals 
What to adopt? 
Definition of the 
innovation 
 
 PET as a proven clinical tool needed by all regardless of location 
« La TEP c’est une instrumentation qui est avant tout clinique. » 
 PET-CT as a high-performing proven clinical and research tool 
“PET-CT is a research and clinical tool” 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation 
essentially grounded in 
equity of access-based 
arguments vs. quality-
based arguments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competing 
interpretations of 
efficiency-based logic 
tied to access-based and 
quality-based arguments 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric 
naturalization arguments 
 PET scan for all 
 
"Chemotherapy is hard as a treatment. That's why with the PET scanner, 
we can evaluate whether local radiotherapy or chemotherapy would be 
better and protect the child from suffering. [...] Just think if you have a 12 
year-old child who needs radiotherapy and you have to send them to the big 
city. It's torture." 
« Ça a pas de bon sens prendre des enfants de 2 ans de l’hôpital F [de la 
région A] et les transférer à l’hôpital THB. »  
« L’hôpital THB avait une certaine expertise mais là, on est pas pour acheter 
une flotte d’autobus pour transférer la province à l’hôpital THB. » 
« c’est une question de qualité de médecine. [Ne pas avoir de PET] c’est de 
la mauvaise médecine d’un point de vue éthique. » 
« Le TEP c’est incontournable » 
 
 Low purchase costs and lower travel costs with greater equity 
and access 
"Oncology is permanent. You have your cancer, you come back, you are re-
evaluated. There's a lot of travelling. So the PET will allow the 
regionalization of care, keeping resources, people, and avoiding excessive 
travel costs."  
"The Association favours the dedicated PET cameras that are twice as 
cheap [than PET-CT], but everyone would get one."  
"[With PET] we can save $15,000-$20,000 for people we operate on 
unnecessarily." 
« Le cout d’acquisition et d’opération est moins dispendieux. » 
 Better quality diagnoses 
 
“A PET scanner will locate the tumor… in the body but not in a specific way. It will say: it 
is there. But with the CT, we can take a tomographic image which will locate the tumor in 
the tissue so we can see exactly where it is.” 
“We would pay the extra because there are not only significant medical benefits in getting 
PET-CT but there’s actually a cost justification for reducing the scan time using CT.” 
« Il y a quand meme un avantage quand meme un avantage de précision. »  
« Avantage clinique, plus grande capacité locale. » 
« Mais ils ne comprennent pas qu’il y a encore un gros développement qui est à faire [et 
qu'il ne faut pas en mettre partout]. » 
 
 
 
 
 Lower cost per examination with higher quality 
 
"So, typically, if you look today at a typical hospital they take may be 15-20 minutes to do 
the attenuation correction a piece [with a standalone PET scanner] versus 30 seconds [with 
a PET-CT]. […] [Moreover], The FDG cost per patient is significantly less."  
"An ordinary PET scanner can do about six or seven patients per day. With the PET-CT, 
we can go up to 12 so we can double the volume. " 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inevitability of PET-CT 
"[In the conference] basically nobody was speaking of standalone PET. Nobody. [...] I 
can’t think of a single institution that has actively gone to tender for standalone PET." 
 
“...in that meeting were people like professor X from London from United kingdom. He 
has been the president of the European association of nuclear medicine, a very large 
scientific body of people and they have no doubt that the PET-CT is the way to go.” 
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Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Distribution based on 
equity (access-based 
logic) vs. competence 
(quality-based logic). 
 
 PET for all, coherence with prior distribution of oncology centres 
"Better give everyone a good Chrysler than giving a Ferrari to 3 or 4 people, 
that's what we wanted at the Association."  
«C'est un examen du noyau dur de l'hôpital. Ça devrait être public, a affirmé 
le Dr A. Le TEP devrait être installé partout où il y a de l'oncologie. »  
"With the government, we proposed that the 15,000 exams that were 
necessary per year in oncology, that the 12 first pieces of equipment be 
installed in the regional centres for oncology as the government had already 
done it." 
 « Ce qu’on a proposé c’est qu’il y ait un déploiement dans les centres où il y 
avait de la radiothérapie pour que l’unité soit en médecine nucléaire. » 
 Competence has to be developed first before allowing adoption 
“They’ll say, « I am a Cessna pilot, I can also pilot a 747.” People will say that, but it makes 
no sense! (..) They’ll say: “It’s not complicated – I’ll put it on automatic pilot.” OK, but is 
that the function of a 747 pilot? So you’ll place your life in the hands of someone who 
doesn’t have the expertise necessary to make complex and major adjustments that a 
technology like that requires.” 
« Les gens qui n’ont pas de formation dans le domaine de la TEP, qui ont tout de même 
une formation en médecine nucléaire, ils pensent que c’est nécessairement tout facile. Ils 
minimisent le travail de mise en œuvre. Ils voient les belles images, ça a l’air facile et ils 
disent je suis capable de faire ça. » 
« On a toujours tendance au Québec de vouloir en saupoudrer un peu partout. Le PET 
scan ce n’est pas juste un appareil. Il y a tout l’aspect humain qui est autour de ça. L’aspect 
humain ça veut dire des médecins qui sont capables de lire, des techniciens qui sont 
capables… des physiciens qui sont capables de l’opérer, du personnel technique pour le 
faire fonctionner. Ça c’a ne se crée pas en deux temps trois mouvements. Il faut former des 
équipes centrales et après décentraliser ça. Idéalement, ça serait de dire oui on prévoit en 
avoir 10 ou 12 au Québec. Sauf qu’on va faire ça par étape. On va commencer par bien 
équiper les gros centres universitaires avec des bonnes équipes qui vont être capable de 
former d’autres équipes par la suite et ainsi de suite. La pensée magique de dire on va en 
ouvrir 10 demain matin puis que ça va tout marcher là, ça c’a va tuer la technique. Ça c’est 
garantie que ça tue la technique et dans deux ans on en parle plus. Parce qu’il faut que ça 
s’implémente, il faut que ce soit progressif. » 
 
 
  3
 
Conditions behind Institutional Testing 
Questions Factors Dimensions Citations 
What caused institutional 
testing? 
Legitimacy of the 
technology 
Large diffusion 
abroad 
"Donc, les évidences.. Mais il y a .. est-ce que y a également … le fait que.. je sais pas… la clinique Mayo aux États-Unis… si soudainement y avaient un PET… est-ce que le 
fait…que des grandes … institutions. Ça fait partie de l’évidence. Quand tout le monde dit – On procède – on achète… on y va..." 
   Adequacy of the 
technology inside 
this organizational 
field 
"Donc... nous autres, on a pris l’étude de l’Agence d’évaluation des technologies... donc on s’est servi de ça pour aller à la Régie disant que toutes les recommandations étaient 
favorables là.. . qu'on devrait peut-être nous autoriser à aller de l’avant avec ce projet-là.. Puis on serait intéressé à avoir du financement pour l’achat. Parce qu'au moment.. au début, 
on n'avait pas aucune confirmation d’achat de... financement de personne." 
   Cancer as a 
prioritiy disease 
"Parce que… tu te vois tu… Mets toi… dans les culottes du ministre de la santé je sais pas qui… qui s’en vient nous dire Aie ça là! Vous allez sortir ça de là… pis vous vous en 
servirez pas. Ça, c'est risqué business… si ça va dans les médias… ça sort… - parce que c'est sûr qu'on aurait eu nous… … des explications très censées et très logiques… à donner à 
la population…. Le gouvernement aurait pu avoir l’air … pas mal épais là! C'était pas… C’est.. le terrain avait été assez miné… que ça aurait pu… leur sauter dans le visage. Fait que 
tu peux pas vraiment… surtout que… y a tellement de cas de cancer… Et tu dis au patient cancéreux… - B'en écoutez… nous, on était prêts à vous offrir… un service … tout à fait 
pertinent mais le ministère… a décidé que vous l’auriez pas ! !!!!! Politiquement là… faut que tu fasses attention!" 
What are the necessary 
conditions? 
1. Evolution of the 
technology 
 "Dans le temps… fallait avoir une source… de FDG.. ça a pris du temps à avoir… fallait avoir une source de FDG parce que j'ai beau avoir… ouvrir un TEP…. si j'ai pas une 
source fiable… de FDG ça me donne rien!  Pis y en a une qui avait été créée à … Albany N'Y… qui était capable de nous fournir… La compagnie T et c'est la raison pour laquelle 
on s’est dit –Okay – une fois qu'on a notre source, on procède!" 
  2. Financial resources  "Si on avait pas eu ce donateur là, dans le processus, c'aurait été complètement différent – je pourrais pas dire comment… mais c'est clair que c'est ce qui a été l'élément déclencheur 
ici…" 
  3. No more legitimate 
ways available 
 "The deployment of PET scanners, I've been hearing about that for four years, and another announcement arrives every 15th of the month. It's the classic running gag. I've stopped 
believing in that." 
  4. No regulative or 
normative sanctions 
 "Et… le processus d’acquisition d'équipement par la fondation, ça c'est pas nouveau.. ça s'est fait avant… et ça s’est fait à plusieurs reprises… je dirais contre le gré du ministère et 
de l'Agence… mais c'est comme ça que ça se faisait. Alors c'était juste que dans le fond, c'était… le même principe qui s’appliquait mais pour une autre technologie…" 
 
"Alors.. on avait.. la nette impression qu'on portait préjudice à personne… puisque la caméra était sous utilisée et que… on faisait un certain nombre de cas pour le privé. Et… et 
donc, on pouvait exécuter plus de cas… et on réussissait à fonctionner un peu.. pis à… offrir un service." 
 5. Alignment with 
mission of the 
organization 
 "Mais c'est notre rôle d'être en avant… C’est nous autres qui forment les étudiants … pas de ce temps-ci.. mais en général… Alors.. y a des médecins… autant les cliniciens que des 
nucléistes… qui disaient – faudrait qu'on ait cette technologie là au teaching hospital THA1." 
What are the facilitating 
factors? 
Competence inside the 
organization 
  Et c'est évident que quand t’as des médecins spécialisés en tes murs pour… cette technologie là.. eux autres en veulent une caméra … sont formés pour ça!
Why did it spread? Mimetic isomorphism  GHA, Y ont fait exactement la même chose que nous autres. Y ont répliqué le même modèle.
  Competition between 
organizations 
  "[Il y a de la compétition avec A3] Parce que un centre universitaire... comme le nôtre... veut être à l’avant-garde, veut être à la fine pointe des développements technologiques et 
thérapeutiques. Et puis je pense que l’oncologie, c'est un.. secteur de pointe. Et il existe une compétition entre le GHA et le THA2.... savoir qui va dominer le programme 
d’oncologie dans le secteur anglophone [dans la région A]. Donc nous autres [A2], en tant que centre universitaire... on pense que ça nous revient. C'est sûr que on veut travailler 
avec le GHA. GHA, je sais pas si ils veulent travailler avec nous autres... Mais c'est sûr que nous, on veut travailler en complémentarité. Mais on aurait certainement été en 
désavantage stratégique qu’une TEP soit installée au GHA... avant le THA2. Je pense que .. de là, l’importance que mon patron a accordée à aller de l’avant avec ce projet là pour 
être sûr qu’on est à l’avant-garde et non pas... en désavantage." 
Why was it a successful 
strategy (consequences)? 
Speed up adoption 
process 
  Adopting without the consent of the government is a strategy to get a PET. Otherwise, we would nave not get one or wait a long time before getting one.
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